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 The study Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 
2006 seeks to identify the key obstacle to sustainable 
growth of the Serbian economy.  Identifying the 
key obstacle for growth does not mean that solving 
this problem will solve all the problems of growth 
in Serbia.  Policy making to maximize sustainable 
growth is inherently a sequence of individual steps. 
This project’s analysis aims to guide policy makers to 
the next best step for Serbia.  
 Through careful application of Growth Diagnostics, 
we conclude that the next steps to achieve sustainable 
growth in Serbia should be devoted to strengthening 
property rights.  If entrepreneurs are able to enforce 
contracts, and feel that their property is secured from 
by judicial certainty and not corruption, investors 
will have greater incentives to invest their resources 
in more productive use of their property. In many 
ways, the state itself will be the greatest beneficiary 
of enhanced property rights, as the state is by far the 
single largest minority shareholder in Serbia.  
 Competitiveness 2006 utilizes the methodology 
of Growth Diagnostics, developed by American 
economists Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausman, and 
Andres Velasco.  Growth Diagnostics seeks to identify 
the key bottlenecks to growth in a particular country 
at a particular time, through a comprehensive 
evaluation of market and institutional variables. 
Application of the Growth Diagnostics model makes 
it possible to systematically establish in which areas—
low corporate returns, low appropriability, or the high 
costs of finance— are the obstacles that most impede 
growth.  
 In Serbia, since the end of 2000, there were many 
attempts to solve the question of sluggish economic 
growth as a theoretical and practical matter.  Often, 
these exercises generated long lists of issues for reform 
across many sectors, but without identification of 
any prioritization or sequencing.  Considering that 
each obstacle has a relatively autonomous causal 
force (each influences growth to some extent), such 
attempts led the government towards a growth 
strategy that was based on a frontal attack on all 
obstacles simultaneously.  
Competitiveness of the 
Serbian Economy 2006: 
Growth Diagnostics
 The consequence was confusion in economic 
policy and the absence of a clear strategy for growth. 
Economic analysts and politicians could not agree on 
the main causes of slow growth, so the government’s 
effort was directed each month to yet another problem 
without a clear indication of whether the previous 
problem was solved.  A good example of this kind 
of  thinking resulted in the 2005 document named 
The National Strategy of Serbia for the Accession of 
Serbia and Montenegro to the European Union.  This 
is a lengthy text of over 200 pages simply lists the 
problems and areas where reform is necessary in the 
process of EU integration, without trying to ascertain 
a relationship among the problems and to single out 
the most important ones.  
 The model of growth diagnostics proposes that 
some bottlenecks to growth are more significant than 
others.  That approach is founded on the conviction 
that the government has at its disposal limited time, 
resources, and capacity to engage the problems that 
confront it.  These scarce resources of governance 
should be invested in the policy areas that will yield 
the maximum return to sustainable growth.  (More 
on the theoretical foundations of the model can be 
found in chapter 3.)
* * *
 The study is divided into three parts and seven 
chapters.  The first part identifies the current state of 
affairs in Serbia’s business environment.  Chapter 1 
presents an analysis of Serbia’s foreign trade in the 
period 2001-2005.  It contains basic data on Serbia’s 
foreign trade exchange.  It analyzes data on the foreign 
trade deficit and the structure of Serbia’s imports and 
exports.  The second part of the chapter is comprised 
of econometric analysis of the determinants of Serbia’s 
imports and exports, analysis of Serbia’s participation 
in world markets, and analysis of Serbia’s comparative 
advantages, as well as a summary of the qualitative 
characteristics of Serbia’s foreign trade exchange. 
Based on the finding that Serbia exports products 
that are labor-intensive and that few are based on 
Executive Summary
advanced technologies, the chapter reaches the 
conclusion that the Serbian economy not only does 
not export enough, but still does not show signs of 
modernization.
 Chapter 2 analyzes the microeconomic bases of 
competitiveness in the Serbian economy.  The analysis 
focuses on sectors and products that play a leading role 
in Serbia’s exports, especially emphasizing those that 
have the capability to penetrate international markets 
and contribute to the economic growth of the country. 
The results obtained in this chapter are derived from 
the application of indexes of market performance 
and analysis of national exports’ performance. 
The first index estimates multidimensional export 
performance, and the other measures the export 
performance of the national economy in the sense 
of the structure of its production, dynamics of 
international market growth, and the course of growth 
of leading exports of (other) national economies.
 The second part of the study establishes the 
diagnosis of Serbia’s economy.  Chapter 3 introduces 
the model of Growth Diagnostics on a theoretical 
level. It analyzes the fundamental goals and limits of a 
market economy and deals with first order conditions 
and implications of the general equilibrium. It 
proposes criteria for choosing the sequence of 
reforms.  It analyzes several combinations of economic 
policies.  
 The next two chapters represent an introduction 
to chapter 6, which applies the model of Growth 
Diagnostics.  Chapter 4 is concerned with analysis 
of economic policies and the institutional context in 
which the Serbian economy operates.  It establishes 
that GDP growth is uneven and that there is insufficient 
investment in the Serbian economy.  It analyzes in more 
detail the efficiency of the judicial system, corporate 
governance, the business environment, development 
of the private sector, and the state of the labor market 
after 2000.  Chapter 5 sheds light on economic policy 
and market institutions from a subjective standpoint. 
This chapter presents the results of surveys that 
confirm the positions of entrepreneurs vis-à-vis 
different factors that, directly or indirectly, influence 
the competitiveness of Serbia’s economy.  The chapter 
exclusively uses data from questionnaires that the 
World Economic Forum used for ranking Serbia on 
a worldwide list for assessing competitiveness in the 
study The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006. 
These observations are important because they reveal 
the motivations of entrepreneurs in Serbia to engage 
in export, and the number of entrepreneurs who think 
that lower prices matter more than product quality 
on international markets.  The chapter analyzes the 
attitudes of firm managers with regard to GDP growth, 
the government’s economic policies, the business 
environment, the labor market, the financial market, 
foreign competition, infrastructure, education, 
research and development, and environment.
 Chapter 6 applies the model of Growth Diagnostics 
to the Serbian economy.  The data and analysis 
found in chapters 1-5 represent the basis for analysis 
in this chapter.  The conclusion reached is that the 
bottleneck that, in the short run, restrains growth and 
greater competitiveness in the Serbian economy, can 
be identified in the area of government failures and in 
the area of micro-risks, such as the weak protection 
of property rights and corruption.  The chapter 
concludes that the key bottleneck to growth in Serbia 
today is the protection of property rights.  While a 
campaign to enhance property rights will not yield a 
perfect environment for growth in Serbia, breaking 
this bottleneck will yield significant return on growth. 
Moreover, a great number of these policy measures 
can be designed and implemented very quickly.  
 The third part of the study consists of one case 
study.  Chapter 7 significantly expands existing 
knowledge about the effects of the privatization 
program that Serbia has carried out since 2001.  The 
research attempts to answer the question whether 
the model of direct sales, mandated by the 2001 
privatization act, has led to the expected restructuring 
of enterprises, by focusing on their pre and post 
privatization competitiveness on the international 
market.  It analyzes the results of surveys of the 
organizational and financial restructuring of 80 
enterprises privatized over the period 2002-2003.  The 
chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part looks 
into results obtained on the basis of questionnaires 
that identify changes in both the areas of corporate 
governance and the method of production in 
privatized enterprises.  It concludes that privatized 
enterprises find themselves at the junction between 
defensive and innovative restructuring.  For this part, 
poor protection of property rights are identified as 
the major obstacle to restructuring.  The second part 
presents the results of financial analysis and points to 
the degree of financial consolidation of enterprises. 
The analysis identifies high production costs and 
weak financial management as the major bottlenecks 
for financial consolidation.
Executive Summary
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  It contains basic data on Serbia’s foreign trade 
exchange.  It analyzes data on the foreign trade deficit 
and the structure of Serbia’s imports and exports. 
The second part of the chapter is comprised of 
econometric analysis of the determinants of Serbia’s 
imports and exports, analysis of Serbia’s participation 
in world markets, and analysis of Serbia’s comparative 
advantages, as well as a summary of the qualitative 
characteristics of Serbia’s foreign trade exchange.  
	 1.	The	Foreign	Trade		
	 Balance	of	Serbia
 Serbia faces a very high trade deficit that reached 
the level of one-quarter of gross domestic product 
in 2005.  It is also the main determinant of the high 
current account deficit as one of the major problems 
of the Serbian economy, and which increased from 
3.3% of the GDP in 2001 to a little less than 9% of GDP 
in 2005. However, it should be noted that both values 
are absolute amounts and relatively but significantly 
improved compared to 200.1  Moreover,the reduction 
in the trade deficit in 2005 was the main factor behind 
the reduction in the current account  deficit. 
 The share of foreign trade exchange (import and 
export of goods and services) has a growing share in 
GDP, growing from 65% in 2001 to around 75% in 
2005.  The longest part of this period was characterized 
by much faster growth of imports compared to 
exports, as well as by an accelerated growth rate of 
imports of goods and services, which was a very 
unfavorable tendency. However, such a trend was 
interrupted in 2005: compared to the previous year, 
as measured by current dollars, exports of goods and 
services grew by 21%, while imports stagnated, that 
is, grew by only 1%. 
1. The Analysis of Foreign 
Trade and Competitiveness
 What is especially interesting is that the growth of 
export value has a crucial influence from the increase 
in the exports of the processing industry,2 despite 
the decline in activity experienced by the processing 
industry in the same period.3 In fact, almost all of 
the activities which achieved production growth 
also recorded an increase in export value, but many 
activities that experienced declines in production also 
exported more than the previous year.  For example, 
the production of clothing and furs during 2005 shrank 
by one-fifth compared to 200, while at the same time, 
these goods grew in export value (measured by current 
dollars) by 51%. There can be several explanations for 
such a discrepancy.  On the one hand, it is likely that 
during the year in question, some activities export the 
stocks they produced during the previous year.  But 
this cannot be a complete explanation for increased 
exports, since these stocks would certainly be exhausted 
after several months, while the statistics of the foreign 
trade shows a constant growth in export value.  The 
most probable explanation of the discrepancy is in 
inadequate recording of official statistics on trends 
in industrial production. Namely, while foreign trade 
statistics register flows in commodity exchange as 
a whole, statistics on industrial production do not 
completely cover the scope of industrial production, 
both in terms of the structure of the sample and the 
number of enterprises that actually submit data on 
production to the statistics service.
 The terms of trade5 also deteriorated after 2001 
when the value of that indicator surpassed 100.6 The 
deterioration of the terms of trade is particularly 
pronounced in 2002 and 2003, while 200 marked an 
improvement in the terms of trade, which remained 
at a similar level in 2005.  During both of these years, 
the unit values of exports and imports were higher 
than in 2001.  However, due to a greater increase in 
1  In 200, the trade deficit was almost one-third, and the current account deficit around 13%, of gross domestic product.
 2 According to preliminary data of the Republic Bureau for Statistics (RBS), the processing industry’s share of the value of commodity exports during 2005  
    was 9%, while the growth rate of that sector’s exports during the given period, relative to 200, amounts to 28%, measured in current dollars. 
3  According to the preliminary data of the Republic Bureau for Statistics (RBS), the indicator for physical volume of the processing industry in 2005 is 0.7% 
lower compared to the previous year. 
  The exceptions are tobacco products, which had significantly reduced exports even with increased production
5 The terms of trade are calculated as a ratio between the unit value of the export and the unit value of the import of goods.
6  In 2001, the unit value of exports was higher than the unit value of imports, due to a high share  of electricity, oil and other energy raw materials in commodity 
imports, which as a rule have a very low unit value, as well as due to a significant influx of donations in goods.
The analysis of foreign trade and competitiveness
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unit values for imports than exports, the terms of 
trade indicator shows a value less than one.  In line 
with that, the terms of trade index in 2005 compared 
to 2001 was less than 100, at 87. 
 The trade deficit represents the most important 
factor behind the deficit in the current account balance. 
It can be noted that in all of the observed years these 
two indicators moved in the same direction:  when the 
trade deficit grew, there was also a significant increase 
in the current account deficit, and in 2005, when the 
commodity exchange deficit fell, the current account 
deficit also declined.  These two indicators also draw 
attention to the fact that the current account deficit 
is significantly lower than the trade deficit, due to a 
constant achievement of a surplus in non-commodity 
transactions/trade suficit. 
 The most important part of non-commodity 
transactions are current transfers,  income from 
which in 2005 reached as much as 18% of GDP.  The 
income on the basis of current transfers is mostly 
made up of remittances by workers employed abroad 
and of purchases of foreign currency.  
Also significant among non-good current transactions 
are the surplus from services and the influx of donations 
from abroad.  The services surplus is to a large degree 
the result of earnings from traditional services, such 
as the transportation and construction industries, 
while tourism has had increasing significance in 
recent years.  What can be observed is that the 
 2001 2005a
I Current	account	(3+4+5+6) -3,3% -9%
1 Goods (1.1-1.2) -23,4% -23%
1.1  Export of goods FOB 15,9% 19%
1.2  Import of goods 39,3% 43%
2 Services (2.1-2.2) 3,8% 0%
2.1  Export of services 6,8% 7%
2.2  Import of sevices 3,0% 7%
3 Goods and services (1+2) -19,6% -23%
3.1  Export of goods and services (1.1.+2.1) 22,7% 26%
3.2  Import of goods and services  (1.2+2.2) 42,3% 49%
4 Income -0,2% -1%
5 Current transfers  (5.1-5.2) 11,1% 14%
5.1  Receipts 14,6% 18%
5.2  Expenses 3,5% 3%
6 Official transfers (donations) 5,5% 1%
II Capital	and	financial	transactions	(A+B) 7,8% 18%
1 FDI, net 1,5% 6%
2
Medium-term and long-term credits, net 
(2.1-2.2)
2,0% 8%
2.1   Utilization 2,3% 11%
2.2   Repayment 0,3% 3%
3 Short-term credits and deposits, net 0,7% 2%
4 Other, net 6,1% 2%
5 Commercial banks, net -2,5% 1%
III Errors and omissions, net 0,0% -1%
IV Total	balance	(I+II+III) 4,5% 8%
V Foreign currency reserves of the National Bank (increase -) -4,5% -8%
 Out of which MMF 1,2% n.a.
Table 1. Balance of Payment of Serbia, share of gross domestic product.  Source: Statistics Bulletin, National Bank of Serbia, RBS data 
and the estimates of the author. * estimate
The analysis of foreign trade and competitiveness
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demand for various business services has grown 
significantly, though they are often sought abroad 
due to a domestic market that is still insufficiently 
developed.  Because of this, the period 2001-2005 is 
characterized by a real reduction of surplus value in 
services that was, thanks to more dynamic growth in 
imports of services compared to exports, significantly 
reduced in 2005 and amounted to USD 20 million.  In 
the forthcoming period it will be possible to achieve 
sustained growth of the services surplus with a 
growth in the influx of traditional services, as well as 
with more considerable investments in tourism and 
a bigger supply of in the domestic market of those 
services that have not been sufficiently present so far. 
 Regarding donations, there has already been since 
2002 a visible tendency towards decline, both in 
absolute amount and in their significance for covering 
the current account deficit.  Also, their share in the 
value of gross domestic product has fallen from 5.5% 
in 2001 to a little over 1% in 2005.  For the foreseeable 
future, the influx of donations will keep shrinking, so 
that its importance in financing the current account 
deficit will also decline.
 The trends mentioned in connection with the 
current account for services and transfers point 
towards the necessity of sustaining positive tendencies 
on the part of the commodity exchange, in order to 
maintain the current account deficit within limits 
that do not endanger the external liquidity of the 
country. 
 For capital transactions, the most important items 
used to finance the current account deficit are foreign 
direct investments and borrowing from abroad.  The 
net influx of foreign direct investment in 2005 reached 
around USD 1.5 billion, or   6% of GDP.  Borrowing 
from abroad is a less desirable means of covering the 
current account deficit, bearing in mind that Serbia 
is already paying off foreign debt from the previous 
period,7 and that the value of the debt will to increase 
in the forthcoming years.
 Bearing in mind that the Serbian economy depends 
on the imports of raw materials and energy raw 
materials, it cannot be expected that the commodity 
imports of Serbia can be reduced if policymakers 
desire a successful restructuring of the economy, 
industrial production growth and consistent growth of 
commodity exports.  However, what can be expected 
is the reduction, perhaps even elimination, of the 
current account deficit, which should be achieved 
by a faster growth in exports of goods, surpluses on 
the part of services, and an increase in the influx of 
export-oriented foreign direct investments.
  
 The foreign trade balance share  
 in the gross domestic product
 For the needs of the analysis of the competitive 
position of Serbia’s economy it is appropriate here to 
look back at which groups of products create surplus 
in the exchange and which percentage of the gross 
domestic product is represented by these values.
 According to the 200 results, there is only one 
group of products from Standard international trade 
classification (henceforth SITC) with which the share 
of the surplus in GDP value is higher than 1%:   non-
plated rolled steel products.  Among the 7 groups of 
products that achieved a trade surplus in 200, there 
are only two groups with a surplus share in GDP 
higher than 5% (sugar, and fruits and fruit products 
excluding juices), plus one group with a % share (car 
tires).  The stated products are also the four groups 
of products with the highest share of exports from 
Serbia, so we can claim a positive finding in that 
the most important export products also create the 
highest surplus.
 However, bearing in mind that only 7 groups of 
products have created a trade surplus that, in total, 
accounts for only .8% of GDP, it can be argued that 
the value of the created surplus is far too small.
7  At the beginning of 2006, after the writing off of the remaining part of the debt by the Paris Club of Creditors, Serbia’s foreign debt amounts to around USD 
1.5 billion.
The analysis of foreign trade and competitiveness
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
11
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
12
	 	2.	 The	Dynamics	and	Structure	
of	Foreign	Trade	Exchange
 The dynamics and structure of  
 foreign trade exchange by sector and  
 area of activities’ classification
 The structure of Serbia’s commodity exports is 
dominated by processing industry products, with a 
9% share in 2005.  This high proportion has been 
achieved mostly thanks to three areas, the metal, food 
and chemical industries, which produced one-half of 
exports of goods in 2005.
that in 2005, despite the stagnation of the general 
level of the industrial production, the export of the 
processing industry grew significantly and that the 
exchange balance improved precisely thanks to these 
activities. 
 
 It is good that restructured activities are operating 
successfully and contribute to the equilibration of 
the foreign trade balance, but this is not sufficient. 
There is an ongoing process of restructuring other 
big enterprises as well, after which it can be expected 
that some of them will also successfully privatize and 
increase exports.  However, what should influence the 
growth of the commodity export much more - but has 
been missing so far - are greenfield investments.  So 
far, investments have mostly been directed at service 
activities and have occurred at modest volume, such 
that they have not had a more prominent influence 
on the foreign trade balance and improvements in the 
commodity export structure.
 The dynamics and the structure of  
 foreign trade exchange by SITC sectors 
 
 In 2001-2005, commodity exports from Serbia, 
measured by current dollars, had an average annual 
growth of 28%.  During most of this period, imports’ 
growth rate was higher than exports’ growth rate, 
because of which the indicator of the degree to 
which imports were covered by exports deteriorated 
from one year to the next.  It is encouraging that this 
unfavorable trend, judging by preliminary indicators 
of foreign trade exchange, was broken in 2005. 
Namely, very high export growth and the stagnation 
of imports in this year meant that the average growth 
rate of exports during the entire period 2001-2005 
was higher than the average growth rate of imports 
(26%).  At the same time, the extent to which imports 
were covered by exports, having fallen from 0% in 
2001 to only 33% in 200, reached 3% in 2005.  
 The dynamics of export growth differed  
 by individual groups of products
 We observe that the exports grew by an above 
average rate were the sectors that are characterized by 
the primary production or a lower degree of products 
finalization, while exports of energy raw materials, 
equipment production, and consumers goods grew at 
a rate lower than average.
 Along with these trends there is a corresponding 
level of cover of imports by exports.  Namely, with 
all the sectors that have an above average growth 
rate of exports, this indicator improved in 2005 
compared to 2001, and the converse is true, except 
in the case of animal and vegetable oils and fats, 
2001. 2005.
Pr. of basic metals 18% Pr. of basic metals 23%
Pr. of food products 
and beverages
15%
Pr. of food products 
and beverages
16%
Pr. of clothing and furs 8%
Pr. of chemicals and 
chemical products
11%
Pr. of rubber and 
plastics products
7%
Pr. of rubber and 
plastics products
8%
Pr. of chemicals and 
chemical products
7%
Pr. of other machines 
and devices
7%
Table 2. Share of the most important areas of the processing 
industry in the commodity export value.
The analysis of foreign trade and competitiveness
 Compared to 2001, there have not been any 
significant changes in the list of the most important 
activities, other than a small change in their order. 
For example, in 2005, the production of clothing, 
traditionally one of the most important exporting 
activities, ranked sixth.  One noticeable tendency is 
the growth of the concentration in exports, that is, 
the growth of the share of some of the processing 
industry areas.  For example, in 2001, the seven most 
important areas in commodity exports had a share of 
somewhat over two-thirds, while in 2005 their share 
increased to 71%.  The proportionate growth of these 
sectors is, on the one hand, the result of their export, 
but, on the other, resulting reductions in the exports 
of other activities. 
 Such occurrences are the consequence of ongoing 
restructuring processes in the processing industry. 
Namely, it appears that the areas that have mostly 
been restructured (e.g., the chemical industry), or 
where there was a significant influx of foreign capital 
(e.g., steel production), or cooperation with foreign 
partners (e.g., the production of car tires), have 
recorded correlated increases in industrial production 
and exports.  Moreover, preliminary results show 
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
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where the cover of imports by exports remained at 
approximately the same level.  What is worrying is 
that in 2005 there were only two sectors where the 
value of exports was higher than imports,8 while 
with all the others, the degree of the cover of imports 
by exports was at best 59%.  It is important that 
among the five three-digit SITC groups that have 
more than 3% share in export value, only one 
(copper production) has an index of the cover of 
imports by exports lower than 100.  It is especially 
vital that the most important group, the rolled non-
plated steel products, which made up as much as 
9.5% of total exports for 200, have 10 times greater 
value of exports than imports.  If we also take into 
account the groups which account for 2% or more of 
exports, there is a higher number of groups whose 
export earnings are lower than imports, which 
indirectly speaks to an insufficient degree of 
competitiveness, in spite of the significance they 
hold in overall exports.  This group includes many 
products of the textile industry, clothes, medicines, 
furniture, paper and cardboard.
 
 The variation of average annual rates of export 
growth of individual sectors compared to the 
average growth rate of the total export is connected 
to the change in proportions of these sectors in total 
exports.  This means that the sectors whose export 
grew with above average speed have also achieved 
growth in their share of total exports;  the converse 
is also true. 
 
 The most important export sectors in 2005 were 
products classified by materials (which made up more 
than one-third of total exports), food and livestock, 
and various final products.  What represents major 
changes compared to 2001 are the reduction of the 
participation of machines and transport equipment 
and various final products in commodity exports, 
and the increase in proportional significance of 
chemical products. 
 The trends mentioned can mostly be marked as 
unfavorable ones.  Namely, even beside the trend 
of a significant increase in exports, the trade deficit 
is high, thus leading to the lower level of export/
import ratio.  The sectors that have for the most 
part contributed to export growth and which at the 
same time also record a better cover of imports by 
exports are predominantly resource-intensive and 
labor-intensive sectors where, as a rule, there are 
products with lower value-added and predominantly 
characterized by price competition in the world 
market.  From the competitiveness point of view, 
such a situation is unfavorable, for in the structure 
of exports, there is a reduction in the proportionate 
share of precisely those groups of products on which it 
would be desirable to base the future competitiveness 
of Serbia:  technology-intensive products, as well as 
consumers products sold in markets dominated by 
competition over quality.
 The dynamics and structure of foreign  
 trade exchange by SITC areas
 The structure of exports changed somewhat in 
200 compared to 2001.  The most important area in 
exports is not clothing, but iron and steel, while the 
second and third positions, during both of the years, 
are occupied by vegetables and fruits, and non-ferrous 
metals, respectively.  The share of the first three areas 
in the value of total commodity exports in both years 
Average annual growth rate in the period 
2001-2005 (in %)
The cover of imports by exports (in %)
2001 2005
0 Food and livestock 30% 82% 132%
1 Beverages and tobacco 44% 13% 48%
2 Raw materials, except fuel 22% 49% 42%
3 Mineral fuels and lubricants 35% 6% 8%
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 24% 207% 208%
5 Chemical products 39% 20% 34%
6 Products classified by materials 34% 57% 74%
7 Machines and transportation equipment 19% 27% 17%
8 Various final products 19% 112% 81%
9 Products and transactions, not mentioned elsewhere -28% 70% 54%
Total 28% 40% 43%
Table 3. Average annual growth rate of the exports and the cover of imports by exports in the years 2001 and 200. 
Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
8 As can be seen from the table, these include food and livestock, and animal and vegetable oils and fats.
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is the same, around one-quarter, and the share of the 
first five areas is also unchanged, around 35%.  
 The change in 2005 compared to 2001 reflects the 
fact that shoes are not in the list any longer, while we 
find sugar and grains as a group not present in 2001. 
However, notwithstanding the change in significance 
of certain areas, it can be concluded that the export 
structure, analyzed by SITC areas during the period 
2001-2005 essentially has not changed, since there is 
still the dominance of agricultural products, clothing, 
metals and several more intermediary groups of 
products.  These ten areas with the biggest share of 
2005 exports, as compared to 2001, achieved an 
average annual growth of 35%, which is more than 
at the level of the entire economy, where exports had 
average annual growth of 27%. 
 These areas, if taken aggregately, create surplus in 
trade, which means that the indicator of the cover 
of imports with export has an above average value. 
More precisely, in 2005, with these ten areas, 127% 
of import value was covered by exports (while at the 
level of overall commodity exchange, this indicator 
was considerably lower, at 3%).  However, even 
with this, in the group of the ten most important 
areas there are as many as six areas which record 
deterioration in the value of this indicator compared 
to 2001, which also means that their exports, in an 
absolute amount, grew more slowly than imports. 
Such a trend can be taken as one indication of a low 
level of competitiveness of the entire economy, since 
even among the most important areas, the dominant 
export groups are those whose imports grew faster 
than exports.  The remaining four areas in 2005 that 
had a better cover of imports with exports than in 
2001 are grains, sugar, iron and steel, and plastics.
 
 The specialization index of exports and imports
 As an indicator of the specialization of the 
exchange, studies usually resort to the concentration 
index or the Herfindahl index.  If the value of the 
index is closer to zero, it is considered that the level 
of specialization is low, and if the value is closer to 
one, the level of specialization is high.  In table 6 there 
are data given for Serbia, calculated on the basis of 
the values of exports and imports of the group of 
products according to the three-digit SITC. 
 For smaller countries there is a general rule 
that the value of the specialization index is higher 
2001. 2005.
Export Import Export Import
in 000 USD
% of the 
total 
export
u 000 USD
% of the 
total 
import
u 000 USD
% of the 
total 
export
u 000 USD
% of the 
total 
import
0 Food and livestock 270.504 15,7% 331.260 7,8% 779.300 17,1% 591.000 5,6%
1 Beverages and tobacco 12.663 0,7% 95.431 2,2% 54.900 1,2% 115.300 1,1%
2
Raw materials, 
except fuels
88.629 5,2% 179.870 4,2% 198.400 4,4% 467.600 4,4%
3
Mineral fuels and 
lubricants
49.948 2,9% 829.989 19,5% 167.300 3,7% 2.034.700 19,2%
4
Animal and 
Vegetable oils and 
fats
17.928 1,0% 8.671 0,2% 42.500 0,9% 20.400 0,2%
5 Chemical products 131.847 7,7% 658.705 15,5% 494.400 10,9% 1.467.600 13,9%
6
Products classified by 
materials
504.887 29,3% 878.189 20,6% 1.613.600 35,4% 2.179.700 20,6%
7
Machines and 
transportation 
equipment
241.049 14,0% 892.950 21,0% 480.600 10,6% 2.796.000 26,4%
8
Various final 
products
357.941 20,8% 320.587 7,5% 709.500 15,6% 879.800 8,3%
9
Products and 
transactions, 
not mentioned 
elsewhere
45.285 2,6% 65.098 1,5% 12.500 0,3% 23.000 0,2%
Total 1.720.682 100% 4.260.750 100% 4.553.000 100% 10.575.000 100%
Table . Share of the sectors in imports and exports in 2001 and 200.  Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
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in exports than in imports because such countries 
export a limited number of products and import 
a large number of items.  In the case of Serbia, 
however, this was not the case in the first two 
years of the observed period, and this correlation 
appeared after 2003.  Yet, the low level of the index 
speaks to an unintegrated and undifferentiated 
character of Serbian exports, and to the lack of a 
clear specialization in exports.  To be sure, the value 
of the index for exports has increased in 2003 and 
200, compared to 2001 and 2002, but it is still at a 
relatively low level. 
	 	3.		The	Analysis	of	the	
Factorial	and	Technological	
Intensity	of	Foreign	Trade
 The qualitative characteristics of  
 Serbia’s foreign trade exchange
 
 Analysis of the factors of competitiveness of the 
Serbian economy is performed by segmentation of 
the groups of products according to 3-digit SITC 
codes, depending on whether they are exchanged on 
markets characterized by price or non-price types of 
competitiveness. For that purpose we used unit values 
of imports and exports, calculated by dividing the 
nominal values of imports and exports by the 
appropriate quantities.
Graph 1. Participation of individual SITC sectors in commodity exports.  Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
2001. 200.
8 Clothing 10,2% 67 Iron and steel 13,6%
05 Vegetables and fruits 8,1% 68 Non-ferrous metals 8,0%
68 Non-ferrous metals 6,2% 05 Vegetables and fruits 5,8%
67 Iron and steel 5,% 8 Clothing 5,%
62 Raw rubber products 5,1% 89 Various final products, not-mentioned ,8%
85 Shoes ,1% 62 Raw rubber products ,5%
89 Various final products, not-mentioned 3,8% 0 Grains and products ,0%
69 Metal products, not-mentioned 3,3% 06 Sugar, sugar products and honey 3,9%
79 Other transportation means and equipment 3,3% 69 Metal products, not-mentioned 3,%
65 Yarn, fabrics and textile products 3,2% 57 Plastics in primary forms 3,0%
Table 5. Ten SITC areas with the highest participation in exports.  Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
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 It should be mentioned that the unit values of 
imports and exports can point towards a qualitative 
dimension of competitiveness.  Namely, if a country 
has a higher unit value of exports, it means that it 
manages to sell the same products as its competitors 
at higher prices.  It signifies that there are certain 
non-price dimensions of competitiveness which that 
country has developed and which are more important 
than the price.
 As it can be seen from graph 2, the unit values of 
exports are lower than the unit values of imports, 
which is typical both for countries in transition, as well 
as for the undeveloped countries.  The reason is that 
the export structure of these countries is dominated 
by raw materials, labor-intensive products and other 
products of lower processing phases, with a smaller 
presence of technology-intensive products, which 
usually have high unit values.  The exception in the 
case of Serbia is 2001, when the unit value of exports 
was higher than the unit value of imports, because 
that year was dominated by energy raw materials and 
other raw materials, which have lower unit values 
compared to other groups of products.  
 On the basis of the data on quantities and unit 
values of exports and imports, it is possible to make 
a segmentation of the products into four groups, 
according to whether they are competitive in their 
prices and quality, or uncompetitive.10 The analysis 
has been performed for the groups of products 
according to the three-digit SITC.
 
 The first segment consists of products where 
Px>Pm and Qx>Qm apply, which means that, even 
though the unit values of exports are higher than in 
the case of imports, these products have higher export 
quantities than the import ones.  For these products, 
it can be said that they compete successfully, in line 
with their quality.  The second segment, characterized 
by the price competitiveness, consists of the products 
where Px<Pm and Qx>Qm apply, which means that 
the quantities of exports are higher than the quantities 
of imports due to a lower unit value of exports.  The 
third and fourth segments are characterized by the 
lack of competitiveness.  For the products from the 
third segment, Px>Pm and Qx<Qm apply, where, 
due to a higher unit value of the exports, import 
quantities exceed the export quantitites. 
 With the products from the fourth group, despite 
the lower unit value of exports, import quantities 
are higher than export quantities, i.e., Px<Pm and 
Qx<Qm apply, which tells us there are serious 
structural problems that must exist in that sector. 
 The performed analysis shows that the state of 
the Serbian economy’s competitiveness deteriorated 
in 200 compared to 2001, when the level and 
type of competitiveness could also be marked as 
unsatisfactory.  Namely, it can be seen in both years 
Year H for export H for import
2001 0,0189 0,0196
2002 0,0185 0,0185
2003 0,0237 0,0183
2004 0,0230 0,0164
Table 6. Herfindahl index. Period 2001-200. 
Graph 2. The unit values of the exports and imports, 2001=100)9 Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
9The unit values of exports and imports have been calculated on the basis of dinar values of the foreign trade exchanged, deflated by the retails prices index. 
10The following symbols were used in continuation: Px – unit value of exports, Pm – unit value of imports, Qx – export quantity (expressed in kg), Qm 
– import quantity (expressed in kg).
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that the number of competitive groups of products 
(from segments II and III) is smaller than the number 
of uncompetitive groups (from segments III and 
IV).  Moreover, the number of competitive groups is 
decreasing, as well as their share of exports.  Namely, 
in 200 the share of competitive groups in total 
exports almost equaled the share of uncompetitive 
groups, which grew to 5%. 
 
 If analyzed by individual segments, it is particularly 
worrying that the number of groups from the segment 
of competitiveness with quality has almost been 
halved, and their share of exports declined to 11% 
in 200.  It is precisely this segment which should 
hopefully dominate exports, with products from 
sectors 8 and 9 of SITC in its structure.  However, 
even when we look at which products dominated 
in this segment in 200, it can be noticed that these 
are predominantly food products and some raw 
materials, which are mostly products with low value 
added. 
 
 The second segment, with price competitiveness 
present, even with the reduction in the number 
of groups, has the same share of exports in 200 
as in 2001.  Again, this group of products consists 
mostly of food products;  then come beverages, raw 
materials, chemical products and metals, as well as 
some equipment (predominantly driving machines). 
The existing structure of that sector corresponds to 
the desirable structure, since there is a presence of 
raw materials and semi-products, where Serbian 
products compete with foreign products.
 The third segment is made up of products whose 
export unit values are high, because of which exported 
quantities are smaller than imported ones.  However, 
in this segment, we can potentially find those groups 
of products that theoretically can move into one of 
the competitive segments.  Some of them could, by 
achieving more efficient production and optimization 
of transportation costs, become price competitive and 
move into another segment with a relative increase in 
the physical volume of exports.
 In the fourth segment, which is extremely 
uncompetitive, we notice that it comprises the 
largest number of groups of products and also that 
it has a large deficit in trade which in 200 was even 
higher than the value of the overall commodity 
export.  Even with that, this segment has a solidly 
high share in the exports:  in 200, it amounted to as 
much as one-quarter.  The structure of this group of 
products varies a lot.  There are both those products 
that are not present in Serbia’s exports, and those 
products which theoretically should have a much 
greater significance in exports;  these are primarily 
equipment and other final products.  Thus, although 
the groups of products found in this sector are 
uncompetitive at the moment and generate the 
largest part of the trade deficit, it remains to be seen 
if the restructuring process of the Serbian economy 
and the influx of foreign direct investments will 
influence the metamorphosis of the nature of their 
competitiveness.  Namely, the only way in which 
Serbia can establish an adequate structure of trade, 
a high level of competitiveness, and a sustainable 
foreign economic position is for some product from 
this segment, (from among those that generate 
higher added value) to move into segments I and II, 
and thereby obtain a significant share in exports. 
  
 The analysis of the factorial and  
 technological intensity of the exchange11
 When we talk about the foreign trade exchange 
of processing industry products, depending on the 
technology used (high or medium) and the intensity 
of using certain production factors (labor, capital 
and resources), they can be categorized into several 
groups: human capital-intensive products, capital-
intensive products, labor-intensive products, and 
resource-intensive products.  Some of these groups 
segment year Number of three-digit groups of SITC
Share in the commodity 
exports Balance in millions of USD
I
2001. 20 15% 124
2004. 11 11% 338
II
2001. 59 43% 302
2004. 50 43% 482
III
2001. 74 23% -990
2004. 79 19% -3.409
IV
2001. 98 19% -1.888
2004. 110 26% -4.368
Table 7. The segmentation of the groups of products. Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
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11 For further description of the methodology, see Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy  2003.
can be further divided, as seen in table 8.  The data 
are calculated for the level of a three-digit SITC. 
 On the basis of the calculated indicators, it can 
be noticed that among the export products of the 
processing industry, there is a domination of labor- 
and resource-intensive products.  In addition, labor-
intensive products have lost the importance they 
had before, and their degree of the cover of imports 
with exports has diminished.  On the other hand, 
resource-intensive products have significantly 
increased their share of exports, while the degree 
of the cover of imports with exports has improved. 
For labor-intensive products, this is mainly the 
consequence of the reduction in exports of clothing; 
for resource-intensive products, these trends are the 
result of growth in the production of chemicals and 
metal products.  Also, resource-intensive products 
are the only ones where the indicator of the cover of 
imports with exports improved more significantly in 
200 compared to 2001.12 When we talk about human 
capital-intensive products, their proportion in total 
exports remains the same, while their degree of the 
cover of imports with exports deteriorates.  From 
the competitiveness point of view, this is actually a 
negative indicator, because these are precisely the 
products, for which  production is dominated by 
qualified labor and for which, in the world market, 
there is competition over quality.  Bearing in mind the 
dominant share of the labor- and resource-intensive 
technologies, the mentioned export structure of the 
processing industry can be evaluated as unfavorable
	 	4.	The	Econometric	Modeling	of	the	
Determinants	of	Exports	and	Imports	in		
the	Function	of	Competitiveness	Analysis
 
 In this part of the study, we have applied 
econometric analysis in order to examine if the 
chosen cluster of macroeconomic variables had 
any influence on  export and import flows of our 
economy in the chosen period of time and to what 
extent.  We limited this analysis to the period since 
2001, which is characterized by the beginning of 
reforms in all the sectors of the economy.  The 
starting point of observation for the time series is 
January 2001, and the endpoint is April 2005.  This 
period was preceded by the liberalization of prices, 
foreign trade and the exchange rate, which took place 
in the last quarter of 2000 and were thus reflected in 
Share in exports Cover of imports with exports
2001. 2004. 2001. 2004.
Human capital intensive 17,8% 17,6% 0,22 0,13
 High technology 5,2% 3,7% 0,30 0,14
 Labor intensive 2,5% 1,3% 0,37 0,13
 Capital intensive 2,7% 2,4% 0,26 0,14
 Medium technology 7,5% 10,8% 0,14 0,12
 Labor intensive 4,4% 4,7% 0,19 0,09
 Capital intensive 4,9% 6,1% 0,16 0,15
 Resource intensive 4,0% 5,2% 0,21 0,27
 Other 0,8% 0,8% 0,07 0,04
 Other 5,1% 3,1% 0,52 0,16
Capital intensive 1,5% 0,7% 0,09 0,10
Labor intensive 32,7% 24,9% 1,06 0,56
Resource intensive 17,8% 26,3% 0,59 0,64
 Poorly 5,3% 3,5% 0,70 0,27
 Strongly 12,5% 22,9% 0,55 0,81
 Human capital intensive 5,4% 15,6% 0,39 1,18
 Other 7,1% 7,3% 0,79 0,49
Other 2,9% 0,8% 0,69 0,46
Table 8. Source: Republic’s Statistics Office.
12 The second group of products where the degree of covering imports with exports is better in 200 compared to 2001 are capital products.  However, besides 
the fact that the value of this indicator is low, it is a negligible improvement – from a level of 0.09 to 0.10. 
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the structure of the monitored variables.  The total 
number of 52 observations allows us to apply the 
chosen econometric approach, without this reflecting 
more significantly on the reduction in the number 
degrees of freedom in the examined models.
 
 In the dynamic modeling of a cluster of the 
chosen macroeconomic variables, we have applied an 
approach based on the vector-autoregression model 
(VAR).13 A comprehensive approach of modeling 
a cluster of initial variables using the VAR method 
enables us to evaluate long-term balancing relations, 
to identify a cluster of endogenous and exogenous 
variables, to recognize long-term and short-term 
influences, and to choose and evaluate the structural 
model.  In short, the VAR approach is based on 
dynamic modeling of the determinants of exports 
and imports.  
 Since it was immediately after the liberalization of 
the exchange rate that there was a real appreciation 
of the rate for the dinar, first versus the German 
mark and then versus the euro, the National Bank 
of (Yugoslavia) Serbia was subject to pressures 
coming from the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia (already by the end of the third quarter of 
2001) and from some experts to allow stronger 
depreciation of the exchange rate in order to improve 
competitiveness and reduce the high unemployment 
rate.  These requests to solve problems came mainly 
from the real sector of economy.  This sector by itself 
was unable to resolve these problems.  The pressure 
kept increasing with the dynamics of restructuring 
the social and public sectors as the main causes of 
economic inefficiency, especially in those moments 
when the restructuring process slowed down.  The 
high growth of the current account deficit compared 
to GDP, which amounted to 3.3% in 2001 and 
surpassed 13% in 200, was also used as an argument 
against the overvaluation of the local currency and its 
limited influence on the increase in competitiveness 
of the domestic economy.  The causes of growth in the 
current account deficit, as well as of the trade deficit 
in the past period will be further analyzed in the other 
chapters of this study.
 In order to make this part of the analysis 
complementary to the remainder of the study, we 
have opted for the econometric analysis of a cluster of 
variables which represent the basic elements of price 
and cost competitiveness.
 The analysis of exports
 The initial cluster of macroeconomic variables1 
in the analysis of export movements consisted of: 
exports (ex), the real exchange rate of the dinar versus 
the euro (rer), real unit labor costs in industry (rulc), 
and the index of industrial production (iip).  Initially, 
the initial cluster of variables also included a variable 
which approximated the fiscal burden on the economy, 
but it was excluded from the analysis, since it did not 
show the expected direction of the correlation with 
the variables we analyzed.  All the data are expressed 
in logarithmic values and the explanations related to 
the definition of the used variables are given in the 
Annex to this part of the study. 
 
 After we chose the cluster of variables which can 
theoretically explain the movement of exports, we 
implemented the procedure of examining the VAR. 
All of the observed variables have previously passed 
the procedure of checking for non-stationariness. 
The four-member system of VAR equations of the 
first order is marked by the method of maximum 
credibility, the test statistics of the track, and the 
maximum characteristic value in order to establish 
how many balancing relations are created by the 
analyzed variables.  As shown by the results of the 
cointegration tests presented in Table 1, the four 
variables create one stationary balancing relation.
 The rating of the normalized cointegration vector 
(kv) parameters suggested the exclusion of the real 
unit labor costs in industry (rulc) variable from the 
cointegration vector.  A limitation was imposed on 
H0:
No cv
Characteristics Track Critical value Statistics of the maximum Critical value
Values Statistics 5% characteristic value 5%
0 0.514 61.271* 47.210 36.107* 27.070
1 0.342 25.163 29.680 20.937 20.970
2 0.075 4.227 15.410 3.909 14.070
3 0.006 0.318 3.760 0.318 3.760
Table 9. Johansen’s cointegration test15 of the initial cluster of the variable VARs.  Remark: the statistics of the track and maximum 
characteristic value suggest that there is one cointegration vector.  Both hypotheses have been tested on 5% level of significance.
13 See Johansen, S. (1991).
1 The econometric analyses of the movement of the domestic exports during 1990’s and later were also done in the studies by Jovicic, M. (2002) and the 
Jefferson Institute (2003), so that the initial cluster of the variables which we analyzed here, but in a different timeframe, is very similar to the one dealt with in 
the previous studies. 
15 Johansen, S. (1991).
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the rated cointegration vector which excluded the 
rulc variable.  Its exclusion from the rated vector 
proved to be justified, so that in the next iteration we 
obtained balancing relation rates with the theoretically 
expected sign and size. 
 
 A unique cointegration vector [kv=ex-0.86rer-
1.88iip+3.30].was rated.  The rated vector proved to 
be significant only in the equation of exports, which 
means that the real exchange rate and industrial 
production index are poorly exogenous variables 
compared to the rated parameters of a long-term 
stationary balancing relation, which allowed us to 
express the growth rate of exports in the form of an 
equilibrium correction model (ECM). 
 
 The simple least squares method was used for 
the rating of the structural ECM of the growth rate 
of exports in the period from January 2001 to April 
of the exports growth rate point toward satisfactory 
statistical features of the rated model.  The Breusch-
Godfrey (BG) and Jarque-Bera (JB)16 tests confirm 
the lack of serial correlation, that is, of the feature 
of normal distribution in the residuals of the rated 
model.  According to the rated balancing relation, 
we can conclude that export growth is determined by 
the depreciation of the real exchange rate and by the 
growth of industrial production.  The movement of the 
direction of dependence in the cluster of the variables 
shows that the movement of industrial production 
is to a certain degree determined by movement of 
the real exchange rate, and that output and the real 
exchange rate represent significant explanatory 
variables in foreseeing future export dynamics.
 
 In order to establish the importance of each of 
the analyzed variables in the explanation of the total 
variability of the initial VAR, we have decomposed 
the rated variance of the prognosis error by applying 
Variable Parameters rating t-statistics Level of testsignificance 
Const. 0.04 2.47 0.02
cvt-1=(ex-0.86rer-1.88iip+3.30)t-1 -0.71 -5.93 0.00
∆ext-2 -0.10 -2.08 0.04
2005.  The rating of the parameters of adjustment 
of exports to the balancing relation with the real 
exchange rate and the industrial production is highly 
statistically important in the model [-0.71(0.00)].  The 
rating of the parameters of adjustments, if expressed 
in a percentage (71%), can be interpreted as the rate 
of monthly adjustment of exports relative to the 
previously achieved balancing value created with 
the real exchange rate and industrial production. 
The existence of the export growth rate with the 
delay of two periods in the rated model points to 
the importance of inertia in the movement of the 
exports, which goes to show that a smaller portion 
of exports is determined by established dynamics. 
We have also included an artificial variable into the 
model that takes a non-zero value in January 2005 
in order to encompass the structural change caused 
by the introduction of the value added tax and the 
temporary slowing down of economic activity. 
 
 Standard errors in the rating of the ECM 
parameters of the growth rate of exports have 
been corrected using White’s procedure in order to 
remove the influence of the heteroskedasticity of the 
residuals.  The specification tests of the rated ECM 
the Cholesky procedure.  The application of this 
procedure supposes that the elements of the rated 
covariation matrix of the residuals are adjusted by 
the number degrees of freedom (T-k), where T is the 
total number of observations, while k is the number 
of rated parameters per each equation of the VAR. 
As the relative contribution of the variables to total 
variability depends on the sequence of introducing 
variables into the procedure, we have established 
two sequences: (1) rer→rulc→iip→ex, and (2) rulc→
iip→rer→ex.  According to the results which are 
represented in Table 3 it can be concluded that in 
the movement of exports, there is significant inertia 
(which is partially also confirmed by the ratings of 
the ECM of the growth rate of exports).  According to 
the first sequence, the real unit labor costs in industry 
play a role in total variability with 2.3%.  However, 
with a change of the sequence of the variables, the 
real exchange rate explains more than one-quarter 
of the total variability, while unit labor costs have a 
significantly smaller share (10.%).  The change of 
the sequence of the variables does not significantly 
change the role of industrial production, which 
contributes to total variability with around 20%.  So, 
it can be concluded that production has a very stable 
Table 10. ECM model of the growth rate of exports.  Dependent variable: ∆ext = ext - ext-1, t=1,…,T.  
Remark:R
—2
=0.55; BG(2)=3.50(0.17); JB=3.91(0.14))
16 The level of significance is in parentheses beside the value of the test.
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influence in explaining changes in the movement of 
the exports.  The variance of the prognosis error is 
decomposed after the prognosis period of two years. 
 The conclusions which come out of the above 
analysis of export movements do not imply that the 
causes of uncompetitiveness of the Serbian economy 
are to be found only in the overevaluation of the dinar. 
In other words, the causes of  uncompetitiveness 
should not be sought only in the relative, price, 
and cost factors of competitiveness, which were 
encompassed by this analysis, but also in the 
difficulties for domestic industry (which finds it hard 
to come to terms with the market conditions in the 
country and abroad), the undeveloped service sector, 
problems related to privatization and restructuring of 
the social and public enterprises, the disproportionate 
ratio between current employment and the degree 
of economic activity, expensive credits and limited 
cointegration tests identified a unique cointegration 
vector created by four observed variables kv= [im, iip, 
cpi, rer].17 However, it appeared that the rating of the 
real exchange rate does not have the expected sign, 
and thus a limitation was imposed on the rated 
cointegration vector in order to examine justifiability 
of excluding the real exchange rate from the 
cointegration vector.  The quotient test of the 
credibility confirmed the justifiability of leaving the 
exchange rate out of the rated vector [LR 
(1)=5.51(0.01)]. 
 Using the maximum credibility method in the 
four-member system of the VAR equations, after the 
imposed limitation which excluded the real exchange 
rate, we rated the cointegration vector [kv=im-
0.95iip-0.885cpi].  The rated vector is significant in 
the equations we used in order to model the growth 
rate of imports and the growth rate of industrial 
Rating of random shocks in the variables of the initial VAR The first sequence of the variables (in %)
The second sequence of the 
variables (in %)
Ex 44,2 44,2
Rer 13,8 25,2
Rulc 24,3 10,4
Iip 17,7 20,2
Total 100,0 100,0
Table 11. The decomposition of the variance of the prognosis error of the variable export.  Remark:  The variance of the prognosis error was 
decomposed after the period of 2 months.  The VAR model of the first order in the levels of variables without limitations was rated. 
access to financial sources, and other factors which 
are associated with a slow and insufficient institutional 
and structural adjustment, as will be shown by the 
microeconomic analysis of a representative sample of 
domestic businessmen.
 
 The analysis of imports
 
 In the econometric analysis of imports, we started 
from a cluster of the following variables: imports 
(im), index of industrial production (iip), consumer 
prices index (cpi) and the real exchange rate of the 
dinar versus the euro (rer).  All of the variables were 
observed in a unique period: January 2001 – April 
2005.  The data are expressed in logarithmic values, 
while the explanations regarding the manner of 
defining the analyzed variables are to be found in the 
Annex.
 
 When analyzing imports, we again applied the 
VAR method.  Initially the VAR of the third order on 
a four-variable cluster was rated.  The Johansen 
production, by which two endogenous variable 
in the system of equations were identified.  The 
simultaneous dependence of imports and industrial 
production created a need for rating two separate 
structural ECMs.
 Using the method of two-degree smallest squares 
(2DSS) we rated the structural ECM of the import 
growth rate.  The ratings of the models are given in 
Table .  The long-term balancing relation created by 
imports, the index of industrial production, and 
consumer prices is very significant for explaining the 
balancing movement of imports in the analyzed 
period.  Other parameters of the imports equation we 
could interpret in the following way.  The observed 
period was characterized by a particularly high level 
of domestic demand, both for imported and for 
domestic products, which justifies a positive 
connection between industrial production and 
imports.  Although short-term dynamics are not 
significant in the rated period, which can be explained 
by the fairly short time period under observation, we 
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kept the rating of the real exchange rate.  The 
explanation of the real exchange rate presence in the 
model has its economic justification.  Namely, as the 
real exchange rate is created by correcting the nominal 
exchange rate with relative prices, it can be expected 
that higher prices of imported goods compared to the 
prices of domestic products should cause decrease in 
domestic demand for imported goods compared to 
domestic demand for domestic products.  However, 
this specified connection between imports and the 
real exchange rate, though economically justified, was 
not significant during the analyzed period and is the 
reason for the low level of significance of the real 
exchange rate in the model.
 The 2DSS method was also used for rating the 
ECM of the industrial production growth rate. 
Rating results are shown in Table 5.  The industrial 
production growth rate model confirmed a high 
dependency on imports by domestic industry, which 
is manifested through a presence of imports in the 
rated model of the industrial production growth 
rate.  On the basis of the rated model, it can also 
be seen that, on the one hand, production adjusts 
to the balance it creates with imports and domestic 
prices, and on the other hand, there is a one quarter 
delay in adjusting production to its own dynamics. 
Therefore, there are no prominent short-term 
dependencies in the industrial production growth 
rate, except the adjustment to dynamics which date 
from the previous period.
 The rated structural ECM models of the growth 
rate of imports and the industrial production growth 
rate also include an artificial variable which takes a 
non-zero value in January 2005 in order to model 
the structural change in exports, expressed through 
a drastic decline in the value of imports compared to 
the end of the previous year. 
 The specification tests of the ECM models of the 
growth rate of imports and the industrial growth rate 
point toward satisfactory features of the rated models. 
When rating both models, we used White’s correction 
of the standard error ratings for parameters in order 
to exclude the influence of heteroskedasticity of the 
residuals.  The test of the absence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals in both models confirms the absence 
of mutual correlation, while the JB normality test 
confirms the supposition that the residuals are 
normally arranged. 
 Since it is very difficult to interpret the ratings 
of the VAR parameters, we have again chosen the 
method of decomposing the prognosis error variance 
in order to establish the contribution of the analyzed 
variables to the explanation of the total variability 
of imports.  In the decomposition procedure for 
error variance of the rated prognosis after a period 
of two years, two sequences of the variables were 
used: (1) iip→rer→cpi→im, and (2) rer→iip→cpi→im. 
However, as the results in Table 6 show, the change 
in the sequence of variables did not influence more 
significantly their contribution to total variability. 
By using the influence of random shocks in the 
analyzed variables on the error variance of the total 
prognosis, it is possible to perform a ranking of the 
variables’ significance, which moves from inertia 
of imports, via industrial production, to domestic 
prices and the real exchange rate (Table 6).
 On the basis of the rated structural models, it 
showed that imports were caused by an excessive 
growth of domestic demand.  Industrial production 
dictated one part of import growth, while the other 
part came from growth in the demand for imported 
Variable Parameters rating t-statistics Level of test significance
Const. 2.68 2.98 0.00
Kvt-1=(im-0.50iip-0.88cpi)t-1 -0.66 2.88 0.00
∆iipt 2.19 2.00 0.05
∆rert-2 -2.31 1.58 0.11
Table 12. ECM model of the imports growth rate.  Dependent variable: ∆imt=imt-imt-1, t=1,…,T.  
Remark: R—2=0.42 ; BG(5)=1.91(0.12); JB=3.23(0.20).)
Variable Parameters rating t-statistics Level of test significance
Const. 1.83 5.14 0.00
Kvt-1=(im-0.50iip-0.88cpi)t-1 0.17 3.81 0.00
∆imt 0.12 3.23 0.00
∆iipt-3 0.46 4.64 0.00
Table 13. ECM model of the industrial production growth rate.  Dependent variable: ∆iipt=iipt-iipt-1, t=1,…,T.  
Remark: R—2=0.75 ; BG(7)=1.84(0.13); JB=0.24(0.89))
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consumer products, which was not covered by 
domestic production.  As we have seen from the 
rated model, the real exchange rate did not take 
over the role of the correction factor for imports. 
For that reason, it was important to include in the 
analysis a variable that represents the approximation 
of the degree of liberalization of trade exchange. 
However, the variable we used to measure the degree 
of openness of domestic economy, both for the short 
timeframe in which we analyzed the imports, and for 
its character and the method of its creation, did not 
meet the expected suppositions in the initial system of 
the VAR equations.  But, we have accorded a certain 
significance to it by separating it from the equation 
system and by separately analyzing its connection to 
imports.
 
 The implementation of the Engle-Granger (EG) 
test of non-stationariness of the static regression 
residuals18 confirmed the hypothesis that imports 
and the degree of openness form a stationary linear 
combination.  The critical value of the EG test on the 
5% level of significance for the model with a constant 
amounts to [-3.6], thus confirming the cointegration 
between imports and the degree of openness. 
 
 By using the ONK method we rated a simple ECM 
with two variables.  The rating results are shown in 
Table 7.  The rated balancing relation in the model 
was replaced by the residuals from the previously 
rated linear regression of imports raised to the 
exponent of openness measured by the share of 
foreign trade volume in the total value of gross 
domestic product.  The liberalization of foreign trade 
and the decrease in tariffs for certain imported 
products, along with other factors that were not 
covered by this analysis, influenced the increase in 
imports during the observed period.  However, the 
presence of the value for imports in the rated model 
with a delay of four months confirms the previous 
result, which showed that a good part of imports 
adjusts to the proper dynamics from the previous 
period. 
	 5.	The	Foreign	Trade	Partners	of		
	 Serbia
 The largest share of Serbia’s foreign commodity 
exchange is with the European Union.  Namely, 
during 2005, the EU accounted for a 5% share 
in commodity exports from, and a 50% share in 
commodity imports to, Serbia.  This emphasizes the 
importance of two very important export markets 
for Serbia - Italy and Germany - where almost one-
quarter of total commodity exports from Serbia are 
marketed. 
 Next to the European Union, surrounding 
countries are the most important foreign trade 
partners of Serbia, such that their total share of 
Serbian exports is a little over one-third, while 
imports from these countries amount to around 10%. 
Among neighboring countries, Serbia has a constant 
surplus in exchange with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Macedonia. 
 Under the auspices of the Stability Pact, the 
countries from southeastern Europe have concluded 
bilateral free trade agreements among themselves, 
agreements which should lead to the creation of a 
Southeast Europe Free Trade Area (SEFTA).  The 
argument for emphasizing mutual trade exchange 
among these countries is, on the one hand, the 
pacification of the region through encouraging 
Rating of random 
shocks in the VAR 
variables 
The first 
sequence of 
variables (in %)
The second 
sequence of 
variables (in %)
zIm 46,6 46,6
Rer 10,4 10,5
Cpi 20,1 20,1
Iip 22,9 22,8
Total 100,0 100,0
Table 1. The decomposition of the error variance of the prognosis 
regarding variable imports. Remark: The variance of the prognosis error 
was decomposed after a period of 2 months. The VAR model of the 
third order in the levels of variables without limitations was rated. 
Variable Ocena parametra t-statistica Level of test significance
Const. 0.02 1.04 0.30
Ut-1=(im-1.35op-4.98)t-1 -0.20 -2.31 0.02
∆opt 1.16 6.98 0.00
∆imt-4 -0.19 3.56 0.00
Table 15. ECM model of the imports growth rate expressed in the function of openness.  Dependent variable:   ∆imt=imt-imt-1, t=1,…,T.  
Remark: R
—2
=0.67; BG(1)=1.19(0.27); JB=1.18(0.56).)
18 The critical value was taken over from Mackinnon, J. G. (1991).
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economic cooperation, and, on the other hand, 
such cooperation should represent some kind of 
preparation of these countries prior to joining the 
European Union. 
 In regard to other important foreign trade partners, 
such as Russia, China, the USA, and Ukraine, 
their significance is mainly related to their share of 
Serbia’s imports;  the value of Serbia’s exports to these 
countries is, though growing, mostly not very high. 
The exception is Russia, to which 5% of the value of 
Serbia’s commodity exports were marketed during 
2005, but that share is negligible compared to the 
importance of imports from Russia, which amounted 
to as much as 16%.  
 If we observe concrete groups of products 
which are exported to some countries, it can be 
concluded that exports to developed countries are 
more concentrated.  Namely, in 200, the export of 
the most important subgroup of products ( digit 
SITC) to specific countries in the European Union 
was never less than one-tenth of total export value. 
The export is particularly concentrated in the case of 
Russia, which tells us there are a limited number of 
products that managed to reach that market.  On the 
other hand, in the case of neighboring countries in 
transition, it can be noticed that export structure is 
diversified.  For example, the most important group 
of products exported to Macedonia accounts for only 
a little over 3% of exports to that country. 
Another striking tendency is that exports to the 
countries of the European Union centers to a great 
extent on enterprises that are directly (through 
ownership) or indirectly (through some kind of 
a cooperation agreement) linked to enterprises 
originating in those respective countries.  Specifically, 
we mention the Aluminum Rolling Mill from 
Sevojno, which was sold to a Slovenian investor, and 
about lohn (loan) jobs of making shoes which Serbian 
enterprises do for their Italian partners. 
	 	
Rank Partner First most important subgroup Second most important subgroup Total share
1 B&H Beer 4% Biscuits, wafers etc. 3% 7%
2 Italy Sugar 19% Shoes 7% 26%
3 Germany
Raspberries (frozen or thermally 
treated)
12% Copper plates 4% 16%
4 Macedonia Biscuits, wafers etc. 3% Lignite 2% 6%
5 Slovenia Aluminum plates 13% Sunflower (seed or unrefined oil) 4% 16%
6 Russia Floor covers 22% Medicines 16% 38%
7 Croatia Sunflower (seed or unrefined oil) 7% Etilen 4% 11%
Table 16. The share of the two most important SITC subgroups in the exports value, per most important export markets in 200
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Graph 3. Foreign direct investment in the period 2001-2005.
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	 6.	Direct	Investments		
	 and	Competitiveness
 
 Although quite a number of foreign investors 
showed interest in investing in Serbia after 2000, 
the influx of foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
2001 was relatively modest ($165 million), which 
can be explained by perceptions that the investment 
climate was still considered to be unfavorable at that 
moment.  With the adoption of a whole list of new 
laws by the Parliament of Serbia, a legal framework 
for FDI was created.  New laws, accelerated reforms, 
and intensification of the process of privatization, 
resulted in visible growth in FDI.  With the aim of 
creating as attractive environment for FDI as possible, 
the Serbian government reduced income taxes for 
enterprises from 1% to 10% in September 200.
 On receiving the credit rating BB- for long-term 
state bonds and B for short-term credits by the 
American agency Standard & Poor on 18 July 2005, 
Serbia was able to enter the investment map of Europe 
and world.  Since 2001, Serbia has attracted almost 
.5 billion dollars of foreign investment, and in 2005, 
there was a record influx of 1.5 billion dollars. 
 It is clear that out of the total amount of foreign 
investment that entered Serbia, a dominant part 
came via privatization, although more recently, there 
have been more frequent greenfield investments and 
acquisitions.  The influx of investments will keep 
coming to a significant degree through privatization, 
but in the future, there will be a natural decline in 
privatization inflows and a necessary shift toward 
greenfield investments.  That is the type of investment 
Serbia needs, but for such projects, it is not easy to get 
foreign investors interested when the country is still 
perceived to be facing transition problems.  So far, the 
inflow from greenfield investments has dominantly 
been directed at the service sector, especially trade 
and banking, while the volume of investments in the 
processing industry has been smaller.  It is expected 
that what foreign investors will find interesting in 
the coming period will be the privatization of hotels, 
dependent enterprises from metal industry, fields of 
telecommunications, energy, construction industry, 
as well as transport potential.  It will be particularly 
important to provide inflows for export-oriented 
greenfield projects, but that will be rather difficult, 
because that kind of investment is most sensitive to 
the overall investment environment. 
 The experience of other countries in transition 
testifies to the importance of FDI  directed at export-
oriented sectors and shows that such investments were 
the main factor of improving competitiveness in each 
case.  The Czech Republic and Hungary are examples 
of countries in which foreign investment was one 
of the main generators of change in the structure of 
the economy, and they completely transformed their 
structure of exports compared to the beginning of the 
transition process, in favor of capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive activities. 
 In the case of Serbia, there are still no indicators 
that foreign investment has had a more significant 
impact on the change of export structure, but data 
show that it certainly has had a strong impact on 
growth in export value.  The most obvious example is 
the export of steel from the only Serbian steelworks, 
now owned by American company US Steel. 
Namely, ever since the steelworks was taken over, the 
production and export of steel record an increasing, 
dynamic growth.  In 2005, the iron and steel sector 
of the Standard International Trade Classification 
was identified as the most significant part of Serbia’s 
commodity exports, amounting to 13.6%.  The value 
of steel exports is one-third higher compared to 200 
(measured by current dollars), while the surplus of 
foreign trade exchange of steel products was almost 
3.5 times higher than in 200, reaching USD 210 
million.
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Appendix 1: The explanation of the data used in the analysis of the determinants of
the exports and imports
The data were observed in the period from January 2001 to April 2005, which means that each variable consists of 
52 monthly observations.  The indexes were calculated relative to a permanent base where January 2002 = 100.
1. The export of goods (ex) is expressed in millions of dinars.  The data on the monthly values of commodity 
exports were taken from the publications of the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia. 
2. The import of goods (im) is expressed in millions of dinars. The data on the movement of imports of goods per 
month were also taken from the monthly publications of the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
3. The inflation growth rate (inf) represents monthly growth of consumer prices and is obtained from the regular 
monthly statements of the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
. The price index of the producers of industrial products (ppi) was taken from the publications of the Republic 
Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
5. The de-seasoned index of industrial production (iip) is the monthly index of  industrial production from which 
the influence of the seasonal factor was excluded through the standard procedure of rating seasons’ indexes in a 
multiplicative model of the time series.  The indexes of industrial production were taken from regular monthly 
statements of the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
6. Real gross wages in industry (rwb) are expressed through the ratio between gross wages in industry and the 
prices of producers of industrial products.  In June 2001, the method of calculating average wages was changed, 
so that the data from the previous sample period were estimated using the method of trend interpolation.  The 
data on average gross wages and the index of the producers in industry were taken from regular monthly reviews 
of the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
7. The number of employees in industry (em) represents the state of the number of employees in industry at the 
end of the period.  The monthly data on the number of employees in industry were taken from publications of 
the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia.
8. Productivity in industry (pr) is expressed through the ratio of the variables for the de-seasoned index of 
industrial production (the indexes were weighted with the prices of producers in industry) and the number of 
employees in the industry.
9. Real unit labor costs in industry (rulc) are expressed through the ratio between real gross wages and 
productivity.
10. We looked at three different variables of the real exchange rate of the dinar versus euro, depending on the use 
of deflators (growth rate of the prices of industrial products, the inflation rate in Serbia, and the inflation rate in 
the euro zone).  We opted for the real exchange rate (rer) expressed in the nominal medium exchange rate, which 
was adjusted with the ratio between the inflation level in the euro zone and domestic prices, for two reasons: (a) 
the real exchange rate thus created showed the highest degree of correlation with import and exports, of 89% and 
83%, respectively, and (b) around 50% of foreign trade exchange takes place with the EU countries, out of which 
a significant part relates to countries in the euro zone.  The data on exchange rates were observed at a monthly 
level and they were taken from the National Bank of Serbia, while the monthly data on inflation rates were taken 
from the Republic Institute for Statistics of Serbia and EUROSTAT.
11. The degree of openness of the domestic economy (op) is a variable created through the ratio of foreign trade 
commodity exchange value and gross domestic product, and represents a kind of approximation of import tariffs. 
The ratio between the degree of openness of the economy and the increase in tariffs is in reverse proportion. 
Lower tariffs increase the openness of the domestic economy, which means that, empirically, it can be expected 
that the reduction of tariffs would result in an increase of imports and depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
We introduced into the analysis a variable used for measuring the degree of openness of the domestic economy 
in order to measure the effects of the liberalization of the foreign trade exchange regime, a process that started 
in December 2000 with legal changes.19 The data on the value of gross domestic product were followed on the 
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quarterly level only until recently, so we disaggregated quarterly to monthly data.  The variable on the basis of 
which we disaggregated quarterly values of gross domestic product is the index of industrial production.  A better 
approximation of the monthly data would be obtained by using variables which created the expenditures side of 
gross domestic product, but our statistics do not have such data at a monthly level. 
12. Fiscal revenues (fr), that is, total public revenues, consist of budget revenues and social insurance fund 
revenues, and are expressed in current dinars.  Since these revenues encompass a wide spectrum of tax revenues, 
they are only a rough approximation of the level of fiscal burdening.  A better approximation of the total fiscal 
burden on industrial producers would be obtained if the corresponding part of fiscal duties were observed per 
unit of physical volume of production.  Data on the value of  revenues from January 2001 to December 2002 were 
taken from the publications of the National Bank of Serbia, and for the period from January 2003 to April 2005 
from the Ministry of Finance.  The changes in the level of tax rates which took place during the analyzed period, 
that is, the abolition or the introduction of taxes, contributed to a certain degree to structural changes in that 
time series. 
19 See G17 Institute and ISSP (200) for the characteristics of the process of foreign trade liberalization in Serbia and Montenegro.
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	 7.	 Introduction
 This chapter seeks to identify the microeconomic 
bases of Serbia’s competitiveness.  It tries to establish 
which particular products and sectors of Serbia’s 
economy are successful in penetrating foreign 
markets.  A vast theoretical literature and several 
databases were consulted for the appropriate 
methodology.   We use the methodology developed 
and applied by the International Trade Center (ITC) 
from Geneva.1 This methodology is most suitable 
because it produces desirable results in listing most 
export performance sectors and products in the 
Serbian economy without requiring vast analytical 
resources and time-consuming methodologies, such 
as General Equilibrium Models.  ITC is an 
intergovernmental organization under the auspices 
of its parent organizations – World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and United Nations (UN), the 
latter represented by the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). 
 One product offered by ITC is the Country Market 
Analysis Profile (Country Map) that explores the 
foreign trade profile of each national economy, 
including countries that are not members of the 
International Trade Center.  Strategic market research 
is used to gauge the effectiveness of national and 
sectoral trade performance and identify priority 
products and markets for trade development.2
A Country Map consists of six methods for assessing 
the foreign trade profile of a national economy.  In this 
chapter, two of these methods will be employed.
 One of the tools in the Country Map is the Trade 
Performance Index (TPI). The tool assesses and 
monitors the multidimensional export performance 
in the context of competitiveness of countries by 
highlighting the principal export sectors.  The other 
tool is National Export Performance (NEP).  As an 
aggregate set of indices, it assesses export performance 
of national economies in terms of the product 
2. Trade Map of Serbia
composition of exports, dynamics of international 
demand, and growth patterns of leading export 
products.
 These two tools from the Country Map assess the 
present situation in the export performance of a 
national economy.  They also capture dynamic 
changes in the trade environment for the preceding 
four years.  However, this dynamic component is 
based on historical data and cannot yield more 
information on sectors and products that may be 
critical in the export structure of a particular 
national economy.  Many theories suggest that 
comparative advantages of a particular country often 
change over time, so national economies as an 
aggregate matter are dynamic in their international 
specialization.3 Changes in comparative advantage 
are due to changes in natural predisposition, trade 
regimes, world market structures, and so on.  But a 
methodology that could specify which sectors and 
products may be most critical for future exports is 
limited.  One can only try to speculate on the analysis 
of future changes in demand, trade regimes, and 
market conditions.  
 These methods, but also the latest results of 
International Trade Center are employed in this 
research. This means that the Trade Performance 
Index is calculated for Serbia & Montenegro for 
200 based on the most recently available data from 
2002, and the National Export Performance for 
Serbia & Montenegro is calculated for 2005 based on 
the most recently available data for 2003.  The indices 
for Serbia and Montenegro will be used to analyze 
the results of Serbia’s export record.  We consider 
this approximation to be acceptable, bearing in mind 
that the economy of Serbia accounts for 92-95% of 
the combined economy of Serbia & Montenegro. 
The ITC does not have a direct source of export data 
for Serbia & Montenegro, because the country is not 
a member of the ITC, so it used “mirror statistics,” 
1 For more information about the methodology and the results for other countries, see the International Trade Center website at www.intracen.org.  ITC 
offers many more tools and application for governmental and enterprise use.
2 International Trade Center, “Country Market Analysis Profiles:  User Guide,” (Geneva; ITC, April 2003) 1.
3 See Stephen Redding, ”The Dynamics of International Specialization,” Paper no. 2287 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, November 1999.
 Serbia is a member of the State Union of Serbia & Montenegro, which, until May of 2006, was still formally an international actor and appears in some 
international organizations under this name.  However, Montenegro is a small economy accounting for no more than 5% of GDP of the State Union.  
Therefore, the data presented here refer mostly to Serbia.
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which means that ITC experts drew on import data 
supplied by Serbia’s partner countries to calculate 
Serbia’s export data.  The ITC data used in calculation 
of indices for Serbia and Montenegro are compared 
with data from official Serbian sources, and help to 
comment on the acceptability of the results.
	 	8.	 Sectors	Dominating	
Serbian	Exports	
 In order to evaluate properly the sectors playing 
the significant part within Serbia’s export structure, 
and Montenegro, utilizing 2003 statistics in static 
indicators as well as data from the 1999-2003 period 
to enable dynamic analysis. According to the TPI 
methodology, ITC calculated the indicators and 
composite ranks for 13 observed sectors of the 
economy of Serbia and Montenegro, such as absolute 
change of world market share, a current index, and 
change index.  The figures are presented in the table 
below.  
 The data contained in the first column of the 
table measure the degree of change of world market 
SECTOR
Absolute change of the world market share Current Index Change Index
% points p.a. Rank Rank Rank
Fresh food 0,0014% 59 77 9
Processed food 0,0109% 24 77 14
Wood product 0,0004% 59 63 35
Textile 0,0017% 40 73 20
Chemical products 0,0021% 34 64 64
Leather products 0,0114% 20 56 28
Primary production 0,0073% 30 59 72
Non-electric power machines 0,0012% 42 43 44
Electronic components 0,0007% 48 56 81
Transportation equipment  - 0,0008% 72 44 11
Clothing 0,0045% 31 57 37
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0,0029% 43 73 80
Minerals 0,0021% 70 84 1
Table 1. Indicators of Trade Performance Index for Serbia and Montenegro (Yugoslavia, Fed.  Rep.) for the 2003 and 1999-2003 periods.  So-
urce: International Trade Center (ITC), according to the figures computed on the basis of COMTRADE data base of UN Statistics Division.
the tool developed by the International Trade Center 
(ITC), known as the Foreign Trade Performance 
Index (also known as the Trade Performance Index, 
or TPI) is used.  The index computes the degree of 
competitiveness and export diversification by way of 
comparing trade outcomes with other national 
economies under review.5 Detailed overview of trade 
performance index methodology is included in this 
chapter as appendix 1.  The method represents one 
pattern of strategic trade analysis.  An increasing 
number of classical trade economists have directed 
their quantitative analysis precisely towards micro-
level theory, as exemplified by international trade 
theories advanced by business economists.6 
 This chapter analyzes the results computed by ITC 
by applying the TPI method for the period 
commencing in 1999 and expiring in 2003.  ITC 
calculated these results from data referring to Serbia 
share exhibited by each export sector of the Serbian 
economy. As may be observed, all sectors, excluding 
transportation equipment, increased their world 
market share respectively.  The leather products sector 
reports the most significant increase, totaling 0.011%. 
That sector ranked 20th in 2003 when rated according 
to world market share growth in comparison to the 
other reviewed sectors.  Also, the leather products 
sector displayed significant export performance 
according to the ITC analysis based on 2002 statistics. 
The overall condition of export competitiveness 
showed significant improvement, which is confirmed 
by the analysis utilizing data referring to the 1999-
2003 period.  Only one sector reports decline in terms 
of world market share, which can be attributed to the 
fact that this analysis excluded to a great extent the 
preceding years when trade activities were hit hard 
by military operations and political sanctions.  The 
5 International Trade Center, “The Trade Performance Index,” background paper (ITC: Geneva, April 2000) 3.
6 One example is James R.  Markusen and Anthony J. Venables, ”A Multi-Country Approach to Factor-Proportions Trade and Trade Costs,” NBER Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper no. 11051 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2005), accessed on the Internet October 15, 2005 at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11051.
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second leading sector in terms of export performance 
of Serbian economy is the food industry sector, 
achieving the best score according to analysis of 2002 
data.
 The second column rates sectors according to the 
Current Index as a measure of current international 
competitiveness and export performance of the 
Serbian economy.  Sectors were subject to review by 
comparison to similar sectors of 189 other national 
economies worldwide.  The best rated national sector 
for Serbia (on 2003 data) in terms of competitiveness 
was that of non-electric power machines, ranking 
3rd in comparison to the same sector of the other 
188 national economies subject to review. 
 The data in the third column provide sector ratings 
as a Change Index computed for the 1999-2003 
period.  These figures indicate international 
competitiveness and export performance of the 
observed sectors from a longer term perspective.  On 
this dynamic index, the best results for international 
competitiveness and export performance were 
accomplished by the minerals sector -- which ranked 
1st among the minerals sectors of 189 other countries. 
Such outstanding performance was driven largely by 
a sudden increase in aluminum exports.  
 Data contained in the table may be reformulated 
as a chart.  Sectors in the following chart are arranged 
in descending order in terms of total export value 
accomplished in 2003, regardless of overall 
competitiveness level.  The first horizontal bar shows 
the Current Index rating, while the second horizontal 
bar reflects the change of world market share, followed 
by the respective Change Index score displayed in 
parentheses.  
 The sector accounting for the largest share in 
Serbia’s export structure in 2003 was basic 
manufacturing.  It ranks only 59th among 189 
countries measured by the current index.  It ranks 
72nd, as measured by the change index.  The next best 
rated Serbian export sectors, in terms of international 
competitiveness, based on 2003 statistics and 
according to the ITC 2005 analysis, were the sectors 
of non-electric power machines, transportation 
equipment and leather products.  The table below 
shows more detailed figures regarding ITC analysis of 
these sectors, arranged by separate indicators. 
Appendix 2 contains results for remaining sectors.  
 Change in World Market Share represents one of 
the indicators encompassing both indices in the TPI 
toolkit, and is of crucial importance in competitiveness 
analysis.  The results referring to each analyzed sector 
Chart 1: Results of 2003 Trade performance index for Serbia and Montenegro.  Source: International Trade Center.
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are presented in the table on line C1, in relative terms 
for the period subject to review and including both 
the overall score of change in world market share as 
well as the sources of that change.  We can thus 
ascertain whether the increase of world market share 
stems from growth in competitiveness of the sector in 
question (labeled as Competitiveness effect), or 
whether it can be attributed to initial geographic 
specialization, initial product specialization, or sector 
adjustment to requirements of world market demand 
(labeled as Adaptation).  The initial geographic 
specialization of a country indicates the advantages 
enjoyed by that country, particularly its geographic 
location in terms of trading convenience with certain 
partners.  Initial product specialization indicates 
sectors in which the country enjoys a long, relatively 
continuous tradition of production.  A country’s 
adaptation to the dynamics of world market demand 
affects its foreign trade performance, i.e., measuring 
the degree of readiness and willingness to adjust 
promptly and thoroughly to the demands of world 
market consumers. 
 The combination of these indices produces the 
final figure measuring world market share change. 
Positive numbers signal an increase in world market 
share, and negative numbers correspondingly signal 
a decrease in world market share.  Decomposition of 
world market share change is executed by means of 
applying the constant market share analysis method.7 
 For example, during the 1999-2003 period, the 
non-electric power machines sector accomplished a 
total relative increase of world market share equal to 
5.07% per annum on average, almost entirely owing 
to the increase of competitiveness as one of its sources. 
Initial geographic and initial product specializations 
represented solid foundations for this sector, but 
adaptation to the dynamics of world market demand 
obtained negative results, thereby annulling the 
effects of good specialization.
 Therefore, we argue that at the stage of economic 
development that currently includes the case of 
Serbia, diversification, rather than initial 
specialization, represents the fundamental source of 
export growth, in addition to development of the 
national economy as a whole.  
 For quite a while, the scientific literature supported 
the notion that national economy development 
generates greater sector diversification in terms of 
exports.  However, more recent research8  shows that 
at a certain level of income per capita, diversification 
is again superseded by sectors’ concentration, such 
that the curve of sectors’ concentration in relation to 
 Table 2. Trade performance index results for the best-rated sectors as per 2003 Serbian export.  Source: International Trade Center.
7 For more detailed information regarding analysis of constant market participation, see Mlađen Kovačević, Međunarodna trgovina, (Belgrade, Serbia: Faculty of 
Economics, University of Belgrade, p. 250.)
8 Jean Imbs and Romain Wacziarg, ”Stages of Diversification,” American Economic Review (March 2003), p. 63-86.
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sectors in the course of 1999-2003, also occur as a 
consequence of a low statistical base stemming from 
small-scale Serbian exports prior to the year 2000.  
 
	 Acceptability of the Results
 Considering that during the 1990s, Serbia and 
Montenegro were almost excluded from world trade 
and international trade organizations, data regarding 
their foreign trade exchange are not always accurate 
and reliable.  A major portion of analysis conducted 
by the International Trade Center relies upon data 
provided indirectly by Serbia & Montenegro’s foreign 
trade partners (mirror statistics).  
 ITC data and analysis outcomes referring to 
Serbia and Montenegro are utilized with the aim of 
reviewing the competitiveness of the economy of 
Serbia proper.  Such approximation is reasonable 
because, depending on the applied parameters used, 
92-95% of economic activity in Serbia and 
Montenegro is that of the production industry of 
Serbia.  However, there is an outstanding issue, 
namely the inclusion of data on Kosovo in the 
analysis:  since 1999, statistics for Serbia do not 
encompass data regarding commerce involving 
Kosovo, and if analysts try to come up with findings 
utilizing an indirect method of evaluating Serbia 
and Montenegro trade flows, such attempts are 
complicated by the fact that some trading partners 
can provide data for Kosovo as a region and some 
cannot, consequently affecting the competitiveness 
SECTOR Ranking RCA
Basic manufacturing 14 3,33
Leather products 19 3,27
Chemicals 22 1,16
Processed food industry 28 3,69
Products made of wood 42 1,65
Non-electric power
machines
42 0,51
Clothing 49 2,12
Miscellaneous production 50 0,71
Electronic components 61 0,27
Transport equipment 61 0,19
Textile 79 0,50
Fresh food 105 1,41
Minerals 105 0,41
Table 3. Specialization index – Serbia and Montenegro, 2003.  Source: 
International Trade Center.  Calculation based on COMTRADE 
UNSD.
per capita income in a given national economy has 
the shape of the letter U.  It means that once a certain 
level of development has been reached, decline occurs 
in terms of number of sectors participating in the 
export of one national economy.
 The ITC analysis of particular national economies 
determines sector specialization by means of applying 
a Revealed Comparative Advantage index, which uses 
the Balassa formula to compute the proportion of a 
sector’s share of national export against the same 
sector’s share of world export.  Table 3 shows the 2003 
figures for 13 sectors in Serbia.
 According to this specialization index, all sectors 
exhibiting a value higher than 1 in the Revealed 
Comparable Advantages Index are deemed critical in 
terms of export. The basic manufacturing sector 
reports the highest value of above noted index for 
Serbia in the year 2003.  The ITC analysis of 
specialization advances another step, ranking all the 
sectors in comparison to the same type of sectors of 
other national economies. Therefore, basic 
manufacturing sector ranked 1th in terms of 
specialization out of 188 national economies.  If we 
take into account that the non-electric power 
machines sector, as the most competitive sector in 
Serbian export according to the ITC analysis of 2003 
statistics, actually shows a specialization index value 
of less than 1, it is consistent with our contention that 
at the present stage of the development, diversification, 
rather than specialization, represents the primary 
source of the Serbian export growth.9
 Data from the table above may be also illustrated  
as a chart.  
 On the basis of the ITC’s Trade Performance Index 
for the period 1999-2003, the most competitive 
sectors of the Serbian economy are non-electronic 
machinery, transportation equipment, leather 
products, and also fresh food and processed food. 
These sectors typically encompass products of a lower 
processing phase, in other words, products with low 
value-added.  This indicates a low level of overall 
economic development in Serbia.  
 Certain sectors, although distinguished in terms 
of exports, presently report absolute decline per world 
market share (for example, the transportation 
equipment sector).  Also, ranking sectors on a list of 
the most competitive sectors depends in part on the 
current trade regime, which is expected to undergo 
significant amendments in the foreseeable future. 
Relative increases in market share, evident with many 
9 Jean Imbs and Romain Wacziarg, ”Stages of Diversification,” American Economic Review (March 2003), p. 63-86.
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Fresh food
Minerals
Textiles
Electronic components
Transport equipment
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Clothing
Wood products
Non-electronic machinery
Processed food
Chemicals
Leather products
Basic manufactures
 Chart 2. Specialization index for Serbia and Montenegro according to the data for the year 2003.  Source: International Trade Center
Service sector Export Import Balance
1. Tourist services 227 182 45
2. Traffic services 271 332  - 61
 2.1. Air traffic 52 27 25
 2.2. Road traffic 81 66 15
 2.3. Railway traffic 31 28 3
 2.4. River traffic 14 14 0
 2.5. Marine traffic 0 21 - 21
 2.6. Others 93 175 - 82
3. Communication services 69 27 42
4. Investment works 
(Construction works 
contracted by investors)
97 75 22
5. Insurance 12 25 - 13
6. Financial services 3 32 - 29
7. Retail 96 76 20
8. Operational lease 1 35 - 34
9. Copy right and license 3 40 - 37
10.Business and professional 
services
174 231 - 57
11. Personal and cultural 
services 40 40 0
12.Government services 15 37 - 22
13. Miscellaneous services 10 14 - 4
Not allotted 167 - 167
TOTAL 1.188 1.146 42
results for Serbia.  Still, this potential source of bias 
does not bear significant impact and certainly is not 
large.  The detriment rests with the fact that data 
regarding trading activities of Serbia with separate 
customs zones for Montenegro and Kosovo were not 
included in foreign trade analysis since they are 
considered and recorded in Serbian government 
records as internal trade statistics, although one 
should bear in mind that these territories effectively 
represent significant export markets of Serbia.  
 The data on Serbian exports for 1999 and 2000 
have been subject to major and extraordinary factors 
(NATO military intervention, sanctions, popular 
uprisings producing a change of government) of 
political instability and therefore can not be 
considered completely representative.  But, taking 
into account that interval indicators include the data 
for 2001-2002 and 2003, they are reliable enough.  
 Also, one should keep in mind that the analysis of 
a majority of national economies reviews 1 
commodity sectors, while the same procedure for 
Serbia and Montenegro reviews only 13 sectors.  The 
information technology and home appliances sector 
were exempted from the analysis.  Such sectors are 
still in their infancy, considering the overall 
development of Serbian economy, and certainly are 
not able to achieve relevant competitiveness 
indicators;  thus, these exclusions did not render ITC 
analysis outcomes unacceptable.  
Some are of the opinion that the competitiveness 
strength of the Serbian economy rests with the 
Table . International service exchange of Serbia for the period from 
January to September 2005, denominated in millions of American 
dollars.  Source: Data supplied by National Bank of Serbia,
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service industry, while the ITC analysis takes only 
commodity sectors into consideration.  In fact, 
provision of services still does not represent the 
dominant sector in terms of generating gross 
domestic product in Serbia, given that the service 
industry achieved only a 38.6% share of GDP in 
2000, as opposed to developed countries where 
services make up as much as 60% of GDP.  But the 
service sector does represent a relevant employment 
venue in Serbia’s economy:  in 2000, approximately 
55% of all employees in Serbia worked in service 
industries.10 Serbia also accomplishes significant 
export of services and balance of service exchange is 
positive.  Services provided by Serbia in its capacity 
of a transit country are particularly highly 
esteemed.  
 It is also true that goods remain the dominant 
product in international trade since it accounts for 
approximately 80% of total export world wide. 
Although many organizations, such as the United 
Nations and the OECD, are engaged in collecting, 
arranging and publishing statistics on service 
industries, precise systems are not yet in place to 
facilitate the obtaining of accurate data regarding 
services.  Statistics on international services are 
inferred from payment transaction records.  That is 
the reason why many organizations omit services 
from their competitiveness analyses.  For all these 
reasons, the results from the analysis of Serbia’s 
export competitiveness, conducted by the 
International Trade Center, are acceptable.  
	 9.	Export	Oriented	Products	of	
	 Serbian	Economy
 After determining the basic sectors that constitute 
the Serbian economy, the next step is to identify the 
products dominating Serbia’s exports.  For that 
purpose, a different ITC analytical tool will be 
applied, namely National Export Performance (or 
“NEP index,” for short).  The NEP index provides an 
overview of export performance of a national 
economy, broken down by products, in addition to a 
survey of world market demand dynamics and 
growth trends intrinsic to a country’s key exports. 
This index identifies the most successful export 
products of certain national economy, both from a 
static as well as a dynamic point of view.  Briefly 
speaking, NEP index indicates the most successful 
export product of a given national economy, its 
position in the market (in comparison to the similar 
products at the world market), and degree of product 
diversification.  (For more detailed information 
regarding the NEP methodology, see Attachment 1, 
Part B, section referring to NEP)
 The 2005 NEP index for Serbia and Montenegro 
was calculated on the basis of the most recent data 
for the year 2003 and data covering the 1999-2003 
period.  The analysis of outcomes for Serbia and 
Montenegro together were utilized to facilitate 
analysis of Serbia’s export structure, divided by 
products, much as was done with the TPI results and 
calculations.  The results from the 1999-2003 period, 
in the context of static analysis, show that 20 most 
successful Serbian export items might be separated 
into four different categories.  
1. The following items number among the so-called 
“star products” of Serbian export: products made of 
aluminum (code 7601 and 7606 of the Harmonized 
System), frozen fruits and walnuts (HS 0811, 
raspberries in first place), pneumatic tires (HS 011), 
footwear (HS 603), polymers of ethylene (HS 3901), 
products made of iron (flat-rolled sheets and scrap, 
HS 7210 and 720), panty hose and tights (HS 6115) 
and female apparel (HS 620);
2. Early development phase products in Serbian 
exports, such as medications (HS 300) and parts 
and tools for motor vehicles (HS 8708);
3. There are no products that might be classified as 
„snails“;
. Traditional products of Serbian export include: 
products made of iron (sheet iron, HS 7208 and 
7209), sugar (HS 1701), wood (sawn/chipped, HS 
07), maize (HS 1005), copper (HS 709), 
construction material (HS 3918) and men’s suits (HS 
6203).
Ranking
PRODUCT Leading markets
HS code Naziv Primary market Secondary market
1. 7601 Raw aluminum Italy Greece
2. 0811 Frozen fruits and walnuts Germany France
3. 4011 New outer pneumatic tires France Great Britain
4. 1701 Sugar Italy Germany
Table 5.  Leading export markets for best selling products (champions) of Serbian export 
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SCEPP (Savetodavni centar za ekonomska i pravna pitanja) September 2003) p. 38.
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Chart 3. Static portfolio of Serbia and Montenegro for 1999-2003 period.  Source: ITC calculation based on COMTRADE statistics.
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Chart . Dynamic portfolio of Serbia and Montenegro, 1999-2003.  Source: ITC calculation on the basis of COMTRADE statistics.
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 These products are presented in chart 3. Product 
groups are separated by quadrants, and lines 
separating them indicate the growth of world 
markets and world market share for each export 
product of Serbia and Montenegro.  The relative size 
of little balloons representing each product 
corresponds to the export value of that particular 
product.  As one might observe, the products 
dominating Serbian export are, in the first place, 
primary products of a lower processing phase and 
low add-on value.  Together, they constitute an 
unfavorable export structure.  In 2003, the world 
market share of all Serbian exports totaled a low 
0.03%, which is below the economic potential of 
Serbia.  All the products listed above create a clear 
picture of Serbian economic performance as divided 
across products and corresponding to the sectors of 
the TPI index (e.g.  basic processing industry, leather 
industry, etc.).  If we look at the leading markets for 
the placement of Serbia’s “champion products,” we 
notice that they are the member states of the 
European Union, primarily Germany, Italy and 
France.  
 Static results for the NEP index for Serbia and 
Montenegro during the 1999-2003 period are 
presented in the chart below.  
 The NEP index also has a dynamic dimension. 
The difference with regard to the static model 
concerns the application of the world market share 
increase of Serbia and Montenegro during the 1999-
2003 period, which is represented on the horizontal 
axis of the dynamic model, instead of the world 
market share of Serbia and Montenegro during the 
same period that was used in the static model.  We 
use two dimensions in this analysis: product export 
performance and market performance at the global 
level in order to classify the condition of 
competitiveness in the world market for a particular 
national economy, thereby arriving at the following 
matrix.  All products are separated into four 
categories:
 Just like static analysis, the results are presented 
in a similar chart with the exception of one dividing 
line in this case illustrating growth dynamics of 
world market share.  The position of Serbian export 
is therefore as follows:
1. Products known as “champions” -- winners in 
rising markets and placed in first quadrant (upper 
right corner) of the reference chart -- include 
aluminum products (HS 7601 and 7606), fresh fruits 
and walnuts (HS 0811), iron products (HS 7208 and 
7210), pneumatic tires (HS 011), polymers of 
ethylene (HS 3901), footwear (HS 603), maize (HS 
1005) and seats (HS 901).  Foreign trade promotion 
activities should focus on this product group with 
the aim of widening the range and capacity of 
product offerings.  
2. Lagging products might be described as losers or 
underperformers in growing markets.  They may be 
found in the second quadrant (upper left side) of 
chart 2.  They are medicaments (medications, HS 
300).  Such products possess strong export potential, 
but they suffer constraints that have to be identified 
and overcome by means of foreign trade promotion. 
3. Declining sectors consist of products deemed as 
losers in declining markets, exhibiting the worst 
export performance in the Serbian economy.  Those 
products are located in third quadrant (lower left 
side) of chart number 2, including wood (sawn/
chipped, HS 07).  Foreign trade promotion for 
these products is a waste of effort and resources.  
. In the fourth quadrant of chart no.  2 (lower right 
corner) we locate winning products in declining 
markets.  That class encompasses sugar (HS 1701), 
copper (HS 709), construction materials (HS 3918), 
and male suits (HS 6203).  Foreign trade promotion 
of such products should build upon marketing 
strategies guided by technological innovations.  
Products distinguished by virtue of exhibiting the 
best performance records within Serbia’s export 
structure include rolled aluminum products, frozen 
fruits, products made of iron and rubber, and maize. 
The overall conclusion confirms that all export 
products of Serbia are classified in a lower processing 
phase, thereby suggesting that future efforts should 
concentrate on raising the level of products’ value-
added.  Foreign trade promotion strategies are not 
sufficient to accomplish growth in value-added, thus 
requiring the additional application of strategies 
designed to increase exports and restructuring.  Such 
policy strategies and their likely consequence for the 
diversification of the products will be discussed in 
the following sections.
 The obstacles mentioned in the earlier section 
analyzing the Serbian economy’s export sectors 
apply equally to the analysis of exported products. 
Trade Map of Serbia
PRODUCTS
Losers Winners
MARKETS
Rising Losers at rising markets (products falling behind) Winners at rising markets (champions)
Declining Losers at declining markets Winners at declining markets
Matrix 1. Product and market classification according to the export performance
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ECONOMY
SECTORS (TPI) PRODUCTS (NEP)
Current index (static)
Change index 
(dynamic)
Stars (static) Champions (dynamic)
SERBIA
Non-electric machinery 
(43), transportation 
equipment(44), leather 
products (56) and 
electronic components 
(56)
Minerals (1), fresh food 
(9) and transportation 
equipment (11
Panty hose and tights, 
frozen fruits and walnuts, 
and pneumatic tires
Petroleum oil, flat-rolled 
products of iron and 
seats
SLOVENIA
Wood products (6), 
electronic components 
(11) and chemicals (14)
Transportation 
equipment (5), electronic 
components (21) and 
textile (25)
Parts for machines, 
electro-mechanical 
devices and home 
appliances 
Medicaments, electricity 
and electro-mechanical 
machines 
CROATIA
Non-electrical 
machinery(29), leather 
products (40) and IT and 
consumers’ electronics 
(42)
Leather products (12), 
IT and consumers’ 
electronics (15) and non-
electronic machinery (21)
Instruments for 
automatic regulation, 
sweaters, pullovers, etc.  
and seats
Oil gas, seats, sweaters, 
pullovers.
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
Leather products (45), 
products made of wood 
(48) and clothing (67)
Fresh food (5), products 
made of wood (8) and 
processed food (9)
Footwear, unwrought 
aluminum
Electricity.  waste and 
scrap iron and steel, seats
MACEDONIA
Basic processing industry 
(44), clothing (46) and 
products made of leather 
(50)
Transportation 
equipment (35), 
processed food (37) and 
leather products (51)
Non-alcohol beverages, 
ladies shirts and ladies 
apparel
Non-alcohol beverages, 
petroleum oil and ferrous 
alloy 
CZECH REPUBLIC
Transportation 
equipment(8), wood 
products (8) and basic 
processing industry (10)
IT and consumers’ 
electronics (4), products 
made of wood (14) basic 
processing industry (19))
TV cameras, air-
conditioning and TV sets
Electricity, TV cameras, 
electrical equipment for 
illumination / signaling
HUNGARY
Clothing (8), fresh food 
(9) IT and consumers’ 
electronics (11)
Textile (3), non-electrical 
machinery (4) IT and 
consumers’ electronics 
(11) various processing 
industry(11)
Video recorders, 
television cameras and 
television sets
Television cameras, 
television sets and 
petroleum oil
Table 6. Sectors and products dominating the export of national economies subject to review.  Source: ITC-analysis of TPI and NEP index for 
respective national economies
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Despite limitations and weaknesses, the ITC analysis 
results may be accepted as valid.  
 The results presented above, as well as conclusions 
derived from ITC methods, are based on earlier data 
and, even more importantly, the already determined 
aggregate of sectors and products for every country 
under analysis.  However, the ITC analysis is 
silent on the issue of introducing new products 
and technologies that might prove sustainable in 
export markets.  In that sense, it is relevant to stress 
the irreplaceable role played by entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs’ vision and ability to see ahead 
might identify products that hold potential for 
classification in the upper right quadrant of the chart 
(“champions“), or are not present in the chart at all. 
In that context, the previously applied methodology 
of ITC chart may, at best, represent useful but 
incomplete information benefiting entrepreneurs 
when communicating and sharing information and 
knowledge in their dealings with policymakers.
 Comparison between the countries
 The ITC results may be used for the purpose of 
comparing the results of Serbia’s exports with the 
accomplishments of other countries taken as points 
of reference (particularly neighboring countries and 
transition countries).  For that purpose, the results of 
selected national economies are presented in table 6. 
The TPI index results denote the sectors dominating 
Serbia’s export structure, and the numbers in 
brackets signifies the rating of sectors’ competitiveness 
at the global level.  The results of the NEP index 
specify the particular products dominating export 
performance relative to the national economy.  Both 
analytical instruments possess the static (current) 
and dynamic (future) versions.  One should bear in 
mind that in the Serbian case, the sector of 
information technology and consumer electronics 
has not been included in ITC analysis, but even if it 
had, it would not have changed the outcome. 
 
 At first glance, it becomes apparent that more 
developed economies, such as those of Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and even Croatia, possess 
more sophisticated sectors and products which 
dominate their export structure, as opposed to less 
developed countries, namely Serbia and Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, where primary 
products (raw and partially processed materials) 
dominate their respective export structure.  The 
described export structure corresponds to the overall 
stage of economic development of the reviewed 
national economies.  
 Also, similar sectors often dominate the export of 
national economies discussed in this paper, which, 
when considering the example of the former 
Yugoslavia, confirms the notion of long-term mutual 
growth and similar foundations in terms of resources. 
But, the competitiveness level of sector in question 
corresponds to the general development level of the 
national economy, illustrated by the example of 
Slovenian sector of electronic parts taking 11th place 
out of 189 reviewed countries, while the same sector 
of Serbian economy ranks 56th.  Situation is similar 
in regards to the sector of wood products when 
comparing Slovenia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
etc.  But the problem underlying sectors dominating 
Serbian export is that their international 
competitiveness level is rather low (ranking 3rd and 
lower, worldwide).
 With regard to table 6, it can also be observed 
how competitiveness affects appeals for direct 
foreign investment.  Hungary exhibits a very 
favorable structure of export sectors.  Sectors 
showing the best performance in Hungary’s export 
structure include IT and consumer electronics, non-
electronic machinery, and electronic components. 
Hungary’s export is dominated by one technologically 
very intensive sector, namely IT and consumer 
electronics.  This state of affairs stems in large part 
from investments by several transnational 
companies, effectively assisting Hungary to achieve 
better technological competitiveness.  Regarding 
Serbia, one might notice the metal sector ranking 
first globally where future expectations are 
concerned, due to enormous investments in this 
sector on part of large multi-national companies.  
	 10.	Trade	Regime	and	Future	Exports
 The ability of a national economy to export is, as 
classical theories of international trade suggest, the 
result of its comparative advantage and abundance 
in natural resources.  This is what many analysts 
have in mind when they research the competitiveness 
of a particular national economy.  But sometimes the 
export of one national economy can also be a product 
of a specific trade regime that exists between this 
national economy and other national economies. 
This means that not only the market environment 
(firm competition and comparative advantage) 
determines trade flows, but also trade policy between 
and among states.
 A trade regime is a system that defines the 
conditions under which goods and services are 
exchanged between national economies.  Trade 
regimes are defined by the application (or reduction, 
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or removal) of trade barriers, and depend on the 
trade policy that a given national economy adopts 
and maintains.  National trade policy can be 
protectionist or liberal, depending on the intensity 
of application of trade barriers.  Today, many trade 
policies are discriminatory meaning that some 
national economies have more favorable treatment 
in trade than others.
 Many national economies today are members of 
regions with formal trade integration, which means 
that regional member states have preferential trade 
arrangements for members compared to states 
outside the region of integration.  This enables 
countries to export products which are not absolutely 
competitive in world markets.  This is known as the 
effect of trade diversion of regional trade integration. 
From a global point of view, this effect is negative. 
However, viewed from the perspective of an 
individual national economy, this means more 
exports, more employment and generally more 
economic prosperity.
 Apart from trade regimes defined by bilateral 
trade agreements and regional trade regimes, there 
is also the multilateral trade regime known as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
today administered by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  One of the basic principles of this multilateral 
trade system is the rule of non-discrimination among 
fellow members of the WTO.  But this rule does not 
apply to regional trade integrations as a big 
exception.  
 This means that within a favorable trade regime, a 
country can export some products that would not 
otherwise have a comparative advantage, which 
suggests that regional trade integration is closed in 
nature. Small national economies do not usually 
have the leverage and resources to create trade 
regimes, and typically have to accept what is offered 
to them.  This refers to bilateral, regional, and 
especially multilateral trade regimes.  But these 
small and undeveloped countries have to try to find 
ways to make the trade regime work for their 
development.  They have to find ways to increase 
gains from international trade.11
 
 In all regimes, developing countries usually 
receive unilateral benefits and more favorable 
treatment than other national economies.  In bilateral 
relations, there is often a generalized system of 
preferences (GSP) structured by a larger, more 
developed nation; in regional terms, there are 
sometimes regional development funds;  and 
multilateral trade regimes sometimes recognize 
Special and Differential treatment for developing 
countries and extremely permissive (liberal) trade 
regimes for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
 Today’s Serbia is a small and underdeveloped 
country with only a few primary products as its most 
important exports.  It does not have regulated trade 
relations with its major trading partners.  The 
European Union (EU) is a major trading partner of 
Serbia, but there is no bilateral trade agreement 
between these two trading entities.  The EU has 
unilaterally adopted Autonomy Trade Measures for 
Western Balkan countries, meaning that Serbia can 
export most products except specific types of beef, 
fish, and textiles into the EU market under a very 
liberal regime.  Even the exports of textiles and sugar 
have been further liberalized.  But these are only 
unilateral measures extended to Serbia by the EU. 
Serbian exports still face many difficulties in the EU 
market writ large.  Even if customs duties were low, 
many so-called non-tariff barriers remain which 
curtail Serbian exports to EU market.  The trade 
agreement with Russia is also very favorable, but it 
has not yet been ratified.
 There have been some steps taken to create a free 
trade zone in Southeast Europe, the first major trade 
integration initiative for this region in which Serbia 
will take part.  But this regional trade regime will 
influence only trade with those former Yugoslav 
republics that are Serbia’s traditional partners.  Any 
future trade regime that Serbia might create must be 
aligned with the EU Joint Trade Policy so long as 
Serbia seeks EU membership and market access.
 Serbia is not yet a full member of the WTO, but it 
started an accession process in 2005, separately from 
Montenegro.  The problem is that all new acceding 
national economies are requested to make more and 
more concessions (so-called “WTO plus obligations”), 
so Serbian negotiators should be very careful when 
negotiating trade concessions with the WTO.  These 
concessions should seek a favorable trade regime for 
Serbia to spur economic development.
 It is difficult to pick out the sectors and products 
that should drive Serbia’s future exports.  Selecting 
export products means that policymakers are 
consciously providing incentives for firms to 
specialize in the production and export of those 
products as the bases of participation in the world 
economy.  A basic competitive advantage and the 
relevant trade regime determine the prospects for 
export.  But both preconditions can change over 
time.  Even the basic competitive advantages for one 
country can change over time, which is why some 
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authors12 argue that over time sectors and products 
which are competitive in exports of one country tend 
to change.  One approach is that evolution of 
international specialization over time can be viewed 
from several angles.  The first angle is to identify 
whether national economies increasingly specialize 
in certain sectors.  
The second angle is to observe how a country’s extent 
of specialization in individual sectors changes over 
time.  Third, analysts can model the influence of this 
specialization on world production and trade.  The 
fourth angle is to analyze whether the patterns of 
specialization are determined by technological 
progress or by factor accumulation.  Under this 
approach, analysis is intended to uncover the 
dynamics of trade patterns of national economies.
 Also, analysis has to take note of change in 
dominant export products and sectors wrought not 
only by natural trading processes but also by 
government intervention in foreign trade in the form 
of foreign trade policy.  Many analyses try to include 
the trade regime as one factor in their explanation of 
trading outcomes.13 Usually we observe trade 
proportion in a multi-country model while focusing 
on only a few foreign trade policy effects.  But trade 
regimes are, in one sense, products of foreign trade 
policies of many countries and aspects of these 
policies can affect every partner country.  So they all 
have to be included in the analysis that observe 
relative inducement and trade cost for many 
countries in a matrix.1 This approach is more in line 
with microeconomic applications.
 There are also some other regimes that are 
necessary for export growth.  For example, there are 
some indications that Serbia has advantages in 
development of software products.  However, the as-
yet-undefined intellectual property protection 
regime in Serbia is an obstacle for production and 
export in this sector. 
 The creation of a favorable trade regime in the 
future is very important for export performance. 
The next section discusses these export intervention 
policies.  We have to keep all these facts in mind 
when we consider the prospects for the Serbian 
exports, and especially if we would like to determine 
which sectors and even products could play a major 
role in Serbia’s future exports.
	 11.	 Policies	of	Export-Promotion
 Many national economy policymakers and 
experts today view export as the most important 
source of economic growth.  Two types of export 
policies — export-promotion policies and export 
restructuring policies — can be distinguished.
 Export-promotion policies include all government 
policies that tend to improve exports under the 
present structure.  This means that with export-
promotion policies, governments hope to increase 
the export of already exported goods.  All these 
policies can be marketing-oriented or finance-
oriented.  Marketing-oriented export-promotion 
policies include all actions that use marketing tools 
in order to promote exports.  These marketing tools 
tend to promote the country‘s exports as a general 
matter, or specific export products through different 
promotional activities (exhibitions, commercials on 
TV, etc.).  For this purpose, countries establish 
national export promotion agencies.  Finance-
oriented export promotion activities include credit 
lines for the export of equipment and other large 
value export products.  For this latter purpose, 
countries tend to establish export credit agencies.
 However, many countries have adopted policies 
that aim to alter the product structure of future 
exports.  These policies have been dubbed export-
restructuring policies, but they are usually referred 
to as industrial policies.  Newly industrialized 
countries have used these policies to initiate the 
development of certain sectors.  Nowadays industrial 
policies are not so popular because of the tendency 
to promote the concept of a free market economy 
with little government intervention.15 
 Some authors16 suggest new types of industrial 
polices that maximize the potential to contribute to 
economic growth, and minimize waste and rent-
seeking.  These new types of industrial policies rely 
on collaboration between governments and the 
private sector.  Governments usually do not have 
sufficient information “to pick winners” among 
firms, sectors, or products for promotion purposes, 
so they need the assistance of private entrepreneurs 
who know the business.  As poor countries get richer, 
their export structure tends to diversify (across more 
sectors or products), rather than specialize in 
particular sectors or products.  The new sectors that 
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emerge are immediately shaped by their potential 
competitiveness.  
 Practically all industrial policies have to have 
high-level political support.  Collaboration between 
the government and private sector can be achieved 
through coordination or deliberation councils which 
are private-public bodies.  These industrial policies 
have to be viewed by public as growth policies and 
not the policies that stimulate growth of already 
privileged sectors of the economy.  
 For an industrial policy to be successful, it must 
observe the following principles.  The main purpose 
of industrial policy is to diversify the economy and 
generate new areas of comparative advantage.  In 
each industrial policy, clear benchmarks should be 
established as criteria for success.  In addition, a 
built-in termination clause should be envisaged.  The 
support provided by the policy should target new 
activities in sectors, not entire sectors.  Activities 
that are subsidized must have a potential for spillover 
effects on other activities in the economy.  It is very 
important to have adequate bodies to carry out these 
policies.  The agencies that deal with promotion must 
have adequate channels of communication with 
private sector.  Throughout the process of discovery 
of adequate sectors for industrial policy, mistakes 
will occur.  This is part and parcel “of good industrial 
policy.”17 
 It is difficult to determine which products will be 
introduced by industrial policy.  That is why 
government should finance the initial process of 
determination of these new export products.  When 
they are determined and proven successful, the 
government should seek to involve private investors. 
Industrial policy can apply many tools to create 
incentives for product development, like subsidizing 
production, research, financing higher risk deals, 
etc.  Even the establishment of export processing 
zones can be viewed as an element of industrial 
policy.  But with this policy, government clearly 
favors one sector over another.
 Sometimes in this age of globalization and 
promotion of market principles, many think that 
there is no place for industrial policy.  The view is 
that regional and multilateral trade regulations 
prohibit industrial policy application.  Dani Rodrik 
is of the opinion that in the multilateral trade regime 
framework of WTO rules, there is room for industrial 
policy for a limited number of sectors for a limited 
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time.  In his mind, industrial policy is effectively a 
process of economic self-discovery.18 
12.	 Conclusions
 The ITC methodology that we applied to identify 
the most vibrant export-performing sectors and 
products of the Serbian economy has shown that 
the most important sectors of the Serbian economy 
are the basic manufacturing sector (metallurgy), the 
leather industry, processed foods, and the chemical 
industry.  For Serbia, a fundamental obstacle to 
establishing global competitiveness over the long 
term is that these primary export sectors are 
dominated by primary products with low value-
added.  
 The Serbian government should strive to boost 
export levels and solve the problem of large and 
permanent trade deficits.  But the government 
should also pursue export-restructuring policies. 
These policies should encourage new products in 
Serbia’s traditional export sectors of Serbia with an 
emphasis on higher value-added.  These policies 
also can stimulate the introduction of completely 
new sectors for export performing, such as software 
or other technologically more advanced products. 
Government research ahead of investment, and not 
tycoons or pressure groups, should designate which 
of these new sectors should be a target of industrial 
policy.
 The actions of the Serbian government concerning 
industrial policy matters must be coordinated with 
a view to EU membership and future specialization 
in the EU Common market trade regime, and 
in accordance with WTO membership, which is 
currently under negotiation.  In these EU and WTO 
accession negotiations, appropriate conditions of 
accession should be achieved in order for this policy 
to be applied. 
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Appendix 1: ITC Methodology
 For determining which sectors of the Serbian Economy and which specific products play an important role in 
export competitiveness of Serbia we have decided to use the methodology developed and applied by the 
International Trade Center (ITC) from Geneva. 19  ITC is an intergovernmental organization under the auspices 
of its parent organizations, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN), as 
represented by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  One of the methodologies of ITC is 
a Country Market Analysis Profiles (Country Map) that explores the foreign trade profile of each national 
economy in the world, even those which are not members of the International Trade Center.  Strategic market 
research is used to gauge the effectiveness of national and sectoral trade performance, and to identify priority 
products and markets for trade development.20 The Country Map consists of six methods for assessing the foreign 
trade profile of the national economy.  Two methods serve our purposes here.
 
 One of the tools comprising the Country Map is the Trade Performance Index (TPI).  This method assesses 
and monitors multidimensional export performance in the context of competitiveness of countries by pointing 
out the principal export sectors.  The other tool is National Export Performance (NEP).  It assesses the export 
performance of national economies in terms of product composition exports, dynamics of international demand, 
and growth patterns of leading export products of these national economies.  These two tools from the ITC 
Country Map assess the present situation in export performance of a national economy.  They also contain a 
dynamic component in the analysis that analyzes changes in the trade environment over the last four years.  The 
dynamic component is based on historical data and by itself cannot yield more information on sectors and 
products that can be critical in the export of one particular national economy.  Many theories suggest that the 
comparative advantages of a particular country change in time, so national economies are often dynamic in their 
international specialization.  Changes in comparative advantage occur due to changes in natural predisposition, 
trade regimes, world market structures, etc.  But methods that could specify which sectors and products can be 
most critical in future export is limited.  One can only try to speculate on the analysis of change in demand, trade 
regimes, and market conditions in the future.
 A.  Trade Performance Index
 The Trade Performance Index (TPI) calculates the level of competitiveness and diversification of a particular 
export sector using comparisons with other national economies.  The last available results for TPI analyzes 
exports across 1 sectors and 18 national economies.21 For each national economy and sector, the TPI provides 
22 indicators grouped in three groups of indicators:
1. a general profile; 
2. the position of the national economy for the most recent year (for which there is data);
3. changes in export performance in recent years.
The following indicators are factored into the general profile:
- value of exports, presented in thousands of USD, for the most recent year;
- weighted trend of exports, for the most recent -year period;
- share in national exports, in the most recent year;
- share in national imports, in the most recent year;
- average annual change in per capita exports, for the most recent  year period;
- relative unit value, in the most recent year;
- average annual change in relative unit value, for the most recent  year period;
- revealed comparative advantage.
Most of these indicators consist of statistical data collected from the COMTRADE database, developed by the 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) as the most comprehensive trade statistics in the world.  Other 
indicators are derived from this data with more or less simplified statistical methods.  
Trade Map of Serbia
19 For more information about the methodology and results for other countries, go to the ITC website: www.intracen.org. 
20 International Trade Center, “Country Market Analysis Profiles:  User Guide” (Geneva: ITC, April 2003) 1
21 International Trade Center, “The Trade Performance Index,”  background paper (Geneva: ITC, April 2000) 3.
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics

The relative unit value (RUV) for each sector is calculated as the ratio of the average unit value of exports for a 
national economy to a world average unit value. It indicates if the national country is exporting its goods with 
a value lower than the world average (if RUV is under 1), at world average value (if RUV is equal to 1) or at a 
value higher than the world average (if RUV is higher that 1).  
As a measure of comparative advantage, the corrected Revealed Comparative Advantage index developed by 
Center for the Study of Perspectives and International Information from Paris (Centre d’études prospectives et 
d’informations internationales Paris – CEPII) is employed.  The correction tends to isolate the effects of the 
business cycle brought about by changes in real exchange rates.  This corrected index is represented by following 
formula:
 with:
 Xti.. i Mi..  national economy i total export or imports in year t, respectively
 Xti.cl i Mi.cl  national economy i total export or imports of products belonging to 
    the cluster cl in year t, respectively
 (Xticl. - Micl.) the observed trade imbalance of national economy i for the cluster 
   cl in year t
 
 
  the weighted of cluster cl in the national economy i exports in year t
 
 the theoretical imbalance of national economy i for the cluster cl in year t.
 In the group position of the national economy for the most recent year for which there is data, the following 
indicators are included:
 • value of net export, in thousands of USD;
 • per capita exports (USD per inhabitant);
 • share in world markets, in percent;
 • product diversification;
 • product spread (ranking);
 • market diversification;
 • market spread (ranking).
 The most important contribution of this ITC tool is that, apart from presenting these indicators in absolute 
terms, it ranks indicators among 18 observed national economies and points out as a relative matter which 
economies are superior in an observed sector.
 In the last (third) group of indicators entitled “Changes in export performance in recent years,” the indicators 
included are:
 • percentage change in world market share;
 • trend of import coverage by export;
 • matching with dynamics of world demand;
 • change in product diversification;
 •  hange in product spread;
 • change in market diversification;
 • change in market spread. 
All these indicators are also relatively ranked between national economies.
 For each of 1 sectors, all indicators are calculated on the 5-digit level of SITC nomenclature, which comprises 
around 3,500 products in total.  Sectors are specially defined as production of similar products.  The indicators 
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from the first group are only used for descriptive purposes and they are not used in the calculation of composite 
rankings.  The other two groups of indicators are the basis for further analysis, namely, the calculation of two 
composite rankings such as:
1. Current Index
2. Change Index
 The Current Index presents a current overall position and is based on the five most important criteria, 
namely value of net exports, per capita exports, world market share, the diversification of products and the 
diversification of markets.  It is a snapshot of present export trade performance for the respective national 
economy.
 The Change Index that shows changes in performance is based also on five criteria including change in 
world market share, the change in the cover ratio (representing the coverage of imports by exports), the 
level of specialization in dynamic products, the change in product diversification and the change in market 
diversification.  This index shows the evolution of export performance of the observed national economy in a 
five-year period.  In this way, the Trade Performance Index positions the export sector of national economies 
by export competitiveness from a static and dynamic perspective.
 B. National Export Performance 
 The National Export Performance (NEP) tool provides an overview of the export performance of a given 
national economy’s product composition of exports, the dynamics of international demand, and growth 
patterns of their leading export product or products.  The results of this tool precisely show:
 • the leading export products of each national economy and their extent of concentration or diversification;
 • the products for which each country has out- or under-performed other countries, and increased or   
    decreased in its share of international markets;
 • the extent to which leading export products are positioned in growing or declining markets;
 • the market segment in which leading export products are positioned in terms of unit values.23 
 This tool yields static but also dynamic analysis results for the product composition of national exports.  In 
static terms, this tool defines four products categories according to their export performance:
1. Stars – products with excellent export performance;
2. Emerging products – products that are on the rise, but are battling for their respective share of world   
 markets;
3. Traditional products – products that national economies have exported for years and that have their
  (relatively well-established) place on the world market;
. Snails – products that have a low growth or declining share in the world market.
 All products in this categorization are presented in the special chart which shows the export value of product 
analyzed (by the size of the bubbles on the chart).  It compares world market share (horizontal axis) with the 
growth of international demand represented by world trade volume growth in the selected period (vertical axis). 
Moreover, the vertical line representing constant world market share of all products divides the chart into two 
parts, and with the horizontal line of growth of world trade for all products, the tool thereby creates four quadrants. 
The first quadrant (upper right) consists of star products, the second quadrant (upper left) are emerging products, 
the third quadrant (lower left) are snail products, and the fourth quadrant (lower right) present traditional 
products.
 In dynamic analysis terms, the results are presented in a separate chart.  It shows the export value of the 
products under consideration (export value determines the size of the circles in the chart), and it compares the 
national export change in world market share (horizontal axis) to the growth of international demand (vertical 
axis).  In addition, the chart indicates the average nominal growth of world imports (horizontal reference line) 
over a certain period.  Moreover, the vertical line divides the chart into two parts.  Exports of products to the right 
22  International Trade Center, “Country Market Analysis Profiles:  User Guide,” (Geneva: ITC, April 2003) 8
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Trade Map of Serbia
of this line have grown faster than the average of world imports, and thereby increased their share in the world 
market.  Conversely, products to the left of the vertical line have seen erosion of their world market share.  The 
vertical and the horizontal reference lines are of particular interest from a trade development perspective, since 
they divide the chart into four quadrants with different characteristics and suggest which trade promotion 
techniques should be used.  The quadrants have been labeled as follows:
1. Champions.  Winners in growth markets (upper right, first quadrant)
These are the export products for which the country has performed very well.  These are particularly dynamic 
products, which are growing faster than world trade in general and for which a given country has outperformed 
world market growth and increased its share in world imports.  Exporters of these products have proven their 
international competitiveness during the late 1990s.  Trade promotion efforts for these products are less risky, 
as these are national success stories, which can serve as reference points.  Promotional efforts should aim at 
broadening supply capacity.
2. Underachievers.  Losers in growth markets (upper left, second quadrant)
These products represent particular challenges for trade promotion efforts since international demand has been 
growing at above-average rates and the country in question has been falling behind.  Its exports have either 
declined or grown less dynamically than world trade overall for that product.  As a result, the country has been 
losing international market share.  In general, the bottleneck is not international demand, but rather it is on the 
supply side.  For these products, it is essential to identify and remove the specific bottlenecks, which impede a 
more dynamic expansion of exports.
3. Declining sectors (lower left, third quadrant).  The export prospects for these products tend to be gloomy. 
World imports of this product have been stagnating or have actually declined, and the market share of the 
country has gone down.  Trade promotion efforts for product groups in this category face great difficulties. 
They need to adopt an integrated approach to take into account bottlenecks for both supply and demand.
. Achievers in adversity - winners in declining markets (lower right, fourth quadrant).  Products in this 
quadrant are characterized by growing shares of the country exporters in world import markets that are 
declining or growing at a below average rate.  From a trade promotion perspective, niche-marketing strategies 
are required to encourage this positive trade performance, despite the overall decline in these markets.
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Appendix 2: Tables with TPI for sectors in Serbia and Montenegro by ITC calculations..
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	 	13.	 Problem	of	Serbian	
Economy	since	2000
 Serbia’s economy lags behind advanced reformers 
in Central and Eastern Europe in both transition 
efforts and the level of development.  In the 1990s, 
the country has managed to slip from the position of 
one of the leading reformers in CEE to one of the 
laggards of the process.  Ideological biases, 
mismanagement, and sanctions imposed by the UN 
Security Council took their toll.  
 After the democratic revolution of 2000, the new 
government faced two problems:  it had to accelerate 
economic growth, and to develop institutions 
appropriate to a market economy.  The country 
needed strong leadership with a clear vision of a 
liberal and democratic society.  Unfortunately, such 
an outcome was quite unlikely, since in general 
terms, the population in the region – at least at this 
stage of development – seems to prefer state 
intervention and income redistribution over private 
markets (Corneo and Gruner, 2002).  In addition, 
the task appeared especially demanding, since the 
government was composed of eighteen parties 
struggling to outmaneuver their coalition partners 
in proposing ever more populist policies.  Leaders of 
those parties demonstrated the inclination, already 
quite common in post-communist countries, of the 
middle-aged cohort to accept state intervention 
instead of free market values (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schundeln, 2005).  Simply put, they were not immune 
to lifelong indoctrination in collectivism, and 
therefore easily succumbed to the electorate’s 
prejudices against a full-blown market system.  In 
addition, large segments of this middle-aged group 
appear to be losers of market reforms in the short- 
and possible medium-run.
 In any event, the institutional changes adopted in 
the last four years seem to be irrevocable.  It is highly 
unlikely for the Serbian economy to return to one-
party rule.  But, underdevelopment remains a serious 
problem that challenges further improvements in 
democracy.  It is also an obstacle to joining the EU, 
and any present or future government that seeks 
3. Growth Diagnostics in the 
Serbian Context
integration into the Euro-Atlantic organizations 
must face the task of growth acceleration.
	 14.	 Approach
 Transition countries have been literally swamped by 
different suggestions for reform strategies.  All kinds 
of approaches have been suggested, and each political 
credo has been articulated into a comprehensive 
reform package branded as “the most suitable” one.  
 International financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank or the IMF, tried to organize this 
welter of confusing and often conflicting ideas into 
more practical, policy-oriented recommendations. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Washington 
Consensus emerged, emphasizing the following 
ten commandments: fiscal discipline, reorientation 
of public expenditures, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalization, unified and competitive exchange 
rates, trade liberalization, openness to foreign direct 
investment, and most of all - policies of privatization, 
deregulation, and securing property rights.  It 
was expected that Central and East European 
(CEE) countries should implement these policies 
simultaneously and thoroughly.  
 Because these policies did not work as 
anticipated in many cases, a second-generation of 
reform suggestions emerged, i.e.  the Augmented 
Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 200).  In addition 
to the objectives of the first Consensus,  transition 
countries were given ten more items to improve: 
corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible labor 
markets, adherence to the principles of the World 
Trade Organization, adherence to international 
financial codes and standards, liberalization of the 
capital account, exchange rate regimes, independent 
central banks, social safety nets, and targeted poverty 
reduction.  A combination of sticks and carrots was 
devised by international financial institutions and 
associations of advanced industrialized countries 
to push transitional countries to adopt all those 
policies.
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 In formulating reform policies, international 
organizations overlooked at least two possible 
objections:  rich countries often no longer resembled 
their earlier incarnations, and all attempts at 
transferring institutions without country-specific 
tailoring have historically failed, as forcefully argued 
by Nobel Prize winner Douglass North (North, 1990). 
For example, Iraq once used a version of the Belgian 
constitution, and several Latin American countries 
had practically adopted the US Constitution, but 
political life in those countries resembled neither the 
Belgian nor American experience.   
 Growing dissatisfaction with implementation of 
such rigid and even mechanistic policies prompted 
some critics to develop their own economic 
reform agenda.  One of the leading contemporary 
development economists, Dani Rodrik, collaborating 
with two of his Harvard colleagues, has recently 
proposed a country-specific approach, which they 
called “growth diagnostics” (Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco, 2005).  Their first idea was that a one-size-
fits-all policy contains several substantial weaknesses, 
and must be replaced with a policy based on a prior, 
thorough investigation of country-specific conditions. 
Their second idea seems equally powerful: a frontal 
attack on all economic distortions might simply fail 
due to limited political capital to implement reform 
in the face of opposition.  Therefore it would be more 
fruitful to select just a few reform activities, invest the 
resources available in reducing restrictions in those 
sectors, and only after achieving positive results, 
proceed to tackle the next most pressing distortions. 
In other words, countries should adopt a sequence of 
reform activities.  
 In the main body of this chapter, we will present the 
key argument of growth diagnostics by summarizing 
the rich content of the proposal of Rodrik, et al.  We 
will point out important implications of their model 
as it applies to the particular economic environment 
of Serbia.  This chapter will be an introductory 
diagnosis of obstacles to more rapid growth in 
the Serbian economy.  At a later stage, we will seek 
to identify the most binding constraints, but also 
recommend some practical steps to be taken in order 
to stimulate economic growth.
 The outline of the chapter is as follows: first, 
we shall analyze objectives and constraints, and 
then proceed to discuss the inevitable distortions 
that create a wedge against optimal solutions.  By 
incorporating political constraints into the model, 
we shall redefine the problem, and propose a set of 
criteria for selecting a reform strategy.  Several policy 
mixes will be analyzed.   Finally, we suggest moving 
from theoretical deliberations to practical policy 
recommendations.  
 15.	 Reform	Packages
 Now we are in position to shed light on reform 
strategies proposed by politicians.  At the beginning 
of the transition process, political parties usually 
propose broad reforms in order to demonstrate their 
understanding of people’s needs and their capacity 
to solve problems.  In that period, democratic 
parties follow the old communist style of politics 
by addressing all strata of society (“working people 
and decent intelligentsia”).  After several changes 
in government, and a more detailed profiling of 
the electorate, political parties accept more modest 
programs, concentrating on specific issues.  The 
growth diagnostics model may be substantial help, 
both for the electorate to evaluate the seriousness 
of different proposals, and for politicians to 
concentrate on policies that give them the highest 
return on the investment of their political capital.
 a) Holistic reform
 This package would be characteristic of the early 
stages of transition.  However, the prolonged rule by 
the ex-communist party in Serbia, and the inability of 
the opposition to oust them from power, stimulated 
development of the holistic reform design.  For 
example, the only successful program (i.e.  the only 
program that aroused substantial interest among the 
electorate), as proposed by the Democratic Opposition 
of Serbia (DOS) coalition of parties in 2000, envisaged 
reform in all segments of social life, starting with the 
national question (border and minority issues), 
including overhaul of the political and economic 
system, and ending with demographic and 
intergenerational issues.  It is interesting that voters 
accepted the offer, probably out of a deep-rooted 
sense of social crisis.  
 We may easily note the unrealistic character of the 
proposal.  The program was built on the false premise 
that its authors have a complete knowledge of all 
prevailing distortions.  Also, there was an underlying 
assumption that the parties that made the offer had 
the necessary capacity to carry out the program in its 
entirety.  That was simply an impossible mission.
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b) „Do as much as you can, as best as you can”
 At the beginning of 200, the DOS parties were 
replaced by another, somewhat similar coalition of 
parties that drew up a similar list of pressing 
problems, but also ranked their objectives.  With 
the national question high on the agenda, the 
program also stressed passing of the new 
Constitution and strengthening of the rule of law 
(as related to the struggle against corruption, crime, 
and other illegal activities).  The coalition agreement 
did not propose to accomplish the entire list of 
reforms, and even suggested an early election after 
the passing of the new Constitution.  Once in power, 
each of the coalition parties promoted reforms 
within their own responsibilities, without any 
coordination, and with the assumption that early 
elections were around the corner.  Their approach 
has been that more reform is better, since it presents 
an opportunity for a better starting position in the 
election campaign.
 This tactic may be also called a laundry-list 
method (Hausmann et al.  2005).  It relies on at least 
three false or at least arguable notions, namely that: 
(i) any reform is good; (ii) the more areas reformed, 
the better; and (iii) the deeper the reform in any 
area, the better.  
 With our model in mind, it is evident that some 
distortions are more important than others, and the 
implications of general equilibrium suggest that 
there must be a sequence of reforms.  As we have 
seen, positive direct effects of some action may be 
substantial, but indirect negative effects may prevail 
in the absence of other reforms.  In other words, we 
cannot be sure that any given reform taken on its 
own can be guaranteed to be promoting the objective 
function.  Only in the limiting case of holistic 
reform, we can be assured that each action is 
beneficial, but as we have just seen, that approach is 
impracticable.  Even as the number of reform topics 
grows, we cannot be assured of being on the right 
track, since reforms may fall prey to adverse 
interactions.  The very same argument is applicable 
to the depth of reforms in particular sectors, since it 
is equally possible for a limited number of deep 
reforms to become an overall failure.
 c) Second-best reforms
 A less ambitious strategy, but more sophisticated, 
would be to search for an activity that has the highest 
indirect positive effect.  Put simply, policymakers are 
aware of their limited capacity to solve the greatest 
distortions, and therefore look for small steps that 
could make a strong impact through 
interconnectedness of different sectors.  They will 
choose actions that, on balance, have positive effects 
and avoid those actions that appear to promise 
significant net adverse effects.  
 As an example, one may recall the first federal 
government in Serbia formed by the DOS coalition in 
2000.  That government had limited authority, 
practically restricted to the sphere of international 
relations and monetary policy, and therefore was not 
capable of any comprehensive reform.  Because of 
that limitation, the government was forced to look for 
policies that could cheer up the electorate that voted 
the old regime out in 2000 at low political cost.  
 Consequently, the government chose to engage in 
foreign trade liberalization, and the closing down of 
the four biggest state banks, under the assumption 
that foreign products would foster competition on 
domestic market, force big socialist firms to raise 
productivity and cut costs in order to survive, and 
increase the competitiveness of the economy.  Also, 
cheaper imports of raw materials and capital goods 
would give an additional boost to the stumbling 
economy, and cheaper imports of consumer goods, 
after prolonged deprivation under the UN sanctions, 
would raise the level of satisfaction and approval rate 
before the crucial Serbian republic-level elections.  It 
was assumed that the immediate effect would be a 
growing trade deficit, but rising competitiveness 
would eventually reverse that negative trend.
 This calculation proved overly optimistic.  Ruined 
socialist firms were not capable of either boosting 
productivity or lowering costs.  They were 
overburdened with surplus labor, since during the 
period of UN sanctions, employment termination 
was legally prohibited and the marginal product of 
labor was negative.  Also, incompetent managers were 
accustomed to state subsidies and were not capable of 
competing with foreign firms.  The trade deficit rose, 
along with a dramatic increase in foreign debt.  The 
only beneficiaries of trade liberalization were a group 
of importers well-connected to the new government, 
and sugar (re)exporters who misused the preferential 
treatment offered by the EU to obtain profits through 
arbitrage.  
 Closure of the main banks was also envisaged as a 
policy with large positive indirect effects.  The banks 
were burdened with debts and they were overstaffed 
with incompetent personnel who could not be 
retrained for modern banking.  Also, wages in the 
sector were for a long time artificially kept above 
average, which produced resentment among the 
general public toward the employees who were 
privileged to work in the banking sector.  Therefore 
political risks were negligent, and economic effects 
substantial.  It was expected that by closing these 
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banks, financial discipline would be enhanced, and 
room would be created for arrival of foreign financial 
intermediaries.  
 However, the policy was only a partial success.  Big 
foreign banks abstained from entering the Serbian 
market, and financial discipline was only somewhat 
improved.  At the same time, big property owned by 
bankrupted banks was used improperly.   The sale of 
the country’s biggest steel plant, which was partially 
owned by the banks, and the creation of a private 
savings bank on the premises of the closed banks 
triggered allegations of corruption.  In general, both 
policies were highly detrimental for the judicial system 
and the rule of law in general.
 As a general conclusion, these second-best reforms 
possessed a principal weakness in an uncertain ex ante 
final outcome.  Decision-makers were not able to 
quantify and determine in advance all the general 
equilibrium interactions.  The strategy requires a very 
strong and accurate sense of the behavioral 
consequences of policy changes, which the decision-
makers in our examples lacked.
 d) Targeting the biggest distortions
 This strategy presupposes ranking distortions by 
their direct effects and concentrating our efforts on 
the distortion with the largest effect.  The second 
largest distortion comes into consideration only after 
the largest has been reduced to an acceptable level, 
and so on.  The strategy is simple—in some cases, 
straightforward—and it may lead to improvement in 
welfare in terms of the overall conditions of the 
economy.
 Sometimes it is easy to recognize the largest 
distortions.  For example, with dissolution of the 
former SFRY and the imposition of UN sanctions in 
1992, inflation accelerated and quickly established a 
world record.  Evidently, that was the biggest obstacle 
to economic growth.  At the beginning of 199, an 
anti-inflation program was adopted with just one 
objective – curbing inflation.  The author of the 
program insisted that all other policies were irrelevant 
at that moment.  However, soon after initial successes 
in the struggle against inflation, it became evident 
that other important policies were lacking, notably 
privatization and deregulation policies.  And by the 
time these shortcomings were realized, it was too late 
for accepting new policies since reformers had already 
lost political support. 
 It is not always clear, as it was in the previous 
example, where the largest distortions lay.  Some 
distortions, like imperfect credibility, never show up. 
Sometimes the largest distortion is known, but never 
confronted for political reasons.  For example, there is 
a consensus among economists, and even politicians, 
that subventions to the state enterprise sector are 
currently a large distortion.  However, no government 
from 2000 on ever dared to tackle the issue, fearing a 
political backlash if they tried.  Perhaps the biggest 
problem with this strategy rests with the need to have 
a complete list of distortions, which is an impractical 
task in an age of uncertainty.
 e) Relaxing the most binding constraints
 Sometimes the government is not able to discern 
all the effects of its policy measures, or it may be 
reluctant to pursue policies due to a fear of secondary 
effects, which are unknown in strength, or which may 
have adverse political consequences.  As time passes 
by, inactivity creates several bottlenecks, and some 
bottlenecks start to constrain other important 
activities.  For example, the lack of investment in 
electricity-generating equipment, or untimely 
replacement of worn-out railroad tracks, may produce 
substantial hurdles in production and transport of 
goods.  Or, a growing trade deficit may easily result in 
limits on foreign credit.  Inactive government will wait 
for events to exert economic and social pressures on it, 
and consequently, it will only move to relax the most 
binding constraint.
 It is hardly necessary to spell out all the shortcomings 
of such a policy.  The model presented in this paper 
has a clear advantage since it concentrates on forward 
anticipation of, and not on chasing after, events.  The 
model uses simple determinants of economic growth, 
and then identifies determinants with the largest 
direct impacts.  Once the focus is selected, investigation 
is concentrated on associated distortions whose 
removal would make the biggest contributions to 
alleviating constraints on growth.
	 16.	 From	Theory	to	Practice
 There is an endless discussion among economists 
on the sources and strategies of economic growth. 
However, few would dispute that economic growth 
depends on accumulation, and on the use of 
disposable resources, as suggested by the founding 
father of the field (Schumpeter, 1911).  Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Velasco (Hausmann, et al.  2005) have 
continued along these lines, and have integrated 
their diagnostics algorithm into a simple growth 
model that depends on a couple of undisputable 
determinants.  Hardly anyone would dispute that 
economic growth depends on 
 (a) returns on capital accumulated, where capital  
 is used in a broad sense, including human as well  
 as social capital, 
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Figure 1.  Decision Tree.  Source: Rodrik, Dani (200) “Rethinking Growth Policies in the Developing World”, at http://ksghome.harvard.
edu/~drodrik/Luca_d_Agliano_Lecture_Oct_200.pdf.
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 (b) possibility for private appropriation of those  
 returns, and 
 (c) the cost of financing accumulation.
 The first factor of growth is mostly technologically 
determined, while the second and the third factors 
offer room for policy correction of return rate.  For 
example, if there were a high tax rate on profits, 
owners of capital would not be willing to invest, 
despite the high rate of return.  Also, entrepreneurs 
would not be able to realize their plans if the cost of 
capital is high, even though appropriation 
possibilities are favorable and return rate is high, 
compared to similar risk assessment.
 The first stage of investigating a low growth rate 
would consist in uncovering which of these three 
factors poses the greatest impediment to development. 
Is it that existing technology is not capable of 
producing higher returns, or that investors are not 
able to reap the benefits of investment, or that the cost 
of capital is prohibitively high? If the answer suggests 
that the return rate is low, than the next question 
would be whether it is low because economy uses 
outdated technologies, or if it is low due to insufficient 
investment in complementary factors of production, 
such as the educational system, communication and 
transport facilities, etc.  
 If the answer is that appropriation is the main 
problem, we should investigate whether it is due to 
low contract enforcement (inadequate laws or 
corruption in the judicial system), poor property 
rights, strong labor unions, poor protection of patent 
and intellectual rights, or high taxation.  Of course, 
all these factors may be present, but we should strive 
to discern which is the most constraining.  If the 
answer rests with the high cost of finance (high 
interest rates), then we should investigate what causes 
it:  fiscal deficits or poor banking intermediation? If it 
is an inefficient banking system, we proceed with 
questions on the inefficiency of the banking sector: 
are there conditions of low competition, high entry 
barriers, a low country rating (high risk of investment), 
etc.? In the course of investigation, we constantly ask 
more and more specific questions in order to design 
remedies that are as closely targeted as possible.
 Now we may make a connection with the 
distortions that we discussed in the previous 
sections.  First, we must admit that each agent is 
somehow constrained.  And the level of constraints 
depends on the number, but also on the intensity of 
distortions.  For example, with the opening of the 
country, an individual can ignore the domestic, 
inefficient banking sector and borrow abroad, 
but still be subject to a collateral requirement as a 
constraint, which in practice is very constraining 
due to distortions, or wedges.  Alternatively, a 
household may decide to accumulate its capital.  We 
may easily reckon that accumulation of both physical 
and human capital creates a lot of externalities that 
are (positive) distortions.  That, on the other hand, 
provides an incentive to the government to stimulate 
employment of an educated labor force by subsidies, 
which will produce negative distortions that may 
prevail in the long run.
 We may also recall that the government provides 
services to citizens, for a price, such as the state 
health care system, or public security system.  The 
price of services usually neither covers nor reflects 
production costs, which is by itself a large distortion 
or wedge.  The difference between high costs and 
low prices is covered by subventions, which are paid 
after imposing taxes on individuals’ income and 
consumption, but also on firms’ costs and profits. 
As we already have seen, taxation is a source of 
large distortions.  Moreover, even under very strict 
public oversight and auditing, government revenue 
is subject to bureaucratic waste that offers citizens no 
utility.  That is also an important wedge that drives 
us even farther from optimal solutions.
 An exercise in growth diagnostics consists of 
identifying and analyzing factors of growth to 
ascertain the most binding constraints on growth. 
All factors, together with government distortions 
and other wedges, influence the growth rate.  We 
keep in mind not only direct effects, but also general 
equilibrium influences, and the challenge is to find 
the one with the highest net impact following a 
policy change.
 We could better organize our thoughts by using a 
decision tree, as suggested in the following figure.
 The objective of Figure 1 is to determine why the 
country faces low levels of private investment. 
Growth diagnostics will help us to explore the causes 
of such an unfortunate event, and to assist in 
formulating remedies.  First of all, we should ask 
whether the low level of investment is due to low 
returns, or the high costs of financing ventures. 
High financial costs may be caused by international 
or domestic factors.  If local factors are to be blamed, 
we should ask whether there is low domestic savings, 
or if the banking sector is inefficient.
 However, if we found that low return rather than 
the high costs of finance was a principal cause of low 
investment, we should trace the left branch in Figure 
1.  There are two possible groups of factors that may 
produce a low return.  One group may be labeled as 
objective, or social returns.   Low returns may be due 
to unfriendly business conditions (bad infrastructure), 
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or to the fact that the labor force is of bad quality (low 
human capital), or to the fact that the country is 
peripheral to important commercial routes and 
destinations (geography).  
 Another group of factors may be labeled as 
subjective, since they can be changed more easily by 
human action.  For instance, low appropriability may 
be due to government failures or to underdevelopment 
of markets.  Mistakes by the government are reflected 
in higher business risks that may dominate both at the 
micro and macro level.  Individual enterprises may be 
exposed to risks by poor protection of property rights, 
high corruption, or high taxes.  Macro risks stem from 
the dire financial position of the state and/or its 
monetary and fiscal instability.  
 If the principal causes of low individual 
appropriation rest with the market, we should try to 
understand the nature of the failing.  Maybe 
entrepreneurs ran out of ideas, or they were not able to 
protect their intellectual property and consequently 
were not able to collect additional profits in the market, 
making them reluctant to invest.  
 Yet another characteristic of underdeveloped 
transition markets is a fractured information system 
in which coordination problems arise.  There are 
always those who are willing to emulate the leaders of 
industry, but since they lack pertinent information, 
they are unable to develop new products or processes, 
and consequently do not follow suit.
	 17.	 Pro	et	contra
 The approach suggested by Hausmann and others 
builds on the novel idea of using expert knowledge 
of a particular economy in order to cure it in a more 
efficient way.  Contrary to the contemporary model 
building practice that tries to draw far-reaching 
conclusions governing all “patients” from past data, 
this approach relies more on the present situation 
of a particular case, and the intuitive assessment 
of possible courses of events following reform 
(treatment).  The authors have not used the word 
“diagnostics” by chance.  The word is intentionally 
associated with the medical profession.  Medical 
diagnostics uses statistical information about 
the relevant population and the doctor’s specific 
knowledge in order to arrive at a specific remedy. 
In this approach, statistical knowledge is important 
as background information only.  For example, the 
notion that sixty per cent of a particular population 
is HIV positive does not mean that chances for our 
next patient to be HIV positive is 0.6.  Likewise, 
inferring from statistical data that a transition 
recession would take three years on average does 
not mean that the next transition candidate may 
expect the same duration of a recession.  Moreover, 
statistical data in a changing economic system, 
where the statistical methodology itself is being 
overhauled, have very little meaning for estimating 
the effects of a certain policy.
 The main idea of the model is acceptable, especially 
its suggestion for escaping a frontal attack on all 
problems at the same time, but focusing instead on 
the most binding constraint.  One leading economist, 
Avinash Dixit (cf.  Dixit, 2005), also supports this 
attempt to narrow down the set of possible actions. 
However, the sequential mode of thinking, based on 
a tree structure, is problematic for him.  Instead, he 
is inclined to accept that each case of development 
failure is a consequence of multiple causes acting 
simultaneously.  Therefore he is more willing to 
capture causes in a table, instead of a tree.
 The next table shows such a grouping, where 
causes (labeled Ci) and effects (Ej) are given, as well 
as ex ante probabilities (πi) of particular outcomes. 
Experienced experts with a lot of experience would 
estimate these probabilities.  Both causes and effects 
could be a cluster or composite of several events.  The 
entries in the table cells are conditional probabilities. 
When the cause Ci is present, the effect Ej will occur 
with probability Pij.  According to Dixit, these 
conditional probabilities are, at least in principle, 
estimated by econometric research.
 In contrast to ex ante probabilities, from Table 1 
we may calculate (Bayesian) posterior probabilities. 
If a particular effect Ej is observed, then the probability 
of a particular cause Ci is given according to the 
following formula
 
.
 To select the right cause, a double criterion must be 
satisfied simultaneously: (i) the posterior probability 
of Ci is close to 1, conditional on observing Ej, and 
Causes
Prior 
probabilities
Effects
E1 E2 … En
C1 π1 P11 P12 … P1n
C2 π2 P21 P22 … P2n
… … … … … …
Cm πm Pm1 Pm2 … Pmn
Table 1 – Causes, Effects, and Probabilities.  Source: Dixit (2005)
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(ii) when Ci is present, that Pij is close to 1, so the rest 
of the Pij ‘s (j=1,…m) are close to zero, and if some 
other effect is observed, the posterior probability of 
Ci becomes close to zero.  The ultimate aim would be 
to find causes that accelerated growth by this complex 
use of expert knowledge and econometric studies.
 However, Dani Rodrik expresses reservations 
towards the use of econometric methods in 
estimating effectiveness of a policy (Rodrik, 2005). 
He views with skepticism the growing literature 
produced by academic researchers and development 
agencies, which predicts the impact of policy 
intervention on economic growth.  The principal 
problem for Rodrik is how to interpret coefficients 
from cross-country regressions when policies are 
not random, but are used systematically by 
governments.  Endogeneity is not only an econometric 
problem, but also a conceptual problem if we attempt 
to treat policy as if it were exogenous or random. 
The literature on cross-national growth is of little 
value because it assumes that it is enough to plug a 
policy variable in a regression in order to answer 
questions concerning effectiveness of policy or the 
government’s motives.  Instead, Rodrik proposes 
using intuition to understand how interpretation 
can go astray when policies are selected 
endogenously.  
Rodrik defends the sequential approach and direct 
observation of channels through which policies 
operate.  He proposes a series of indirect tests that 
can supply some clue for answering the key question: 
why is growth of a particular economy so low? 
(Rodrik, 200):
 • If the cost of capital is high, we may expect a 
current account deficit and domestic banks to be 
faced by unconstrained credit demand; an increase 
in autonomous foreign transfers would increase the 
investment/GDP ratio.
 • If an economy is constrained by an objectively 
low rate of return, it must have few skilled workers, 
poor infrastructure and geographical or other 
disadvantages (peripheral geography relative to 
important trading channels)
 • If rates of return are not low, but investors are 
not able to collect them (low appropriability), we 
would find high official and unofficial taxes:  poor 
contract enforcement, macro instability, corruption, 
etc.  A combination of surveys and cross-national 
benchmarking would help in this case.
As already discussed, once these issues have been 
analyzed, we may proceed to the next stage: if the 
problem is with the high cost of capital, is it due to 
low savings, a low level of integration into 
international financial markets, or poor 
intermediation? If indirect evidence suggests the 
third factor is the culprit, we may proceed to the 
third stage and ask whether poor intermediation is 
due to low competition in the sector, high taxes on 
financial services, or some other cause.  We proceed 
in a similarly sequential manner until we reach the 
most binding constraint.
 In Chapter 7 of this study we will use this 
approach in order to identify the most binding 
constraints on faster growth of the Serbian economy. 
We will assume that accelerating economic growth 
is not only beneficial for domestic populace, since it 
reduces the level of unemployment and increases 
incomes and consumption, but also alleviates the 
foreign debt repayment burden, which will become 
the principal economic problem from the year 2007 
on.
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	 18.	 Introduction
 As suggested earlier in section 15, there are two 
possible ways to approach bottlenecks thwarting 
greater competitiveness in the Serbian economy. 
One is to count all the obstacles and seek to 
eliminate each of them simultaneously.  The other 
consists of prioritizing constraints by importance 
and engaging each separately, starting with the 
most binding constraint.  The first strategy could 
be called a “laundry list” strategy, while the second 
strategy may be more appropriate for inadequately 
developed states whose governments lack sufficient 
expertise and resources for a frontal attack on 
obstacles to rapid economic development.  Before 
we apply growth diagnostics in chapter 6, it is 
necessary to examine the state of growth and levels 
of investment in Serbia as of the end of 2005.1 
. Growth Diagnostics – Data
	 19.	 Gross	Domestic	Product
 The value of Serbia’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2005, according to preliminary estimates, amounted 
to about $2 billion.  During 2001-2005,  GDP 
recorded constant real growth, with an average 
monthly rate of 5.6%.  The cumulative rate of real 
growth for that period amounted to 2.6%, from 
which growth for 2005 can be estimated, relative to 
growth of 6.5% in 200.
 The realized rate of GDP growth per capita is 
somewhat greater than the growth of absolute GDP-
a, taking into account that the Serbia population fell 
during the period in question.  The most recent data 
on population trends refers to 200, such that the 
real rate of growth in GDP per capita in 200, 
starting from 2003, amounted to 9.6%, and, 
measured from 2001 onwards, 19.9%.  
Chart 1. Comparative view of indicators of economic activity.  Sources:  for Serbia for the period 2001-200, Bilten javnih finansija (Bul-
letin of Public Finance), (Belgrade: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia);  for 2005, estimates of the author;  and for other coun-
tries, Economist Intelligence Unit.
1 In the greatest number of cases, the data refer to 2005.  However, because of a lack of some numbers, some data as presented are available only for 200.
Growth Diagnostics – Data
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
63
Growth Diagnostics – Data
 As can be seen in chart 1, the dynamic of real GDP 
growth in Serbia follows a dynamic that is prevalent in 
the region.  In 2001 and 2005, Serbia’s GDP achieved 
the highest rate of growth compared to other observed 
countries.  However, besides the fact that it grew, GDP 
per capita was higher only in comparison to 
Macedonia, and significantly lagged behind the 
advanced countries in the region.  
 Economic growth in Serbia in 2001-2005 was most 
remarkably led by growth in domestic demand, in 
large measure because of real growth in wages and 
pensions of residents.  A part of this growth is the 
consequence of growth in budget expenditures, whose 
structure is such that the largest portion is directed to 
the payment administration of wages and pensions. 
The World Bank2 proposed that the public sector be 
reduced, in order to create room for greater domestic 
savings and investment of the private sector, and to 
change the structure of public spending, in order to 
reduce expenditures for wages, pensions, and 
subventions, while increasing expenditures in public 
investments.
 Analyzed sector by sector,3 the economy is 
dominated by the services sector, which creates more 
than half of gross value-added in Serbia.  The 
uniqueness of Serbia during the previous period is 
the unusually high proportion of the primary sector, 
which was typically more than one-fifth of gross 
value-added.  This indicates the importance of 
agriculture in total economic activity.  Keeping in 
mind that agriculture by nature is extensive and 
insufficiently productive, its high proportion of 
economic activity is mainly the result of a significant 
decline of activity in the secondary sector during the 
1990s.  The trend of the last several years shows that 
participation by the service sector is increasing and 
the secondary sector is diminishing, while the role of 
the primary sector is mostly holding steady, 
accounting for close to one-fifth of gross value-added. 
Preliminary data for three quarters of 2005 show 
further change in the structure of economic activity, 
where the declining importance of the primary sector 
(16% of gross value-added (GVA)) and further growth 
of the tertiary sector (58% of GVA) can be observed.  
 Individual activities contributed to real growth in 
GDP in 2005, due to growth in service activities, 
above all in transportation, commerce, and financial 
services.  Interestingly, agriculture, construction, and 
processing industries, which in 200 contributed to a 
high rate of economic growth, recorded a decline in 
activity during 2005.  
 Regarding the distribution of GDP, the latest data 
is from 2003.  One negative feature visible at first 
glance is that, as a rule, the value of final spending in 
Serbia in recent years has exceeded the value of 
achieved GDP.  In other words, Serbia as a whole 
spent more than she produced.  In spite of that, a 
positive trend is that total investment activity is 
growing, such that the proportion of gross investment 
of GDP for 2003 amounted to 1%.  This aggregate 
investment value is, however, lower than is preferable, 
and should amount to more than 20%.
	 20.	 Investment
 The average GDP growth rate of 5.6% in the period 
2001-2005 represents great progress compared to 
1990-2000.  However, it is still completely unclear 
how sustainable such growth is.  For example, in 2001 
and 200, a high growth rate was accomplished 
thanks to strong growth in agriculture.  Growth of 
gross value-added in agriculture in 2001 amounted to 
19%, and in 200, even 20%.  Those were the years 
when GDP growth was greatest.  GVA fell in 
agriculture by 3.% in 2002, and by 7.2% in 2003. 
(Nevertheless, decelerating GDP growth in those 
years was not solely the consequence of falling GVA 
in agriculture, but also in processing industries.) 
Agricultural production by nature experiences large 
oscillations and cannot be a guarantee of sustained 
development.
 The level of direct investment in 2001 appears 
insufficiently high to stimulate growth more 
Chart 2. Structure of gross value-added in 200.
2 World Bank, “Program for Economic Growth and Employment,” Issue no. 29258-YU (200).
3 Sectors are defined according to the NACE classification of activities, as follows: the primary sector encompasses agriculture, hunting, forestry, hydropower, 
fishing, and extraction of ore and stone;  the secondary sector encompasses (light) processing industries, production of electrical energy, gas, and water, and 
construction; while the tertiary sector encompasses all other activities, including commercial and public services.  
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substantially.  As shown in section 20, except for 
2003 when direct investment amounted to $1.36 
million, it had fallen again to $890 million by 200, 
though rising in 2005 to about $1.5 billion.
 As can be seen in table 1, the ratio of foreign direct 
investment to GDP in Serbia is not much less than in 
neighboring countries, but Serbian government 
statistics on foreign investments factor in revenue 
from privatization.  (In 2003 revenues from 
privatization amounted to €929 million.) Those 
revenues enter the state budget, which the government 
later uses to cover a budget deficit, that is, for 
spending.  In 200, revenues from privatization had 
less and less of a role in the total influx of foreign 
direct investment.  (For example, in 2005, revenues 
from privatization amounted to less than €00 
million.) The share of greenfield investments increases 
within total investments.
 Regardless of the higher level of investment, 
Serbia is an even more risky country for investing. 
As can be seen from the risk estimates carried out 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit, although the 
entire region is risky, Serbia is the riskiest country 
in the region.  High risk deters foreign and domestic 
investors, and can be taken as a general reason why 
Serbia’s economy grows more slowly than it could.  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
Serbia 1,2 3,4 7,0 4,2 7.0
Croatia 9,0 11,2 2,1 3,7 7,4
Bulgaria 6,0 5,8 10,4 10,7 7,6
Macedonia 12,8 2,1 2,1 3,0 -
Hungary 4,1 4,0 -0,6 4,2 4,2
Overall grade Overall estimate Political risk
Risk from 
economic 
politicse
Risk from 
economic 
structures
Risk of liquidity
Serbia D 64 D D D C
Croatia C 45 C B C C
Macedonia C 60 D C C C
Bulgaria B 39 C B B B
Hungary B 34 B B B C
figure 1 in section 16), it is difficult without further 
analysis to conclude which problem in Serbia today 
is the most acute.  The Serbian economy suffers from 
high and growing inflation, high public spending, 
high deficits in the current account, a high proportion 
of export credits from state debt, and weak protection 
of property rights as the consequence of an inefficient 
and corrupt judicial system.  
	 21.	 Return	on	Social	Capital
 Drawing on figure 1 (section 16), low growth 
could be caused by high financing expenses and low 
rates of return on economic activity.  The reasons 
for a low rate of return could be twofold.  Either the 
reason for sluggish growth is return on public 
capital, or it is low appropriation.  This section will 
present some data relevant to the first reason
 Human capital. Contrary to popular belief, the 
quality of human capital in Serbia is low.  Almost 
6% of residents older than 15 years of age do not 
have any education.  The number of persons with 
a university education is only 15% more than those 
without schooling.  If we add the number of persons 
without any education to those who are practically 
illiterate (with only a third grade education), that 
total exceeds the number of university-educated 
by 17%.  Moreover, almost one-quarter of residents 
have only an eighth grade education.  If those 
without education were unemployed, and those with 
more educational  instruction were entirely in labor 
relationships, we would claim that the employment 
structure is better than the qualification structure of 
the labor force.  However, the educational structure 
of those employed is almost completely the other way 
around, because persons without a basic education 
make up only 3% of the unemployed
 
 Wages. For the last four years, personal incomes 
grew faster than productivity.  The growth of wages 
is one of the basic obstacles to a flexible monetary 
policy.  The growth of the average wage over 2001-
2005 amounted to 15% per year.  This large growth 
in wages rendered a flexible policy on the dinar 
Table 2.  Political and economic risk, September 2005.  Estimates by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).  Note: Rankings are expressed 
by descriptive evaluations from A to E, where A signifies the least risk, and E the most risky.  “Overall estimate” is a numerical expression of 
the “overall grade.”
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Table 1. Net foreign investment as a percentage of social 
production.  Source: ING Wholesale Banking.  aEstimate from 
ING Wholesale Banking.
 As seen in the previous section, economic growth 
was insufficiently rapid in 2001-2005, and was largely 
driven by high public spending.  If we start from the 
lower layer in the “tree“ of growth diagnostics (see 
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exchange rate impossible.  In order for the dinar to 
have devaluated more quickly than in the period 
2001-2005, and at the same time to prevent the 
danger of inflation, it would have been necessary for 
wages to grow more slowly.
 However, to limit wage growth, slower increases in 
prices are also necessary.   Taking into account that 
the state controls one part of a given price, it often 
negotiates with public enterprises over price increases 
(oil, electricity, public utilities, edible oils, and so on). 
If the state approves price increases in public services, 
then it is difficult on the other hand to prevent the 
growth of wages in the public sector.  That there are 
constant negotiations over prices and wages only 
shows that there exists inflationary pressure caused 
by high state expenditure.  
Be that as it may, average gross earnings in Serbia 
grew in real terms by 70% in 2001-2005, and reached 
308 EUR by the end of 2005, more than in Bulgaria 
or Romania, which are on the road to joining the 
European Union, but less than income levels in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which also aspire 
to membership
 This real increase contributed to growth in 
earnings in all the individual activities from the 
previous period.  That especially applies to service 
activities, where the average of earnings is the most, 
but in 2005, activities with the highest earnings joined 
some branches of processing industries.  A good 
part of these high earnings is connected to budget-
friendly activities, such as for monopoly activities 
(for example, transportation, energy, public utilities, 
and so on).  
 
 A comparison of earnings in Serbia with those of 
neighboring countries shows that competitiveness 
based on low earnings is almost always lost.  In truth, 
gross wages in Serbia during 200 and thereafter were 
lower than those in Croatia (by 63%) and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but were significantly more than in 
Romania and Macedonia (by 2%), and especially 
compared to Bulgaria (by as much as 85%).
 Labor force flexibility  in Serbia is lower than in 
surrounding countries.  Privatized firms are usually 
contractually obligated, as compelled by the Agency 
for Privatization, to maintain their level of employment 
or to gradually reduce the number of workers by at 
most ten percent per year.  The law imposes 
administrative difficulties in dismissing workforces 
in order to slow the growth in unemployment. 
Naturally, that also slows restructuring, 
competitiveness of firms, and economic 
development.
 One of the essential innovations of the Law on 
Employment and Unemployment Insurance (enacted 
in 2003) is the change of emphasis from passive to 
active measures of finding employment.  Namely, 
although the unemployed used to receive monetary 
compensation and to wait for the National 
Employment Service to find work for them, now they 
have incentives to get themselves involved in the 
search.  That is attained with the organizing of 
training and additional vocational education for the 
unemployed in order to gain new skills.  On the 
other hand, the law shortened the duration of 
monetary compensation and introduced an 
obligation for the unemployed to call the Employment 
Service regularly and to accept work offered to them, 
or otherwise be removed from the register of the 
unemployed.
 The second important legal act in this area is the 
new Labor Law, enacted in February 2005.  The chief 
reason for its enactment (effectively suspending the 
reformist Law of 2001) is that it makes possible better 
protection of the employed by respecting European 
Union standards.  It provides for the politics of earnings 
to be conducted through collective bargaining.  It also 
provides for the formation of an Emergency Fund from 
which workers of bankrupt enterprises can quickly 
pay their claims.  By this law, discrimination against 
workers on any basis is forbidden and sanctioned. 
In the event an employer wants to dismiss excess 
workers, the employer must come up with a program 
for solving excess employment, in consultation with 
the National Employment Service and representative 
unions.  Now it is more difficult to dismiss surplus 
workers.  The law demands that enterprises possess 
a long-term program for the reduction of their labor 
force in the case of technological surpluses, in spite 
of the fact that all firms, since the period of self-
management, have surplus workforce capacity. 
 If an entrepreneur is not satisfied with a worker, the 
former is not permitted simply to dismiss the latter. 
Instead, he must give a formal warning with precise 
reasons for his dissatisfaction, inform the labor 
union about his intentions, and offer the employee 
alternative employment.  Also, the law establishes 
an Emergency Fund for workers who lose their jobs 
because of the firm’s bankruptcy.   Employers pay 
supplementary taxes in order to finance the Fund, 
which makes the workforce all the more expensive. 
All these changes were made under the guise of 
harmonizing labor legislation with European Union 
standards, and only a few protesting votes called into 
 In truth, wage growth has not been uniform over all five years under observation.  During 2001-2003, wages grew significantly faster, while in the last two 
years, wages grew more slowly and closer to growth rates in productivity.
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question excessive EU directives on labor drawn up 
by the leaders of wealthy states.
 Labor productivity.  In principle, the high price 
of the labor force can exceed its productive benefits. 
The growth rate of productivity of the Serbian 
economy is greater than in surrounding countries. 
On the basis of the index of growth in the numbers 
of the employed and the real growth of earnings in 
2005 compared to 2001, real growth in productivity is 
recorded in the context of all activity, but at different 
levels.  Financial services recorded the greatest real 
growth (209%), while the smallest was realized in 
trade (20%).  The processing industry accomplished 
growth of 9%, and agriculture achieved 87%.
Productivity by activity sector also can be analyzed 
according to gross domestic product per employee. 
The primary sector records the largest GDP per 
employee in 200, amounting to $1,700.  This is a 
significantly greater value compared to the other two 
sectors:  four times more than the secondary sector, 
and three times more than the tertiary sector.  Such 
a big difference can be explained by the fact that this 
statistic does not include the agricultural population 
among the ranks of the employed, although agriculture 
certainly is an essential activity contributing to the 
production of GDP.  
 In relation to surrounding countries where the 
comparison was made, Serbia achieved the highest 
growth rate of productivity if we consider the 
economy as a whole, while regarding industrial 
productivity, Bulgaria realized the best results. 
In Serbia’s case, growth in productivity is the 
consequence of real growth in GDP, but also 
reduction in the number of those employed, as a 
result of restructuring of particular activities. 
 In the World Bank study The Cost of Doing 
Business 2006, Serbia was graded positively in regard 
to employment regulation, as compared to other 
countries.  Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize 
that the World Bank’s study used as its reference point 
for Serbia the Labor Law of 2001, a law which was 
rather liberal.  Some of the key regulations in this law 
changed with the adoption of the new Labor Law in 
2005.
 Infrastructure.  During the time of UN sanctions, 
hardly anything was invested in the infrastructure 
of the country.  Resources were practically used 
up because in that period there were no additional 
investments.  Railroad lines and wagons became 
worn out, and as a result, the average speed of 
railroad transport fell drastically.  The survey from 
chapter 5 reveals almost universal dissatisfaction 
among managers with the infrastructure of the 
country, emphasizing particularly the bad state of 
the railroad system (98% of managers expressed 
dissatisfaction).  Two-thirds of survey participants 
had experienced traffic jams that to a great degree 
increased their costs of production, and more than 
80% of respondents considered infrastructure to 
be insufficiently developed.  Contrary to repeated 
promises, the main highway, which connects 
Western Europe with Greece and  Turkey, has not 
been completed.  Driving conditions on that road 
and in other directions, but also bad conditions in 
ports, undoubtedly increase the costs of transport 
(according to 90% of those investigated).
 
Serbia Bulgaria Macedonia Croatia
r(Pi) r(P) r(Pi) r(P) R(Pi) r(P) r(Pi) r(P)
2001 ... 4,7 2 7,5 1,7 -13,5 7,6 9,8
2002 9,9 7,9 5,2 3,4 4,2 7,2 7,6 1,2
2003 3,6 5,1 10,7 1 8,5 5,7 3,5 3,7
2004 14,2 8,2 19,7 2,5 2,7 7 4 2,1
Serbia Bulgaria Macedonia Croatia
Costs of employmenta 25,0 32,2 32,5 17,2
Rigidity of the employment index 28 44 54 57
Costs of dismissalb 21 30 41 38
Table 3. Comparison of real annual growth rates of productivity (in %)5    
Table .  Regulation of employment.  Source:  The World Bank, The Cost of Doing Business 2006.  For the 
explanation of the methodology, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/HiringFiringWorkers.
aspx, a Expressed as a percentage of wages. b Expressed as weekly wages.
5 The source of data as the basis of calculations is the Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche.  The index of productivity Pi  is based on 
productivity in industry, and is calculated on the basis of data on the number of employees in industry and the index of physical volume of production 
in industry.  The second index of productivity, P, is based on productivity as a whole, uses data on the number of employees (through an investigation of 
the labor force) and on the achieved real GDP.
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 The number of land-based telephone lines is 
relatively low (38 per 100 inhabitants), but is similar 
to regional norms.  Business communication is 
impeded more by the unreliability of land lines as 
well as mobile telephone connections.  Reliability 
is also a problem in respect to energy supplies, 
especially electricity.  For the last several years, 
electrical current supply is under constant demand: 
there are no shortages, but the quality is rather low. 
More than half of respondents agreed with this 
opinion.  Whenever the government or electricity 
exporters consider export to be profitable, they simply 
reduce the voltage of the current in the network, 
which damages equipment quite a bit.  The price 
of electrical energy is close to regional levels, and it 
appears that the period of cheap (subsidized) current 
has irretrievably passed with the abandonment of 
the socialist model of development
 In Serbia, the Internet is expanding.  According 
to the 2005 study “The Internet on the Palm” by the 
Center for Free Elections and Democracy, 35% of 
respondents (i.e. millions of residents) use the Internet 
in Serbia.  Of the total number who use the Internet, 
1% of respondents do so daily, and 13% very rarely. 
In 3% of cases, the Internet is used for “surfing,” and 
in 28% of cases, for sending and receiving e-mail.
 By and large, numerous elements suggest low 
social returns, as in many underdeveloped countries. 
However, there are a number of other factors that 
seriously jeopardize economic growth; among these, 
government failures appear to play a prominent role.  
 22.	 Appropriability
 According to the model of growth diagnostics 
(chapter 3), low appropriability can be a second 
reason causing a low rate of return on invested funds. 
That would mean that the country has sufficient 
public capital to provide suitable infrastructure 
and processing of invested funds, that there exist 
significant sources of financing which protect the 
continuity of deposited funds, but there is a problem 
with payment of profits.  Dani Rodrik establishes two 
possible causes for low appropriability:  government 
failures and market failures.  This section will 
consider each of them in the context of the Serbian 
economy.
 Government failures can be separated into 
two types – micro and macro risks. Micro risks 
include taxes, corruption and property rights.  If key 
bottlenecks are identified in this area, that would 
mean that the economic policy of the government is 
good, but that low appropriability is caused by weak 
protection of property rights, high corruption, and 
high taxes
 Corruption. At first glance, there are enough 
government failures to create risks at the micro and 
macro levels.  According to international studies, 
corruption in Serbia is getting wider.  It is probably 
one of the greatest problems that the government 
of Serbia confronts today.  The first post-Milošević 
government fell because of a corruption scandal 
in the fall of 2003.  The government of Vojislav 
Koštunica, although it promised in the election 
campaign that it would clear up all corrupt affairs 
during the tenure of its predecessor, did not do 
anything to keep its promise.  The government 
generally did not react to several reports compiled 
during 200 by the Council for the Fight against 
Corruption, a body established by the government 
in 2002 to research corruption as a systematic 
matter and draw attention to it.  The persistent 
refusal of the government of Serbia to react to these 
reports confirms corruption in society and in state 
administration that resists its own uprooting.  Some 
movement in the fight against corruption began to 
occur at the end of 2005 with the discovery of a 
good political reason for it.
 According to several international institutions and 
non-governmental organizations that study 
corruption, Serbia ranks among the most corrupt 
countries.  According to reports by Freedom House, 
estimates of corruption showed a high presence 
several years back, and most importantly, they are 
somewhat worse than the average estimates for the 
Balkan region, recognized for weak institutions and 
high levels of corruption.
 According to a yearly analysis of the World 
Economic Forum, the state of public institutions in 
Serbia that enable the fight against corruption is 
poor.  Table 6 shows a comparison of selected 
estimates for the state of public institutions in the 
region, according to the study The Global 
Competitiveness Report.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005
       5,25 5,25 5,0 5,0
Average estimate 
for the Balkans as 
a region
5,04 4,86 4,97 4,97
Table 5.  Corruption estimate for Serbia and average estimates 
for the Balkans as a region.  According to the measuring 
system applied by Freedom House, an estimate of  “1” indicates 
the absence of corruption, and an estimate of “7” indicates a 
maximum presence.
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 According to corruption studies carried out by 
Transparency International, Serbia is also ranked 
very low.  In results for 200 and 2005, Serbia had 
one of the most negative indexes of perceptions of 
corruption as a regional matter, and occupied 97th 
place among a total of 15 countries
 At the end of May 2005, the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia adopted a National Strategy for 
the Fight against Corruption.  At the moment, it is 
making its way through parliament.  This strategy 
decided in favor of three fundamental goals:  to 
define clearly the places where the phenomenon of 
corruption is possible and those who could commit 
it, the production of an action plan, and the raising 
of anticorruption awareness among citizens.  
 
 The transparency of the work of the government, 
as one of the conditions for eliminating corruption, 
has not been satisfactory.  One of the more acute 
problems is the budget of the government of Serbia. 
By means of the law on the budget, government 
consumption is announced to the public, but by the 
end of the year, there is no report submitted regarding 
the uses of the budget.  The armed forces of Serbia 
and Montenegro have a non-transparent budget:  it 
is submitted to the Finance Ministry only as a total 
amount of demands, without specific details on 
Serbia Croatia Bulgaria Slovenia Slovakia
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Independence of the judiciary 85 91 88 76 81 88 54 50 62 67
Efficiency of the legal framework 87 78 80 79 88 97 46 50 60 68
Property rights 94 103 90 86 80 85 49 49 42 42
Protection of intellectual property 96 110 76 67 81 90 32 30 49 44
Transparency of government policy 86 - 87 - 91 - 49 - 69 -
Favoritism in government policy 79 95 87 77 89 101 57 50 74 91
Bureaucratic proceduresa 10 66 7 4 87 93 57 50 13 27
Organized crimeb 72 67 77 85 98 110 30 46 70 64
Gray economy 80 70 52 64 61 66 21 25 32 35
Bribery for export and import 83 55 69 67 29 38 22 21 48 40
Bribery in the public services sector 83 66 57 62 41 46 25 27 33 34
Irregular payment of taxes 79 45 59 64 31 33 24 30 37 38
Illegal influence of government policy 80 76 27 32 79
Bribery in the judiciary 75 59 73 68 43 47 27 28 76 79
Influence of illegal political donations 64 73 79 42 87
Diversion of public fundsc 84 49 100 39 47
Position in the Public Institutions index 85 69 76 73 56 62 31 35 49 45
Subindex of corruption 55 65 38 25 37
Serbia Croatia Bulgaria Slovenia Slovakia
2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005.
Index of perceptions of 
corruption 2,7 2,8 3,5 3,4 4,1 4,0 6,0 6,1 4,0 4,3
Position 97 97 67 70 54 55 31 31 57 47
Table 6. Position of selected indicators and aggregate estimates for the Index of Public Institutions which points to corruption.  Source:  The 
Global Competitiveness Report 200-2005, and The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006. 
aThe measure by which bureaucratic procedures and contact with state employees impose a cost for business.bThe measure by which mafia-
type racketeering imposes a cost for business. 
cThe measure by which public funds are used for private purposes.
Table 7. Index of perceptions of corruption (CPI), by Transparency International.  The CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).  Source:  Reports 
of Transparency International for 200  and 2005 (http://ww1.transparency.org/).
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where and how much the military budget is to be 
spent.  The State Security Service (SDB) is almost 
completely closed to public view, even in those 
segments which the rest of Eastern Europe mostly 
opened to the public after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989.  (For example, State Security refused for a 
long time to let the public see secret files on Serbia’s 
citizens for the 195-2000 period, and then in 2005 
launched the story that the files were lost by 
mistake.)  
 Except for these discouraging facts, the survey 
data presented in section 27 reveals that more than 
half of top managers think that illegal donations to 
political parties are rather typical.  Whether on the 
basis of such an impression, or for other reasons, 
more than three-quarters of persons do not think 
that the government is impartial towards business 
firms.  
 Property rights.  A critical micro risk occurs in 
the area of abuses of property rights and the 
government’s inability to protect them.  One of the 
greatest problems is the return of property of which 
owners were deprived without compensation by the 
application of regulations and other acts enacted 
after World War II.  A condition for legal and 
legitimate privatization is the passage of a law on 
restitution, which would be founded on the basic 
legal principle of respect for the continuity of 
ownership, as well as on the right to claim property. 
 A step forward was the passage of the Law on 
Declaring and Filing Seized Property (the so-called 
Restitution Act) that entered into force on 8 June 
2005.  This law confirmed a procedure for declaring 
and filing claims regarding real estate on the territory 
of Serbia as property seized without compensation at 
market value by the application of regulations and 
acts that entered into force after March 195. 
Registration of seized property can carried out by 
physical persons whose property was seized, or by 
their heirs, by no later than 30 June 2006.
 That the government is incapable of protecting 
owners of private property was demonstrated in the 
case of the attempt to take over two influential 
enterprises that were partially privatized by law in the 
1990s.  In the case of the takeover of Knjaz Miloš, the 
largest producer of mineral water in Serbia, the 
government in the fall of 200 exerted pressure on 
the Securities Exchange Commission to eliminate 
one bidder and favor another.  In the case of C Market, 
small stockholders (who possessed over 50% of the 
shares) could not sell their shares on the stock 
exchange for a long time because the director of the 
enterprise did not want to sign the prospectus that 
would have made it possible to trade shares freely on 
the stock exchange.  Subsequently, the Commercial 
Court got involved in preventing small shareholders 
from trading shares by annulling the registration of 
shares in the Central Registry for securities.  Although 
the shareholders of C Market have not been able to 
freely dispose of their shares since 1997, the 
government of the Republic of Serbia took no action 
to make possible the free disposal of private property 
until the end of 2005, when C Market was finally sold
 This does not exhaust in any way the list of cases 
that reached the point of abuse of ownership rights. 
There was the “auditors’ scandal” (involving the firm 
Putnik), the fraudulent operations reducing the share 
value of new broadcasts (Jugoremedija), the 
transaction of connected parties and abuses of official 
positions (Nacionalna štedionica), the insolvency 
procedure suitable for manipulation and fraud 
(Sartid), or the saga of the government’s taming of 
independent institutions (the Securities Exchange 
Commission).  Not one of these cases has reached the 
point of a court judgment.
 
 One of the most striking examples where the 
government failed to defend its own property rights is 
the example of the corporation MOBTEL which 
operates in the field of telecommunications.  In the 
name of unpaid dividends, this corporation, in which 
the state held about 50% ownership, owed the state 
€52 million for the period 199-200.  Although the 
government of Serbia established a commission that 
confirmed during 200 the indebtedness of MOBTEL 
to the state, the government did not succeed in forcing 
this corporation to pay its debts to the state until the 
end of 2005, nor did it succeed to confirm exactly how 
much the state’s share of MOBTEL was, and how 
much belonged to other owners, whose identities are 
unknown.
 Corporate governance. The inefficiency of 
protection of property rights is perhaps better seen in 
poor corporate governance in practice.  The new Law 
on Companies (200) significantly advanced the 
principle of corporate governance.  Besides innovation 
connected to the simplification of procedures for 
founding and lower initial investment, the Law offers 
space for significant advancement of corporate 
governance in enterprises.  For example, companies 
can have either directors or an administrative 
committee (not both), whose mandate lasts three 
years, and the shareholders’ assembly can release 
them without citing a reason.  The assembly has a 
control function in the company, and over 
shareholders’ access to all relevant information and 
documents.
 However, it should be kept in mind that the new 
law is not being implemented right away:  it 
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anticipates a period of two years, during which 
enterprises have time to adapt to its provisions.  That 
would perhaps be why the EBRD in its 200 and 
2005 reports gave Serbia its actual rating for corporate 
governance.
 The system of corporate governance in Serbia at 
the end of 2005 showed serious deficiencies in respect 
to transparency of ownership and control, unreliable 
financial reporting, defects in measures to prevent 
asset-stripping, and share dilution – all those 
constituting otherwise normal protections of small 
shareholders.  (See section 39 for more.)  In some 
possible comparability between domestic and foreign 
financial reports
 
 However, introducing standards does not solve 
everything, and brings some new problems.  First, 
there do not exist adequate controls over financial 
reporting, as the result of insufficient capacity in the 
government and other state bodies to carry out 
appropriate control over reporting.  There exists no 
efficient mechanism for implementing all the 
prescriptions of the Law on Audits and Accounting 
from 2002.  That disturbs competition between the 
private sector and enterprises with state ownership.
Serbia Croatia Macedonia Bulgaria Hungary
World bank 2006. 5,7 3,0 6,0 5,3 4,7
EBRD 2004 2 3 2+ 3- 3+
EBRD 2005 2+ 3 2+ 3- 4-
Table 8.  Index of corporate governance in the Serbian economy according to the World Bank, The Cost of Doing Business 2006, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 200 and 2005.  The maximum rating for corporate governance 
in the World Bank’s study is 9.7, and in the EBRD study, +.
enterprises, especially in those which were privatized 
before 2001, it is impossible to identify the real owner. 
The new Law on Companies requires that all owners 
have access to the full list of owners, but the Securities 
Exchange Commission does not always possess 
complete lists of owners for all enterprises.  The 
public’s access to information on internal ownership 
structures occurs exclusively through stock exchange 
brokers.  In some cases, owners list the name of their 
brokerage house instead of their own, personal name. 
Also, it often happens that the owner appears to be an 
enterprise registered in Cyprus or some other offshore 
location.   The Securities Exchange Commission has 
no way to sanction the voting power of owners whose 
identity is unknown.
 The financial situation of an enterprise is signed 
on the basis of a financial report.  The form that 
expresses the enterprise’s situation is the prospectus. 
It contains insufficient information on the financial 
situation of the enterprise and is updated only once 
per year.  The application of international accounting 
standards began in 200 for banks, and in 2005 for 
enterprises.  That has brought significant innovation 
and improvement relative to the previous system. 
The most essential thing is that the new system is 
much more flexible, unlike the previous period, 
when the entire process was founded on legal 
regulations.  That makes it possible to cover all 
potential situations, and for enterprises, in accord 
with the general framework, to apply decisions 
appropriate to their needs.  Except for that, the 
application of international standards finally makes 
 There is an audit obligation only in the case of 
medium and large enterprises.  In the case of small 
firms, except for formal confirmation of information 
on the occasion of submitting reports, and except for 
inspection reports on the part of tax authorities, 
accounting controls are not required.  Financial 
reports are accessible to the public through the 
Center for Solvency, but practice shows that large 
and medium firms mostly do not present for 
inspection audited financial reports.  For example, 
in  200 about a thousand large enterprises submitted 
financial reports to the Center for Solvency, but of 
those, only 600 submitted auditors’ reports.  The 
Center warned firms that did not submit auditors’ 
reports, but did not go farther than that.  There is no 
information that anyone in Serbia has ever been 
punished for erroneously reporting information in 
financial reports.  
 Second, accounting audits are more concerned 
with whether information has been completed in 
accordance with regulations, and cannot get into the 
credibility of the documentation as the basis for 
completing the bookkeeping.  Third, even where 
audits are carried out, that is no guarantee that the 
reports are good, because auditor responsibility is not 
adequately regulated.  Existing regulations on 
criminal and civil responsibility as they relate to 
auditors do not represent a means of discouragement, 
and the Law on Accounting and Auditing in 2002 
generally does not require controls over the quality of 
auditing practice.
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 Lastly, an essential problem is insufficient education 
of accountants and enterprise owners.  There will 
come a time when completing and publishing 
financial reports ceases to be experienced as a legal 
obligation, and owners and management begin to use 
them as the most fundamental source of information 
for managing a firm.
 Perhaps the greatest problem with accounting 
audits consists of the fact that for holdings, there is no 
legal obligation of delivering consolidated financial 
reports as a basis for inspection of cross-ownership 
(where one enterprise possesses another in similar 
industrial branches) between banks and insurance 
companies, or banks, firms, and the largest financial 
and industrial holdings that are being formed. The 
standard forms prepared by the Ministry of Finance 
and the National Bank of Serbia do not enable the 
submission of consolidated financial reports that 
enable the creation of monopolies, and are contrary 
to the Seventh Directive Company Law of the 
European Union.
 The 200 Law on Companies should have prevented 
owners with the greatest number of shares from 
increasing illegitimately their proportion of shares so 
as to dilute the proportion of small shareholders. 
Frequently, the practice is for new owners to be slow 
to register the enterprise for trading on the stock 
exchange, such that small shareholders cannot freely 
dispose of their shares.  Under previous legislation, 
the owner with the greatest number of shares could, 
on the basis of a limited number of shareholders, 
increase his part of the firm and thus become an owner 
controlling more than 50% of shares.  It is not 
uncommon that such an increase happens by means 
of exchange of goods or that the capital of the enterprise 
is used to finance the issuing of new shares. 
Implementation of the new law is still not effective, 
and the practice of asset-stripping is still always 
present
 The new law does not supply sufficient protection 
for small shareholders because the procedure for 
takeovers is defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 
2002.  The procedure for takeover does not require 
that the buyer buy all 100% of shares, but it is possible 
for him to buy at least 30%.  In enterprises in which 
the state through the Stock Fund has 0% of shares, 
the buyer can obtain a controlling share of over 50% 
with which he can endanger the position of small 
shareholders
 The Securities Exchange Commission also does 
not have sufficient authority to protect shareholders 
and their ownership.  The Commission does not have 
the authority to influence the work of the Central 
Registry or the Belgrade Stock Exchange, not even 
when it can be shown that there is reason to suspect 
violations of the law.  The Securities Exchange 
Commission forbids insider trading, but the 
punishment for manipulation of such kinds is 
negligible.  Similarly, the law does not permit a 
prospectus to contain falsified information, but also 
does not provide for punishment if the enterprise 
does not have a prospectus at all.
 Bad protection of property rights is visible in the 
surveys we discussed previously (section 27)  More 
than half of respondents think that property rights 
are not correctly defined and therefore are 
unprotected.  The same number of managers indicate 
that there is weak concern for the interests of investors, 
and more than 70% of respondents consider that 
minority shareholders are not adequately protected.
 Land. A common phenomenon in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union consists 
of privatization policies that permitted the sale of 
enterprises, but not of the land on which those were 
found.  A similar practice continues in Serbia.  Article 
60 of the Constitution of Serbia of 1990 forbids the 
privatization of city civic lands.  It is only possible to 
permit exploitation of the land by interested persons. 
However, the conditions of use are unfair.  The Law 
on Real Estate Taxes obligates users of civic land to 
pay taxes on that land, although the owner is the state. 
That is an additional motive for state employees to 
delay privatization of civic land.6 
In order to obtain land property in Serbia, it is 
necessary to be correctly included in the public books 
on real estate (the cadastre (registry) of real estate 
deed books).  Only about 3% of the territory of 
Serbia is included in the deed books.  Information is 
not up to date, and the number of objects is not 
registered.  Legal security on the occasion of purchase 
of objects located on such land is not guaranteed. 
Because of the disorderly situation, it is not possible 
to use a mortgage as a means of protecting lenders 
and to jump-start the development of financing. 
Except for that, the Privatization Act does not prevent 
the sale of enterprises located on land that is not 
registered in the deed books.  The buyer must calculate 
and pay the price for the land even though he cannot 
obtain ownership over it.  Exceptional resources at 
the disposal of investors remain unused, and therefore 
economic subjects do not have the possibility to come 
by adequate capital for business, construction does 
not develop with the desired speed, and creditors lack 
legal security.  To avoid these problems, which are 
connected to unclear property rights, it is necessary 
to create a single registry of real estate rights with 
reliable information.  
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Another aspect of land issue, which is also related to 
property right, has to do with the fact that Republic of 
Serbia took away from municipalities the right to use 
land. Under the Law on Asset Owned by the Republic 
of Serbia (adopted in 1995), municipalities were 
deprived of the opportunity to dispose of the land 
property and use it for economic purposes. Study on 
the Costs of Existence of State Property on the Asset 
Used By Cities and Municipalities in the Republic of 
Serbia prepared by the Economic Institute and G17 
Institute listed different types of losses that originated 
as a consequence of the fact that municipalities were 
taken away property rights over land (inability to 
issue licenses for construction, lease out office space 
and collect revenues, employ people etc.) The total 
loss incurred is estimated to have amounted to €1.3 
billion.
 The judiciary.  Weak protection of property rights 
can have only one main cause – an inefficient judiciary. 
The system of regulations that define the judicial 
system constantly change.  Since 2001, there have been 
efforts to align the judicial system with European 
standards.  The most acute problem for the justice 
system since 2000 has been its independence from 
political leaders.  After reforms from 2001-2005, 
government officials and state employees still 
successfully exert pressure on the courts, public 
prosecutors, and try to influence the results of 
important (political) judicial trials.  The system of 
choosing and releasing judges further permits the 
influence of political leaders.  Although the reform of 
2001 established two bodies that decide the reasons 
for electing and changing judges, the Serbian 
Parliament and parliamentary committees still use 
political loyalties for the selection of judges.  Pressure 
is not exerted exclusively by declarations and threats, 
but also with low salaries and lack of personnel 
(especially law experts).  The judicial system does not 
have a source of financing independent of the state 
budget, although that could be arranged, taking into 
account the numerous court taxes paid for the great 
number of lawsuits the courts process in the course of 
each year.
The work of the courts is not satisfactory in its 
efficiency.  The shortage of information and statistical 
data on the resolution of different kinds of cases 
represents a special problem.  The general situation in 
which the judicial system in Serbia finds itself is 
unenviable.  Because of a lack of funds, the courts in 
Serbia are not motivated to solve cases efficiently, and 
the impossibility of following world and European 
trends in resolving disputes from various economic 
areas is a lasting problem.
 The judicial system is overloaded with cases.  The 
Court of the State Union (of Serbia and Montenegro) 
inherited from the former Federal Yugoslav Court 
over 1,000 unsolved cases and around 3,500 
administrative disputes from the High Army Tribunal 
that ceased work on 1 January 200.  An enormous 
number of these cases are still undecided because the 
Court of the State Union, although now constituted, 
had not begun to work effectively as of the end of 
2005.  
Township and district courts in Serbia are also 
overloaded with cases that slow down their work. 
The basic reason for the slow work of the courts in 
Serbia is the enormous number of old cases that are 
maintained in the court for several years, mostly 
because of the failure to appear of one of the parties to 
a dispute.  For example, the District Court of Belgrade 
at the end of 2003 had 990 unsolved cases in the area 
of criminal law, and by the end of 200, it had 1,07 
open cases.  For other courts in other regions, the 
situations is similar.  Each court possesses too few 
judges, such that judges are overburdened.  To take 
another example, for the field of criminal investigation 
on behalf of the Belgrade District Court, there were 
only 13 judges in 200, while in the same period there 
were introduced 1,661 cases, which amounted to 128 
newly introduced cases per judge for the year.
 The chief reason why courts work slowly are the 
frequent postponements of legal and criminal 
proceedings (see table 9), a key bottleneck in the case 
of local and district courts.  The study Reducing 
Backlogs in Open Cases establishes the following 
reasons for the frequent postponement of court 
cases: 
1. The practice of scheduling trials and audiences: 
fewer trials and audiences are held each day than are 
scheduled;  the parties often do not appear at 
audiences, which prolongs the resolution of trials;
2. Parties often come unprepared to audiences 
because of the fact that there is no office to inspect 
ahead of time whether the parties have complete 
materials with them;
3. There is no practice of preparatory audiences, 
although it is prescribed by the Law on Trial 
Procedure;
. A great number of audiences take place in the 
absence of the parties from the trial;  judges rarely 
draw on their powers under the Law on Criminal and 
Trial Procedure to compel witnesses and attorneys to 
appear at trials, and also do not order sanctions for 
failure to appear;
5. Cases last a long time because of the presentation 
of evidence for which there is no limit in practice, 
except that there are too many scheduled trials and 
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7 The total number of enterprises subjected to bankruptcy proceedings definitive from 1 September 2005 amounted to 565.
8 Included here are proceedings carried over from the previous years..
audiences each day to collect all the evidence for one 
audience;
6. Expert witnesses do not complete their testimony 
on time, and often courts question their expertise, 
etc. 
 The system of Commercial Courts, especially the 
Belgrade Commercial Court, is a special case. 
These courts handle economic disputes and, the 
Belgrade Commercial Court is considered the most 
non-transparent and corrupt institution in the 
country.  The case of the bankruptcy sale of Sartid, 
carried out by the Belgrade Commercial Court, is 
well-known.  On that occasion, the bankruptcy 
proceeding was violated by the court itself.   The 
Commercial Court selectively struck the registration 
of shares from the Central Registry of Securities. 
That happened in the case of the shares of C Market, 
the largest Serbian retail chain.  The elimination of 
the registered shares coincided with the 
announcement of the intention of the commercial 
chain Merkator (of Slovenia) to take over a majority 
packet of shares of C Market.
 Over the period 2000-200, the Commercial 
Court carried a total average of 18,700 unsolved 
cases from each year to the next.  Taking into account 
that the average number of solved cases during one 
year in the same period amounted to 70,562 in total, 
that means the Court failed to solve about 26% of all 
cases (not just bankruptcy cases) every year.  The 
average number of judges employed in the court 
amounted to 70.2, which meant that each judge 
worked on about 1,000 cases per year, or 3.83 cases 
each working day.
 A particular problem in the work of the 
Commercial Court is the resolution of cases from 
the regions and the conduct of bankruptcy 
proceedings.  In this area, this court represents one 
of the most inefficient institutions in the region.  On 
1 January 2005, a new Law on Bankruptcy Procedure 
was passed which simplified bankruptcy proceedings, 
but that law still had not begun to be applied as of 
the end of 2005.   
 In 2001-200, the number of demands for 
bankruptcy proceedings in the Belgrade Commercial 
Court surpassed by far the number of bankruptcy 
proceedings on which one judge worked.  The 
average number of new demands which the court 
received for one year in that period amounted to 
,996, but on average, bankruptcy proceedings are 
open for only 37 enterprises.7 At the same time, 
2001. 2002. 2003. 2004.
Number of bankruptcy proceedings per judge per year 2.520 1.401 836 297
Number of new demands received per year 11.104 12.244 5.661 1.997
Number of unsolved bankruptcy proceedings in the current year 3.167 3.543 1.273 861
Number of enterprises in open bankruptcy proceedings 515 651 340 242
Number of enterprises that have concluded bankruptcy 311 650 858 595
Courts Sample size Failures toappear New evidence Expert report
Convenience 
of the court Other Reasons
Criminal cases of original jurisdiction
Belgrade 1st Municipal 94 28 17 7 6 11
Belgrade District 94 46 18 3 1 21
Kragujevac Municipal 103 66 25 10 9 27
Kragujevac District 85 25 15 11 4 15
Novi Pazar Municipal 109 53 12 2 7 5
Novi Pazar District 67 29 27 10 7 10
Trial cases of original jurisdiction
Belgrade 1st Municipal 101 23 17 4 1 21
Kragujevac Municipal 103 45 18 10 7 29
Novi Pazar Municipal 101 40 18 9 17 24
Table 9.  Reasons for postponing hearings.  Source:  Reducing the Backlog of Open Cases.  National Center for State Courts, www.ncsc.org.yu.
Table 10.  Data on bankruptcy proceedings in the Commercial Court in Belgrade.  Source:  Commercial Court in Belgrade.
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one judge each year in the same period, conducts on 
average 1,263 bankruptcy proceedings.8 The great 
overload leads to a large number of unsolved cases: 
on average, the Commercial Court carries 2,211 
bankruptcy proceedings from each year to the next.
 Domestic courts also have great problems with 
the application of contracts.  According to data from 
the World Bank study The Cost of Doing Business 
2006, Serbia in that regard has the most inefficient 
and expensive courts in the region, although, as 
shown in table 11, it is the only one in the region 
making progress in that area:
 Because of the great inefficiencies of courts, firms 
resort to alternative ways of payment such as advance 
payment and establishing strong connections with 
suppliers and consumers, which makes the economy 
less flexible.
 Taxes. During the last year, public revenues 
recorded a tendency to play a growing part in GDP, 
while public expenditures, beginning in 2003, tended 
to play a smaller role in GDP.  The largest part of 
revenue comes from sales and import taxation.  The 
share of corporate taxes in state revenue is small 
because of false financial reports that do not show any 
profit at the end of the financial year.  The efficiency of 
tax payments basically increased after the introduction 
of VAT on 1 January 2005.  Compared to 200, total 
payments to public revenue during 2005 were greater 
for 31.2% (in nominal terms) and 12.6% (in real 
terms).  (All categories of public revenues and income, 
except taxes on fixed assets, achieved growth in 
payments during 2005 compared to 200.  The 
greatest contribution to growth in public revenue was 
realized through payment of taxes on goods and 
services, and in that context, with the payment of 
value-added tax.  MAT 12/2005, p.  1.)  At the end of 
1995, that resulted in a surplus in the  Serbian republic 
budget of €3.25 million.  
 The increase in public revenue was accomplished 
in large measure thanks to efficient payment of taxes, 
with a change in tax laws toward reducing tax burdens, 
widening the tax base, and evenly distributing the tax 
burden across taxpayers.
 
 With respect to the rate of value added taxes and 
taxes on enterprise profits, it is possible to say that 
Number of proceedings Vreme (dana) Costs to enforce contract (% of debt value)
2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005.
Serbia 36 33 1028 635 23,0 18,1
Croatia 22 22 415 415 10,0 10,0
Bulgaria 34 34 440 440 14,0 14,0
Romania 43 43 335 335 12,4 12,4
Hungary 21 21 365 365 8,1 8,1
Table 11.  Application of contracts.  Source:  The World Bank, The Cost of Doing Business 2006, 2005.
Chart 3. Share of consolidated budget expenditures and incomes in gross domestic product.  Source:  Memorandum on the budget and 
economic and fiscal policy for 2006. Ministry of finance, Republic of Serbia.
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Serbia is competitive in comparison with 
surrounding countries, with some of the lowest 
rates in the region.  
Erroneous decisions by state organs also can be 
identified at the macro level.  Rodrik cites three 
macro risks in all:  financial, monetary, and fiscal 
instability (Rodrik 200)  If bottlenecks are found 
here, that means that the primary culprit for low 
appropriability consists of bad government 
policies.
 Fiscal policy. Reform of the public finance sector, 
which began in 2001, already led to relatively low 
deficits of 1.6% of GDP that year.  After growth in the 
share of the deficit in the following two years, 
restrictive policies of public expenditure and real 
growth in gross domestic product resulted in a 
reduction of the deficit in 200, and a surplus of 2.2% 
GDP in 2005 (26.8 billion dinars, that is, €3.25 
million).  However, it is necessary to mention there 
was a methodological change in budgetary 
Chart .  Comparing the extent of general tax rates on profit and value added taxes at the end of 2005. Source: Serbian Ministry 
of Finance and Economist Intelligence Unit.
Name of the taxes Rate (in %) Comments
1.  Tax on enterprise profit 10
The lowest in Europe, after the rate in Montenegro.  Regulated 
with the goal of attracting investment, above all FDI
2.  Taxes on citizens’ income::
2.1 on income from independent activities 10
2.2 on earnings
2.3 on incomes from agriculture and forestry
14
Since mid-2001, the earnings tax is calculated on gross 
earnings.
2.4 on incomes from authors’ rights and rights over 
industrial property
2.5 on incomes from real estate
2.6 on capital gains
2.7 on other income
20
2.8 on citizens’ income 10
Paid by residents who realized a yearly income greater 
than four times the amount of the average yearly 
earnings per employee paid in Serbia.   In 2004, that 
limit amounted to 986,640 dinars (about 13,600 EUR)
3.  Real estate taxes:
3.1 on claims to real estate
3.2 on inheritance and gifts
3.3 on the transfer of absolute rights
min. 0,4
min. 3
min. 0,3
4.  Tax on value-added (previously, tax on sales/
circulation) 
8 and 18 (previously 
0 and 20)
Introduced 1 January 2005.
Table 12. Summary of the most important taxes in Serbia
9 Table 12. Summary of the most important taxes in Serbia.
Growth Diagnostics – Data
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
76
bookkeeping at the beginning of 2005 by which the 
paying down of the public debt was not included in 
budget expenditures, such that it was even easier for 
the government to show a surplus in the budget 
 Be that as it may, compared to neighboring 
countries, it is possible to conclude that the budget 
of Serbia is significantly more balanced than the 
budgets of Hungary and Croatia. 
 Since 200, the government has been striving to 
speed up economic growth and increase investment, 
accomplished with a combination of expansionary 
fiscal and restrictive monetary policy.  Fiscal policy is 
directed at moving aggregate demand by means of 
greater spending.  In the absence of a restructured 
economy that would enable faster growth, this seems 
a logical choice.  Increased spending should increase 
demand, and then greater demand should prompt 
enterprises to produce more, which should result in 
greater economic growth.  
 That combination of fiscal and economic policy, 
however, carries risks because it can lead to rising 
inflation.  In order to reduce the risks of expansionary 
fiscal policy, it is necessary that monetary policy be 
restrictive.  Fiscal policy by definition is directed at 
spending more than monetary policy;  restrictive 
monetary policy to a great extent averts growing 
inflation, but it constrains the banking sector and 
prevents its greater liquidity.
Chart 5. The budget deficit, in millions of USD and share of GDP.  Source:  Memorandum on the 
Budget and Economic and Fiscal Policy for 2006. Serbian Ministry of Finance.
Chart 6.  Comparative summary of budget deficits (as % of GDP).  Source of data: for Serbia, 
the Ministry of Finance, and for other countries, the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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 That an expansionary fiscal policy would not be 
successful could be seen already at the end of 200. 
Real economic growth at the end of the year was 
significantly  larger (7%), but primarily thanks to 
successes in agriculture.  An expansionary fiscal policy 
led to higher inflation (13.% at the end of 200, and 
17.7% by the end of 2005) and to greater spending 
that, it appears, overflowed into a higher foreign trade 
deficit.  In 2005, the government had budget sufict of 
2.2% of GDP, and in 2006, it was projected to be 2.8% 
of GDP. (Public revenues in 2005 increased by 20% 
compared to 200, but GDP also grew.) The 
government also reduced spending, but did not 
change its structure much.  Deficit reduction as agreed 
with the International Monetary Fund was enabled by 
increased public revenues (to which greater inflation 
also contributed).  Revenues from taxes grew in 2005, 
such that the structure of spending more or less 
remained the same.
 That the government desires to solve the problem 
of growth by means of an active fiscal policy, instead 
of active restructuring of the industrial sector, can 
be seen from its attitude toward monetary policy 
and dinar exchange rate policy.  If fiscal policy is 
expansionary, then monetary policy must be 
restrictive.  A restrictive monetary policy requires a 
stable (fixed) exchange rate, and that creates a risk of 
high deficits in the current account (table 1), while 
monetary policy relaxation increases the risk of 
inflation.  Nonetheless, it seems in this moment that 
it is better to favor a restrictive fiscal policy, and a 
flexible dinar exchange rate policy, that is, making it 
easier to control inflation through fiscal policy (less 
spending), and through exchange rate policy.  That is 
what the IMF recommended to the Serbian 
government in the summer of 200.
 According to the Memorandum on the Budget 
and Economic and Fiscal Policy for 2005 published 
by the Ministry of Finance, it is expected that public 
spending will fall gradually from 5.7% in 2005 to 
2.5% of GDP in 2008.  Reducing public spending 
could lead to the possibility of conducting a more 
flexible monetary policy.  But whether doing so is 
possible, taking into account that reduction in public 
spending endangers many social categories of people 
who depend on the budget, remains to be seen. 
According to IMF calculations from 200, 7% of 
the employed depend directly or indirectly on the 
budget  (International Monetary Fund, Fifth Review 
Under the Extended Agreement (July 2005) p. 10).
 Growth of wages is one of the fundamental 
obstacles to a more flexible monetary policy.  Such a 
large growth in wages renders impossible a more 
flexible dinar exchange rate policy.  However, limiting 
wage growth requires slower growth in prices. 
Considering that the state controls prices in the public 
sector, it often negotiates with public enterprises over 
price increases (oil, electricity, public utilities, edible 
2002. 2003. 2004. 2005.a 2006.b
Serbia 46,8 46,5 45,3 44,4 43,5
Croatia 44,37 44,39 42,5 40,2 38,0
Bulgaria 39,41 40,89 40,1 40,0 39,6
Macedonia 34,92 33,18 33,0 33,0 33,0
Hungary 57,8 54,0 51,6 51,0 51,2
Serbia Croatia Bulgaria Macedonia
Year 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005. 2004. 2005.
Foreign trade deficit -31,9 -22,3 -24,33 -23,35 -13,9 -19,6 -21,1 -19,8
Current account deficit -13,2 -8,5 -4,7 -5,1 -8,5 -14,9 -7,9 -3,4
Table 13.  Comparative summary of public spending as percent of 
GDP.  Source: EIU.  ab Estimate of EIU.
Table 1.  Comparative summary of foreign trade and current account deficits expressed as percent of GDP.  Data from 200 and 2005.  
Source: MAT no.  12/2005, and Economist Intelligence Unit.  
oils, and so on).  If the state permits price increases 
for public services, then it is difficult on the other 
hand to prevent wage growth in the public sector. 
(Some public employees and pensioners in Serbia 
have their wages indexed, by law, to inflation or 
particular prices.)  That constant negotiation over 
prices and wages only shows that there is inflationary 
pressure which leads to high social spending.
 Given an expansionary fiscal policy, monetary 
policy must constantly control the quantity of money 
in circulation.  A restrictive monetary policy has 
several consequences.  In December 2005, the 
National Bank of Serbia (NBS) raised the level of 
compulsory bank reserves for citizens’ foreign 
exchange deposits from 35% to 38%, making credit 
more expensive.  Expensive credit makes current 
business affairs more expensive, so enterprises, as one 
measure, have to dismiss workers or temporarily 
pension them.  (The real rate of unemployment at the 
end of 200 amounted to 18.%.)  Excess 
unemployment in turn increases costs to the budget 
because the state must take care of them, and that 
prevents reductions in public spending.
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 An expansionary fiscal policy and its consequences 
for monetary policy lead to a higher exchange risk. 
According to the risk estimates of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Serbia has a high exchange risk in 
the region.
 State spending in 2001-200 not only negligent 
and careless, but also uncontrolled.  There is no 
independent inspection of expenditure of funds. 
The budget system imposes a hierarchical control 
from the top down and taxpayers have no control 
over the state apparatus, not even indirectly through 
their representatives.  In effect, only the minister of 
finance possesses a detailed picture of state revenues 
and expenditures.  He is in a position to stir up 
uncertainties at the micro level with arbitrary 
diversion of budgetary drains and subjecting certain 
markets or entities to pressure.  A large part of the 
budget is used up for failed enterprises. They are kept 
alive instead of being filed for bankruptcy. Under 
IMF pressure  by the end of 200, this policy has 
significantly changed in 2005. The government 
started to pursue more restrictive fiscal policy, 
employing more prudent spending. 
 Inflation .  State spending also creates a significant 
macro risk in the Serbian economy.  Although 
spending has been reduced, its structure remains 
unchanged.  At most, state resources are spent as an 
unproductive use because of which the rate of 
inflation grows, though spending has been reduced. 
The official estimate of inflation for 2005 was 9%, but 
by the end of the year, it amounted to 17.7%.  Table 
16 shows that these rates were far higher than in 
Serbia’s main trading partners (mostly EU members), 
and more than inflation in Montenegro, which 
adopted the euro as an official means of payment. 
 
 At the same time, the dinar has not been 
depreciating proportionally relative to the Euro, such 
that every day, Serbian exports are becoming more 
expensive.  Up until now, the Central Bank has 
resisted all pressures on the part of exporters to 
devalue the dinar, but no one knows quite how much 
risk the exchange rate will create for daily business 
for the near future.  There are basically two claims 
here.  One is the predictability of depreciation, the 
chances of which are rather high.  The other is 
predictability of sudden devaluation, which is 
speculative.  The consequence of the first factor is 
increased through credit expansion, due to the 
arbitrage opportunities arising out of the interest rate 
differential, while for the second factor, this credit 
expansion is mostly short term.  
 Monetary policy in Serbia since 2000 has 
primarily been directed at attaining and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability.  As a result of restrictive 
monetary policy over 2001-2003, the government 
accomplished a significant lowering of the rate of 
inflation, but in 200 and 2005, inflation surpassed 
the projected rate of growth, partly due to external 
effects, and partly due to partial relaxation as a 
function of economic growth..
 During the observed period, monetary authorities 
tried, using suitable instruments, to manage monetary 
aggregates, in order to establish a maintainable 
relationship between the need to reduce inflation, on 
the one hand, and to provide a sufficient quantity of 
money for economic and citizens’ needs, on the other. 
Serbia Croatia Bulgaria Macedonia Hungary
General grade C C C D C
General score 59 44 45 65 42
Table 15.  Grade and score of exchange risk, July and August 2005.  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
2002. 2003. 2004. 2005.
Serbia 14,8 7,8 13,7 17,7
Croatia 1,89 1,66 2,69 3,5
Bulgaria 3,82 5,64 3,98 4,5
Macedonia 1,1 2,6 -1,9 2
Hungary 4,8 5,7 5,5 3,6
Table 16. Rate of inflation in Serbia and surrounding countries, as a percentage.  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2003-200);  National 
Statistical Services (2005).).
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That meant that the money supply grew in real terms, 
but in a controlled framework.  The gradual reduction 
of cash in circulation was very important, among 
other things, for the goal of reducing the size of the 
gray economy.  Although it has never been at a 
satisfactory level, the share of cash in M1 was reduced 
from a level of 7% in December 2002 to 37% in 
December 2005.
 Managing monetary policy relies to the greatest 
extent on the management of the high rates of 
compulsory reserves of banks  in dinar and foreign 
exchange deposits, and in open market operations, 
which are not adequately developed.  Open market 
operations were conducted with the sale of securities 
of the NBS, and since January 2005, the National 
Bank has initiated repo operation of long term bonds 
of the Republic of Serbia.  During 200, restrictive 
policies began to be conducted, in order to limit the 
growth of financing consumer spending, and to 
reduce bank obligations abroad.11  
 These measures of the NBS continue to control 
bank liquidity (measured by the extent of free 
reserves), in order, on the one hand, to avoid 
endangering their business affairs, and, on the other 
hand, to avoid the danger of macroeconomic stability. 
Liquidity in the banking sector, although it varied 
from period to period, can be evaluated, on the whole, 
as satisfactory.  Namely, banks mostly possessed 
surplus free funds, and NBS credits for keeping up 
daily bank liquidity were usually almost never used. 
 
 Foreign exchange rate policy at the beginning of 
the period was oriented toward keeping the rate stable 
(the dinar appreciated in real terms relative to the 
Euro), but the nominal rate since 2003 depreciated 
somewhat more dynamically.  During the initial slide, 
that resulted in real depreciation, but since mid-200, 
exchange rate policy mostly lost that effect, with the 
consequence of dynamic price growth at retail. 
Relaxation of exchange rate policy began after the 
relatively successfully conducted first phase of 
stabilization (which was visible in the lowering of the 
inflation rate and the remonetization of the economy). 
It was meant to establish a foreign exchange rate that 
is closer to equilibrium in order to improve the index 
of exchange abroad.  However, such an effect in the 
observed period is absent, because, in spite of real 
depreciation in the exchange rate, the foreign trade 
deficit continued to grow -- to a great extent, the 
consequence of structural problems in the economy.  
 Macro risks do not arise only in unforeseeable 
monetary policy, but also in arbitrary tax policy.  A 
great number of those surveyed (section 27) are not 
satisfied with the government’s tax policy or with tax 
rates.  For now, all state efforts in tax policy were 
devoted to reducing tax evasion and creating adequate 
revenue for anticipated expenditures.  International 
organizations, worried above all about the budget 
deficit rather than about the budget’s composition, 
urged the government to take this approach.  The 
structure of the budget showed enough room for 
savings (four-fifths of managers point to an inadequate 
structure of public spending).  Above all, there are 
huge subsidies of state enterprises and some politically 
motivated subventions that are added to the ministries 
held by parties that control the state’s finances.  Also, 
subsidies are added to some dilapidated enterprises 
that use only part of their capacity and which cannot 
be privatized thanks to obsolete technologies.  The 
government is not prepared to bear the political risk of 
shutting down and dismissing workers of these 
Chart 7.  Rate of price increases at retail in Serbia.
11To give an example, the average interest rate at a yearly level with which the NBS conducts open market operations grew from 11.35% in December 2003 to 
16.30% in December 200.
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inefficient companies, and therefore it endlessly pours 
money into them.  
 In addition to that, the government uses tax revenue 
to support some politically motivated or insufficiently 
transparent investments through the Development 
Fund.  Created as an institution for pouring money 
into inefficient socialist firms, the Fund has gradually 
diverted its official policy to support firms in 
insufficiently developed regions and imitating risky 
investment funds.  However, the policy of the Fund is 
under political revision, and the structure of credit 
reflects corresponding political influence.  Credits, 
which the Fund awards under favorable conditions 
and with subsidized interest rates, contribute to 
undeserved profits for enterprises, and large investors 
do not spare their effort trying to get favorable credits. 
Once again, taxpayers pay the bill, but to a great extent, 
this policy limits the development of market capital, 
creates enough disequilibria through financing 
projects with great political support instead of high 
rates of return on investment and leads to uncertainties 
provoked by political-business cycles.  The law 
regarding the Development Fund changed around the 
middle of 2005.    The innovations are that it is no 
longer financed from the budget, and only private 
enterprises can qualify for credit.
 The costs of business.  .  Legal security for existing 
and potential investors in the previous era was 
disturbed by very slow and inefficient procedures of 
payment of creditors’ claims.  To that problem can be 
added slow bankruptcy procedures, which as a rule 
last for several years.  That is why some key steps for 
improving the total business environment and 
strengthening financial discipline were enacted in the 
new Law on Bankruptcy Procedure and Law on 
Executive Procedure.  It is expected that all proceedings 
will be significantly faster, simpler, and more efficient; 
with that, the usual slowness of bankruptcy procedures 
should be superseded.  The courts are obligated to act 
urgently in executive proceedings, so that in a period 
of three days after the submission of claims, they must 
render a decision.  A very important innovation is 
based on the reason for setting bankruptcy in motion. 
Earlier, that could only be done for extended incapacity 
to pay, and the procedure as a rule was started by the 
Bureau for Settlement and Payment.  Now, as cause for 
legal insolvency, the creditor or the debtor can launch 
the procedure, and in exceptional cases, the public 
prosecutor or tax authorities can do so.  What is new 
is the expected possibility of reorganizing the bankrupt 
debtor, creating the possibility for its recovery.  (Some 
legal measures for reorganization foresee the 
possibility, with the goal of debt compensation, of 
selling or transferring a part of unencumbered real 
estate, closing unprofitable operations, obtaining new 
investment or credits, dismissing employees, breaking 
unfavorable contracts, satisfying demands that have 
come due, and so on.)
 Also, bankrupt managers in bankruptcy procedures 
receive much more authority than earlier, and can 
even carry out some solutions before the court’s 
decision, but for that he must be skilled and possess 
the permission of the Agency for Licensing Bankruptcy 
Managers.  These kinds of innovations are very 
important from the view of legal security, because 
they offer greater security to creditors that their claims 
will be efficiently settled.  However, as in many other 
areas, passing the law seems the easier part of the job; 
the challenge is its implementation.  Taking into 
account that both laws were relatively recently adopted, 
there is not yet enough information to judge the 
efficiency of its application.  
 Competition policy is yet another essential factor 
that influences the quality of the business environment. 
According to the transition report of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Serbia 
received a grade of 1 for competition policy for 200 
and 2005.  That is the lowest possible grade, received 
by only two other former communist countries: 
Turkmenistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The 
important steps made until now are liberalization of 
foreign trade, which has led to market competition 
from imports, and strengthening the sector of small 
and medium enterprises.  However, in key areas 
where monopolies operate, reforms are applied 
slowly, even in cases when there exist legal obligations 
to do it.  That imposes significant costs on enterprises 
and citizens, considering that these are mostly areas 
of public importance.  One example is 
telecommunications, where the degree of penetration, 
costs, and quality and reliability of services are 
significantly lower than in developed countries, 
thanks to the land-line telephone monopoly, which, 
although it should have been broken up in the 
summer of 2005, still formally exists.  It is expected 
that the Law on Protection of Competition, adopted 
in September 2005, will finally regulate this question. 
The law should protect the equality of all participants 
in the market, and a Commission for Protection of 
Competition is expected to be formed, as a special 
organ that will take care of protection of competition. 
The law defines situations that are considered 
violations of competition, and provides for 
punishments.  For example, agreements among 
market participants, or abuse of a dominant position, 
to set or impose prices, production quantities, 
dividing of markets, imposing additional obligations 
on the conclusion of contracts, etc., are considered 
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violations of competition.  Also, concentration in 
markets is regulated, such that it can be carried out 
only with the approval of the Commission.
 
 Regarding what kinds of perceptions 
businesspeople have in connection with the business 
environment in Serbia, and how those perceptions 
have changed since the beginning of the transition 
process, the World Bank study The Cost of Doing 
Business in Serbia 3 offers important information. 
The findings of the research show that it is possible to 
evaluate the level of efficiency of state organs as 
improved, relative to previous years.  Namely, 
waiting and costs connected to contact with state 
organs are reduced,  because management and other 
employees must spend less time than before when 
dealing with state employees (inspections, different 
offices, etc.) and have more time to devote to their 
affairs.
 There is a positive shift also on the level of 
information on enterprises.  Not only are there a 
greater number of firms that present sought-after 
financial and statistical reports, but the efficiency of 
their work has also increased, because enterprises in 
such businesses use up less time than before.  A 
criticism that could be leveled is that the possibilities 
of informational-communication technologies are 
still not sufficiently used, as much connected with 
the acquisition and application of standardized 
software, as connected to the possibility of delivering 
sought-after reports by electronic means.  As one 
example, enterprises could submit reports in 
electronic form, but after scheduling a meeting with 
the civil servant responsible, and coming in 
personally to hand it to him, that eliminates the 
advantage of electronic delivery of reports.  
 Another area where it could be said, with 
reservation, that there is progress, is the general 
evaluation of the level of corruption, which can be 
evaluated as stagnating.  In addition, there are areas 
where this problem is less apparent than before, such 
as in foreign trade and registration of businesses, but 
also areas where corruption is more pronounced 
than before, as in relations with local authorities and 
inspections.12
 The analyzed factors lead to the conclusion that it is 
the legal environment factor which has the most 
significance for business.  However, the negatives are 
those variables that describe the legal environment, 
the stability of the legal environment, and the 
possibilities and limits of law, estimated as considerably 
worse than in previous research.   With, that, we can 
confirm in this moment that the legal system really 
represents the main obstacle to improvement in the 
business environment in Serbia, because in many 
areas there is a lack of either adequate legal solutions, 
or of corresponding efficiency in carrying them out.  
 Although there are certain shifts compared to 
earlier states of affairs, the great problem is that it is 
possible to discern among businesspeople an 
overwhelming dose of pessimism connected to events 
in the future.  What is worrisome is that they expect a 
more active commitment of the state in economic 
life.  Such expectations are a relic of the former way of 
doing business, and contradict the principles of the 
contemporary market economy.  Therefore it is 
recommended that the government and other state 
organs become more involved in informing 
businesspeople about the real role that the state has in 
a market economy, and raise the level of awareness, to 
the effect that businesspeople must take responsibility 
for successful or unsuccessful business of their 
enterprises.  
 Development of the private sector after 2000. 
New registration procedures for enterprises were 
significantly simplified during 200, such that 
enterprises are now registered quickly and efficiently. 
During 2005, there developed a process of re-
registering enterprises in order to form a single registry 
of all enterprises in Serbia.  That should reduce the 
possibility of abuses, previously widespread, when 
businesspeople formed phantom enterprises or 
undertook registration for the purpose of avoiding 
payment obligations.  In 2001-200, the rate of 
founding new enterprises was consistently somewhere 
under 10%  (Table 19).  According to the data of the 
Agency for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
more than 10,000 new enterprises were founded in 
2005, as a consequence of easier conditions for their 
registration.  
 Although founding enterprises is simplified, the 
registered private sector is insufficiently strong.  Its 
portion of total GDP in 200 amounted to about 55%, 
which is less than the share of the private sector in 
neighboring countries  (Table 20).  According to the 
same data, the share of employees in the private sector 
Serbia Croatia Macedonia Bulgaria Hungary
Return of funds (% of the bankrupt estate) 20,3 28,4 15,4 33,5 35,7
Time (in years) 2,7 3,1 3,7 3,3 2,0
Cost (% of the bankrupt estate) 23,0 14,5 28,0 9,0 14,5
Table 17. Bankruptcy procedure in Serbia:  comparison with countries in the region.   Source: the World Bank, The Cost of Doing Business 2006 and 2005.
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12 It should be mentioned that in regions where it is estimated that the level of corruption worsened, the frequency of bribes declined, but the amounts 
increased.
is 35%, and the share of the private sector with respect 
to capital is 29%. 
 In Serbia, by the end of 200, enterprises that were 
not 100% privately owned were by far the largest and 
most profitable.  According to the rankings published 
by Ekonomist magazin, on the list of the twenty 
largest enterprises as measured by total revenue were 
four enterprises with predominantly private capital: 
Delta Holding, US Steel Serbia, Rodić M&B Co,  i MK 
Commerce (Ekonomist magazin 2005, 18).  All four 
still had relations with the government, and their 
good market position may have had something to do 
with the absence of a policy of competition carried 
out by governments in market economies.   The 
situation is not much better on the list of the most 
successful firms.  Among the top twenty most 
successful firms as measured by profits in 200 are 
eight purely private enterprises – thus, less than half 
of the top twenty firms (Ibid.  9).  In order to dispose 
of enormous funds (that is, which one can dispose of 
without controls) in Serbia, or to extract great profits, 
it is necessary to be a state enterprise or somehow  to 
convince the government to forget about competition 
policy and not touch monopolies.
 The result of low competition is sluggish 
restructuring of the industrial sector.  The Agency for 
Privatization in 2001 set aside 71 enterprises with the 
intention of restructuring them and then privatizing 
them.  From this list of enterprises, ten enterprises 
were sold over four years, or about 1% of the total. 
These enterprises employ about 150,000 workers, 
which meant that their rapid privatization could be 
politically dangerous.  That probably means that the 
state abandoned the strategy from 2001 by which it 
should have sold enterprises earlier, and mitigated 
the social repercussions of privatization for 
subsequently dismissed workers, and returned to a 
policy of subsidizing loss-making public and social 
enterprises.  The course of privatization in 200 and 
2005 also demonstrate that.  In 200, the number of 
privatized enterprises amounted to 2% of the 
number which were privatized in 2003.  In the same 
period, revenues from privatization amounted to 20% 
of revenues realized in 2003.  In 2005, the results of 
privatization were not much better.  Total revenue 
from tenders and auctioned sales amounted to €268 
million, and of that, the sale of only one bank 
(Jubanka) collected €152 million.  (As shown in table 
21, total realized sales from privatization amounted 
to €390 million, but belonging to that was €122 
million in revenue accomplished through shares 
  Amount in EUR No. of days
Work permits 
2001 733 22
2003 2.603 30
2004 3.051 10
Product certification
2001 1.364 -
2003 1.815 13
2004 870 50
Costs of customs and transport of exports
2001 5.740 -
2003 79 94
2004 3.049 18
Construction permitsa
2001 3.981 -
2003 13.542 -
2004 637 -
Registration of enterprises
2001 237 50
2003 1.314 40
2004 673 9
Payment of taxes and fees
2001 - -
2003 - -
2004 39.520 -
Table 18. The costs of business in Serbia, selected indicators. a The data is one sum necessary for obtaining all permits at once (usu-
ally through specialized firms that offer such services), instead of procuring each permit individually.  Note:  Considering that the 
question changed over time, comparable data is used.  Besides the comparability of data, it should be kept in mind that the sam-
ple during the observed years is not the same, and that for some questions, there are a wide range of answers, such that the ave-
rage value, given here, can be unexpectedly high.  Source: Cost of Doing Business in Serbia 1, 2, 3 (2002, 200, 2005).
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Year Number of newly registered enterprises
Number of 
liquidated 
enterprises
2001. 6.959 1.614
2002. 7.634 1.828
2003. 6.692 2.302
2004. 6.329 1.703
2005. 10.500 (no data)
Serbia Croatia Macedonia Bulgaria Hungary
Share of GDP (2004) 50 60 65 75 80
Share of GDP (2005) 55 60 65 75 80
Table 19.  Number of newly registered and liquidated firms by 
years. Source: Agency for smell and medium size enterprises. 
Table 20. Percentage share of the private sector in GDP.  Source: EBRD Transition Report 200, 2005
traded on the stock exchange where, in the greatest 
number of cases, property only changed owners and 
the state achieved less profit.) 
 According to research in 2001 published by the 
Wiener Institut fuer Internationale 
Wirtschaftsvergleiche, (Christie E. & Holzner M. 
(2003). “The Dark Side of the Balkans”, in: WIIW 
Monthly Report, no. 8-9) the gray economy in Serbia, 
measured on the basis of domestic spending and 
undeclared taxes, produced 36% of GDP.  It is possible 
that both of these gray economies have shrunk since 
2001.  
 As far as existing enterprises are concerned, data 
from 2005 show that two-thirds of registered 
enterprises are privately owned, while 5% are socially 
owned or are otherwise under the ownership of the 
state.  Private enterprises visibly dominate the great 
majority of activities, especially in the area of 
commerce, and a minority of private firms participate 
in the areas of education and health, which remain 
mostly under state ownership. Separated by type of 
organization, limited liability  c o m p a n i e s 
(LLC, or in Serbian, DOO) dominate private 
enterprises, by a proportion of 70%.  What is 
interesting is the exceptional number of one-member 
LLCs, which make up 36% of the total number of 
registered private enterprises, and are mostly small 
enterprises, the owner of which is also usually the 
manager.  Until recently, such an organization type 
dominated activities where the majority of firms were 
privately owned, but their number and proportion of 
the total number of private enterprises is declining.
 
 Monopolies. An important part of economic 
activity in Serbia is still under the control of the state. 
The state is still the owner of public enterprises that 
have significant influence on total business in the 
economy.  At the end of 200, public enterprises 
employed 11.7% of all employees and realized 16.8% 
of total revenues, 13.% of net profits, and 13.5% of 
losses for the entire economy.
 The process of restructuring public enterprises has 
not progressed very far, despite the demands of the 
IMF and the European Union.  Because of that, their 
efficiency has not particularly improved, such that 
many of them realize losses, and they receive subsidies 
from the budget.  Profits of public enterprises fell by 
8% in 200, relative to 2003, while during that same 
period, the private sector increased profits by 2.2%. 
Public enterprises also have large debts that amount 
to 13.5% of total debts in the economy.  NIS, EPS and 
Railway alone account for 8% of total debt in the 
public sector.  NIS’s debts is, for example, 3.6 times 
greater than the value of its assets and 1.3 times over 
the value of working capital (data are from the study 
Analysis of the Business of Public Enterprises in 
200.)
 At this stage, the majority of public enterprises are 
in the process of laying off and separating auxiliary 
activities from core activities.  After that, it would 
remain to be seen which operations could be 
privatized in a timely period.  Table 23 illustrates the 
dynamic of reducing work forces in 200.13
Method Total sold Sale pricea Investmentsa No. of employees
Tenders 15 96.336 75.159 8.159
Auctions 204 172.000 43.000 29.023
Tenders + auctions 234 268.336 118.159 37.182
Market capital 282 122.291 na 31.302
TOTAL 501 390.627 118.159 62.520
Table 21.  Summary of privatization in 2005.  aIn thousands of euros. 
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12 I13 It should be mentioned that in regions where it is estimated that the level of corruption worsened, the frequency of bribes declined, but the amounts 
increased.
 Taking into account that the period for privatizing 
activities of public enterprises is not restricted, and 
that, until now, punishments were replaced with 
enacting and carrying out appropriate regulations, 
there is a justifiable worry that this process will last 
longer than is optimal.  That is particularly problematic 
considering that these enterprises are by their nature 
monopolies, and that the economy and citizens suffer 
because of high prices and goods and services of 
unsatisfactory quality which public enterprises offer 
them.
 Through control of the public sector, the 
government hinders the entry of new entrepreneurs 
in the areas of telecommunications, refining of oil 
derivatives, railroad services, and distribution and 
production of electricity.  For two years already, the 
government of Serbia, in spite of continued pressure 
and threats from the IMF, has been unable to begin 
restructuring of even one public enterprise and  thus 
carry out the assumed obligations that represent an 
integral part of its economic policies.  
 Furthermore, the example of the slow 
implementation of the Law on Telecommunications, 
so as to prevent the entry of third-party operators of 
mobile phones, provides additional confirmation of 
how the public sector deters competition and 
strengthens monopolies.  (The Law was enacted but 
could not take effect until just three months after the 
publishing of the act on the election of the president 
 Privatly-owned
Socially or state-
owned Other
a Total
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and hydropower 2.564 247 1.877 4.688
Mineral and rock extraction 209 24 13 246
Processing industries 17.691 620 759 19.070
Construction 4.215 295 381 4.891
Commerce 41.098 603 591 42.292
Hotels and restaurants 1224 95 67 1386
Transportation, storage, and communications 4.953 159 153 5.265
Financial services 436 225 253 914
Education 1024 1896 427 3.347
Other 9.880 2087 29.420 41.387
Total 83.294 6.251 33.941 123.486
Table 22.  Number of enterprises by activity and form of ownership, as of 31 December 2005. 
Source: Republic of Serbia’s statistical office. 
aCooperative or mixed, or the form of property is not mentioned.
NIS PTT ŽTP JAT Srbijašume Aerodrom
Number of employees 17,328 17,900 26.200 3,672 3,983 1,059
Reduction 1,500 1,294 3,783 2,164 350 314
Table 23.  Number of employees, and reductions in the number of employees of public enterprises in 200.
and members of the managing board, which happened 
only in May 2005.)
 That the government still does not seriously intend 
to restructure the public sector is shown by the absence 
of independent regulatory bodies over infrastructure. 
The Agency for Telecommunications was established 
in May 2005, while the Council for Radio-Diffusion 
has been almost inactive since it was illegally 
inaugurated in the summer of 2003.  Independent 
agencies which would regulate the spheres of public 
transport and oil traffic have still not been 
considered.  
 Indebtedness represents one of the primary levers 
of power that result from control over the public 
sector.  This pertains not only to the great financial 
means which are at the state’s disposal, but also to the 
possibility of nonpayment, that is, the manipulation of 
the debts between the public and the real sectors.
 If state enterprises sell electricity, oil, telephone 
services, or transport –  the complete infrastructure of 
a state – then it can extract a benefit from forgiving 
debts or postponing payments of these services.  A 
good example of that is the privatization of three sugar 
refineries in October 2002.  The sugar refineries  were 
sold for €3 apiece to Miodrag Kostić, at that time a 
close friend of the Serbian prime minister.  Kostić 
promised that, in return, he would pay the refineries’ 
debts, which exceeded €20 million.  Taking into 
account that the sugar refineries owed money to NIS, 
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two years after privatization, their debts have still not 
been paid. 
 
 Market failures.  .  For bad business, entrepreneurs 
as a rule blame the government and the regulatory 
system.  However, entrepreneurs’ lack of 
resourcefulness in the market can also be a reason for 
slow economic growth.  Rodrik calls this market 
failure.  For example, firms are not motivated to make 
new products or advance workforce training.  It is 
always cheaper to use innovations developed by 
foreign or domestic competitors, or to get around the 
problem of staff shortages by using previously trained 
and qualified workers or personnel who possess 
certain information, from competing firms.  The 
failure to protect intellectual property rights leads to 
weak activity in research and development in 
enterprises.  
 
 It often happens that enterprises stubbornly cling 
to their products or their primary products without 
considering changes in market circumstances.  This is 
evident not only among socialist directors, accustomed 
to state subsidies, but also among many private 
entrepreneurs.  For example, when market conditions 
changed for the worse for selling strawberries, they 
sought state coverage of their losses.  Not one 
strawberry producer thought of examining new 
production ideas, searching for new markets,  or 
considering the introduction of more complex levels 
of processed fruit.  Their position was that either the 
state needed to commit itself to reducing risk and 
covering their loss, or they would not produce 
anything.  Resistance to accepting risk and caution in 
implementing new, profitable ideas are characteristic 
of insufficiently developed economies.  
 In such circumstances, it can be expected that the 
government will intervene to stimulate research and 
development activities among producers, to cover 
part of the market risk, or to provide organizational 
and informational support to entrepreneurs.  Some 
governments go even farther, adding budget funds 
for research and development.  However, the Serbian 
government has shown frugality in respect to 
investing in research and development.  
 In order to reach the goals supported by the IMF, 
the government is forced to reduce costs, but naturally 
not in a linear way.  Thus, in accord with Olson’s 
expectations (Olson 1982), the worst hit are those 
groups which cannot find common interests to exert 
pressure on the government.  As a result, Serbia 
spends less than her counterparts on research and 
development, and similarly invests less in training 
qualified staff.  
 These facts are easily checked on the basis of data 
from those states, but in this instance, it can be pointed 
out that managers are aware of this problem.  Almost 
three-quarters of surveyed managers in the sample 
confirm the lack of investment in research and 
development, and 86% agree that the general level of 
technological development in Serbia lags behind 
competitors (section 26).    There is almost universal 
agreement among them that intellectual property 
rights are not sufficiently protected (95%), and 
therefore the great majority (two-thirds) do not see 
the purpose of paying for royalties.  With such a state 
of affairs, it is rational for firms to grab all they can and 
avoid spending on research and development.  It is a 
classic case of market failure, since everybody would 
be better off with strict implementation of the patent 
law, but there is no grass-roots initiative for it. 
Individual agents are reluctant to pursue such a policy 
since free riders could be in position to collect 
substantial payoffs.
 This leads us to problems of other cases of bad 
coordination.  There are several Serbian business 
associations, mostly with the same (overlapping) 
members.  However, their main aim is to take the state 
captive, and not to coordinate profitable activities. 
The Yugo Project, planned in the 1980s, was practically 
the last one to include several business activities, but 
imposed from above by the communist party, and 
carried out through orders.  At this time, entrepreneurs 
do not show interest among themselves to support 
some other export project.  Viewed theoretically, the 
Economic Chamber is the institution that could 
provide support and coordinate export activities, but 
it is conceived in a communist manner, more as a 
shelter for retired politicians than as a true business 
organization.  In the meantime, the government has 
established the Agency for Foreign Investment and 
Promotion of Exports (SIEPA).
	 23.	 Costs	of	Financing		
 The costs of financing represent the last (third) 
group of reasons where, according to the model of 
growth diagnostics, limits on faster growth can be 
found.  If public capital is used in an appropriate way, 
and if there are no failures (government or market) 
precluding reasonable return on investments, it still 
does not mean that the economy will necessarily grow 
as long as the financial system is not readied in an 
appropriate way, that is, as long as the economy is not 
supplied with funds for economic activity.
 Financing can be local or international.  If local 
financing is poor, that means the country possesses 
an inefficient and weak banking system.  The main 
loss-making banks were closed at the beginning of 
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the transition of this sector in 2002. The remaining 
banks are getting better and more competitive. Yet, 
the total of basic resources in the banking sector 
amounts to scarcely more than 0% of GDP, while, 
for example, in neighboring Croatia and Hungary, 
the value of the same coefficient is greater than 
100%.  
 Real interest rates on credit are high, considering 
that debt is evaluated in euros.  Nominally weighted 
monthly rates on loans to citizens at the end of 2005 
amounted to 15.82%.  The journal Kvartalni monitor 
shows that interest rates are falling, that they differ (as 
shown in table 2), depending on the kind of credit, 
and that they depend on credit risk, that is, on the 
type of client.  There is one interest rate for citizens 
Union was switching to the Euro, less than half of the 
amount of Deutsch marks exchanged for the Euro 
was collected by banks over the next three years.  By 
the end of 200, the total amount of savings was less 
than 1.5 billion euros, held almost exclusively in 
foreign currency (97%), and deposited on a short 
term basis (9%) -- and that amounted to just over 
one-fifth of GDP. 2005 saw continued growth in 
citizens’ savings, after growth began in 200.  At the 
end of 2005, foreign exchange savings by citizens 
reached 80 billion dinars, and financing by citizens 
climbed to 65 billion, such that the growth of net 
savings was about 16 billion dinars (€181 million).  
 In theory, enterprises can choose between credits 
and issuing shares in order to finance investments. 
Consumers’ rates (1-5 years) Housing rates (10 years) Rates for large enterprises (1 year)
Euro zone Oct 2005. 6,7 4,0 3,91
Slovenia Aug. 2005. 4,8 4,8 3,2
Croatia Aug. 2005. 6,84 5,03 6,77
Romania Sep. 2005. 7,3 9,0 5,3
Serbia Oct. 2005. 15,82 10,01 9,21
Table 2.  Interest rates in selected countries in 2005.  Source:  Kvartalni monitor no. 2, p. 73.
(15.82%), another for big enterprises (9.2%), and a 
third for small and medium enterprises (1.5%).
 At the same time, interest rates on deposits by 
citizens were scarcely more than 2%, and on deposits 
by legal entities, the average weighted interest rate 
amounted to 3.6% in 200.  Such a great different in 
interest rates on borrowed or deposited funds is a 
sign of imperfect competition in the banking sector.  
The trust of the population in commercial banks is 
increasing, as is banker readiness to extend credit to 
households.  This can be seen in the increase of 
deposits and credits, as documented in chapter 6. 
The credibility of the central bank, on the other hand, 
is not increasing, which can be seen from the low 
share of savings in dinars.  The level of deposits 
measures the credibility of the banking sector, while 
the level of currency substitution measures the 
credibility of the central bank.
 The low credibility of the central bank consists in 
its inability to boost the dinar as the local currency in 
Serbia.  In the 1990s, several pyramid structures 
collapsed, the state defaulted on its internal debt in 
foreign currency, and the population was effectively 
stripped of its saving accounts in foreign currency. 
All these elements created distrust in banks during 
the 1990s.  The distrust was still present after the 
regime change in 2000.  In 2002, when the European 
However, the financial market is shallow.  Most of the 
trading is in controlling shares of corporations.  It is 
practically impossible for a firm to gather the financial 
funds on the open market because credits are the only 
source of foreign resources.  Shares issued on the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange do not serve to collect 
capital for financing enterprises, but to obtain 
ownership over fixed capital in enterprises.  Through 
shares on the stock exchange, they want to enter into 
possession of property, not ownership.  About 80% of 
trades on the stock exchange take place over the 
counter, but the price is reported only from sales that 
took place at the stock exchange.  
 Furthermore, bonds that contribute to the state 
debt have a short and long term of maturity.  Shifting 
to long term maturities of repayment would help the  
 
 Serbian financial market to stabilize debt, manage 
it, and attract foreign investment.  In this way, those 
who manage debt are confronted with greater and 
more complex risks.  Liquidity and transparency of 
the secondary bond market are small.  The Securities 
Exchange Commission does not have the authority to 
demand that reports on trading also include the 
market price.  It is necessary for either the Securities 
Exchange Commission to announce market prices, 
or the National Bank of Serbia to drive banks to 
announce market prices of bonds traded outside the 
stock exchange.  Other than that, the period of 
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agreements for bonds is T+3.  After executing 
transactions, brokers and custody banks inform 
clients about the concluded agreement.  In these 
transactions, it is necessary to eliminate all barriers in 
the system of agreements and clearing, and in the 
system of transactions of compensation payments. 
The introduction of standard and transparency-
adding techniques of agreements and an added 
system of market makers for (government) bonds 
would be of great benefit.  Trades outside the stock 
exchange are not a shortcoming as an a priori matter, 
but there is too little information on it, which increases 
the inefficiency of markets and harms the mechanism 
of price formation.
 
 Government risk is also great, in spite of the fact 
that economic sanctions were lifted in 2000.  Political 
unrest, unsolved problems with neighboring states, 
and the need for collaboration with the Hague 
Tribunal are all factors of high risk according to 
estimates of several international agencies.  In section 
20, we saw that the Economist Intelligence Unit 
ranked Serbia, sometimes alone, and sometimes 
paired with Macedonia, as the state with the highest 
level of risk in the region.   The riskiness of the banking 
sector is, without a doubt, greatest in Serbia (with a 
general result of 68 points, versus 61 points for 
Macedonia).  Serbia received an average grade grades 
of D (risk is measured on a scale from A (lowest risk) 
to E (highest risk) in following areas:  political risk, 
economic policy risk, risk of economic structures, 
and risk of foreign debt.  This ranking is not without 
foundation, and the attitudes of interviewed managers 
in chapter 5 mostly concur with the mentioned risk 
estimates.  All these elements contribute to the high 
price of financing that also is characteristic of 
insufficiently developed economies.
 An expert in the Serbian economy would add to 
this inventory many more inefficiencies, but even this 
limited list of grave economic problems is quite 
sufficient for reaching an impression of the 
underdeveloped character of Serbian economy. One 
suggestion for a way out of this unfortunate state of 
affairs would be to attack all elements of this “laundry 
list” simultaneously. However, underdeveloped 
countries would not be underdeveloped if they were 
capable of solving all vital problems at the same time. 
The government usually does not have resources and/
or political capital to solve all problems at once. 
Therefore, the government is limited to the position 
of selecting goals that will yield the highest returns in 
accelerating economic growth.
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 This chapter scrutinizes subjective attitudes 
concerning the competitiveness of the Serbian 
economy.  The analysis examines the attitudes of 
Serbian entrepreneurs obtained from the survey 
used by the World Economic Forum for its annual 
publication The Global Competitiveness Report 
2005-2006.  To facilitate the reader’s ease in 
comparing objective analysis with subjective 
attitudes regarding the same issues, the structure of 
chapter 5 replicates the structure of chapter  as 
much as possible.  Both are structured according to 
Rodrik’s model of growth diagnostics (presented in 
chapter 3).  This chapter investigates the attitudes 
of Serbian entrepreneurs concerning social capital, 
appropriability and cost of financing.
	 24.	 	Methodology	and	Sample
 This chapter draws on the findings of the survey 
developed for Serbia and Montenegro to fulfill the 
needs of World Economic Forum (WEF).  (The data 
obtained are the exclusive property of the WEF and 
are published in The Global Competitiveness Report 
2005-2006.) The research surveys the attitudes of 
entrepreneurs of 80 enterprises.  There were no 
respondents from Montenegro.  In some cases, 
where appropriate, the survey is supplemented by 
results from the previous year’s survey (referred to 
here as the 200 survey).  The reason for this is that 
the 200 survey contained some questions that the 
2005 survey did not. 
The survey was structured so as to provide two 
opposite attitudes, making respondents select one of 
the options available, stating whether they agree in 
full, mostly, or to a certain degree with the proposed 
answer, or whether they feel indifferent about both 
choices.  Scores ranged from 1-7.  1 represents full 
agreement, and 7 represents full disagreement. 
Score  indicates that the respondent is indifferent 
between available choices (attitudes). 
An enterprise is regarded as private if more than 
50% of its equity is privately owned (whether 
the owner is of domestic or foreign origin).  An 
5. Growth Diagnostics –
Attitudes of Entrepreneurs
enterprise is regarded as an exporter if at least 10% 
of the respective company’s income is generated by 
export. 
 The sample is dominated by small and medium 
enterprises.  38% of the firms employ less than 50 
persons, while three-quarters employ less than 500 
people.  In regards to type of ownership, more than 
one-half of sampled enterprises are 100% privately 
owned, one-eighth are absolutely state or public 
owned, and in one-fifth of enterprises, foreigners 
possess equity or stock holdings in the company.  
 In the state-owned sector, the largest number 
of companies (0%) employ 100-500 people.  The 
private sector is dominated by firms (3%) that 
employ up to 50 people.  The companies surveyed 
are mainly in manufacturing industries, agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and water management, while one-
fifth of firms are in retail.  
 Almost one-half of the firms do not report exports 
at all.  Even those firms that do export report their 
export levels on a very small scale.  For example, the 
income of only one-fifth of the exporting enterprises 
exceeds one-fourth of total revenue, while the income 
of only 5% of the firms exceeds one-half of total 
output.  Most of the exporters, 80%, are privately 
owned. 
 Research was conducted during the period from 
March 1-28, 2005.  
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25.	 Economy	and	Economic	Policy
 More than half of the participants responded that 
they expected that Serbia would enter a recession, 
while only a quarter foresaw relatively stable 
economic growth.  Regarding the volume of the grey 
economy, respondents had the option of choosing 
between two attitudes: “the grey economy does not 
exist” and “the grey economy takes up over 50% of 
economic activities.”  As one might have expected, 
entrepreneurs mostly (over 60%) opted for the latter 
answer.
 The respondents were asked to select five factors 
they consider to be the most troublesome for 
business activities in Serbia.  Instability of economic 
policy ranked as the most worrisome factor, as 
selected by 35% of respondents, and one-half of 
participants ranked it as either their first or second 
biggest worry.  The next most worrisome factor was 
inefficient government administration, appraised as 
the most troublesome factor by one-seventh of those 
filling out the questionnaire, and almost one-fourth 
of respondents selected inefficient government 
administration as either their first or second choice. 
Third in line was access to sources of financing, cited 
as the greatest impediment to business activity by 
one in ten survey participants, with 28% ranking 
access to financing as either first or second worst
	 26.	 Social	Capital	Returns
 Poverty
 The attempts of the government to reduce poverty 
and differences in wage levels are evaluated as 
unproductive or futile by 69% of the respondents. 
Out of total number of persons partaking in survey, 
33.3% thought government efforts in these areas to 
be absolutely futile, and 35.9% estimated them as 
mostly unproductive.   
 Employment
 A question was asked about hiring and firing 
employees.  Around 0% of respondents leaned 
towards both possible replies (whether the rules 
regarding hiring and firing allows flexibility or 
rigidity), while one-fifth felt indifferent.  The answers 
were divided into two classes depending on whether 
respondents came from privately or state/publicly-
owned enterprises.  Almost one half of entrepreneurs 
(7%) employed in the state sector considered hiring 
and firing procedures to be burdened with legislation 
(27% expressed such an attitude without hesitation), 
while one-third expressed an indifferent attitude. 
The attitudes of private entrepreneurs differ by 
comparison to the work force in state sector, and they 
exhibit less conformity in terms of their opinions.  In 
other words, 3% of private entrepreneurs consider 
that hiring and termination of employment allow 
flexibility in employer’s decision-making (22% found 
it mostly flexible, 11% found it absolutely flexible 
and the same percentage of respondents opted for 
“flexible to a certain degree”).  On the other hand, 
a smaller share of private enterprise respondents 
(39%) believe that recruiting and firing employees 
is impeded by legal regulations (19% chose partial 
agreement, and 12% chose total agreement with 
the statement offered in the questionnaire).  It 
is important to point out that the survey was 
distributed simultaneously with the enactment of 
the new Law on Labor (March 2005);  therefore the 
survey does not measure how entrepreneurs judge 
this legislation or its consequences.  
 As for the question “do labor regulations in Serbia 
hinder the hiring of foreigners by the enterprises?”, 
the sentiments expressed by entrepreneurs are rather 
uniform regardless of the type of proprietorship of 
their respective firm.  Half of entrepreneurs believe 
that legislation does not prevent recruiting a foreign 
labor force (one-fourth agree in full with that view), 
15% of respondents believe that hiring of foreign staff 
is limited, and a large number of persons express 
indifference, making up 37% of the total number of 
respondents.  
 Regarding the issue of salaries being determined by 
collective bargaining, versus each enterprise having 
the liberty to work out remuneration of employees on 
its own, 60% of respondents, regardless of private or 
state ownership, believe that salaries are determined 
by the enterprise itself (one-quarter of respondents 
agree in full with this attitude).  
 One unfavorable aspect represents the belief of 
surveyed entrepreneurs, regardless of their type of 
ownership, that salaries in Serbia do not depend 
on employee productivity.  In other words, only 
one-quarter of respondents reckon that salaries 
more or less depend on productivity, while 20% of 
respondents exhibited indifference regarding this 
issue and 5% believe that there is no link between 
salaries and productivity.  
 Productivity
 According to the 200 survey, Serbian 
entrepreneurs evaluated productivity in their 
enterprises, in addition to the most significant 
obstacles impeding improvement therein.  The 
participation of entrepreneurs employed in state- and 
publicly-owned enterprises equaled 27% of persons 
participating in the 200 survey, with the remaining 
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73% of respondents working in the private sector. 
The respondents were asked to evaluate productivity 
in their own enterprise compared to productivity in 
other firms.  On average, entrepreneurs saw their 
own firms as being among the leaders in the industry 
regarding productivity.  In other words, almost 55% 
of respondents consider productivity in their own 
enterprise to be high as opposed to competitors, with 
20% agreeing in full, and one-quarter selecting the 
“mostly agree” option.  Respondents who appraised 
their own company as lagging in productivity behind 
competitors accounted for 28% of the total number of 
persons filling out the questionnaire.  The division of 
answers according to the type of ownership indicates 
that entrepreneurs evaluate private companies as 
more productive, while state-owned companies 
are generally thought to exhibit lesser productivity. 
Among the entrepreneurs employed in the state 
sector, a remarkable 5% considered the productivity 
of their own enterprise as low in comparison to the 
industry average (with a relatively high percentage of 
respondents – 29% - agreeing in full on this point), 
one-quarter felt indifferent in regard to the issue, 
and a minority (21%) held the opinion that their 
productivity equals the most productive enterprises 
in their sector.  68% of private sector entrepreneurs 
appraised the productivity of their own enterprise as 
high, with a relatively high segment of respondents 
(27%) agreeing in full with said appraisal.  Among 
private sector respondents, persons evaluating 
their own enterprise as falling behind competitors’ 
productivity make up 18%.  
 It is interesting that a significant number of 
entrepreneurs evaluated the state of productivity in 
their own enterprises in relatively favorable terms 
compared to the world’s most productive companies 
in the industry.  That is to say, although most 
entrepreneurs rated productivity of own enterprise 
as low compared to global competitors (7%), some 
0% of respondents defended the opposite attitude, 
believing that their enterprises exhibit a high level of 
competitiveness in comparison to the world’s most 
productive companies in their respective industry. 
Again, entrepreneurs from the private sector gave 
better ratings to their own enterprise:  almost one-
half the participants evaluated their productivity 
level as high compared to global competitors.  Such 
an attitude of survey participants contrasts with 
the real state of affairs in the domestic economy, 
characterized by an unsatisfactory aggregate level 
of productivity, and tends to confirm the perception 
that entrepreneurs are neither very familiar with the 
market where they do businesses, nor fully aware of 
the performance and global standing of their own 
enterprise. 
 Among the most significant obstacles hindering 
enhancement of productivity, entrepreneurs listed 
the following items in the 200 survey:  bad work 
habits, labor-related regulations, shortages in a 
qualified work force and training opportunities, and 
lack of capital and infrastructure.  Lack of capital and 
infrastructure was declared the most troublesome 
factor by almost 70% of respondents (a high portion, 
or 37%, agreed in full with that attitude), while 20% 
did not acknowledge it as important.  This problem 
is even more serious in regards to state-owned 
enterprises:  89% of state sector entrepreneurs 
identified lack of capital and infrastructure as an 
obstacle, with 62% of respondents declaring this 
factor being the most significant obstacle.  
 Some obstacles to productivity were found in 
bad work habits and the shortage of skilled labor. 
Approximately the same percentage of surveyed 
persons chose bad work habits as a significant 
impediment (3%) versus those who saw bad habits 
as an insignificant factor in terms of productivity 
(7%).  It is interesting that more than half of state 
sector entrepreneurs find bad work habits to be an 
important disadvantage (5%), while 3% do not 
perceive bad work habits as relevant.  Regarding 
private sector entrepreneurs, half consider bad 
work habits to be an irrelevant obstacle in terms of 
increasing productivity.  This set of answers suggests 
that private companies have established better 
mechanisms designed to encourage employees’ 
dedication and commitment to work.  
 Half of the interviewed entrepreneurs rate 
business and industry regulations and by-laws as 
insignificant in terms of hindering enhancement 
of productivity, while 35% believe regulations and 
rules to be a significant obstacle.  Both private and 
state entrepreneurs expressed similar opinions on 
this issue.  It is interesting how the issue of skilled 
labor and the lack of training opportunities that 
prevents productivity development is perceived as an 
irrelevant obstacle by a majority of all entrepreneurs. 
60% of sample respondents believe this to be an 
insignificant obstacle to productivity growth, 
and 30% declared the opposite.  The findings are 
almost identical to those obtained in the private 
sector, while managers in the state sector leaned a 
little more than the average respondent towards the 
attitude indicating that the lack of skilled labor does 
represent an important problem (39%).  
 The 2005 survey asked the entrepreneurs to 
select the five most troublesome obstacles to doing 
business in Serbia.  53% respondents listed bad work 
habits as among the five greatest obstacles.  Despite 
the number of respondents listing it as a serious 
concern, work habits were still at the bottom of the 
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list in terms of negative impact.  Therefore it was 
usually rated as the fifth worst (in 38% of cases) or 
fourth worst factor (in 21% of cases).  Regarding 
other obstacles affecting labor market, one-fifth of 
respondents cited a labor force lacking adequate 
education as the most serious challenge, with only 
6% of respondents citing restrictive labor regulations 
in that respect.  These findings suggest that surveyed 
entrepreneurs consider that the quality and work 
habits of employees represent an obstacle to efficient 
business in Serbia, but problems found in other areas 
of the business environment are more troubling. 
 Basic infrastructure
 Infrastructure in Serbia is rated with an extremely 
negative score.  Not a single respondent agreed, not 
even partially, with the survey statement evaluating 
infrastructure in Serbia as one of the best in the world. 
Everybody (except for two participants exhibiting 
an indifferent attitude) said that infrastructure 
was underdeveloped and insufficient.  One-third of 
survey participants agreed in full with the claim of 
underdevelopment and insufficiency. 
The quality of railway, ports, and internal water 
routes was rated as low.  Namely, for rail or water 
transport, over 90% of respondents (98% in the case 
of railways) declared both types of transportation as 
undeveloped.  The greatest percentage (over 5%) of 
respondents agrees with the previous statement to a 
great extent, followed by participants agreeing in full 
(35%).  
The 200 survey researched the availability of choices 
of transportation in Serbia.  More than half of survey 
participants found such choices very limited (57%), 
while over one-fifth of respondents believed there 
was a large scope of available choices.  Consequently, 
two-thirds of respondents opined that the integration 
of various means of transportation is complicated 
and unreliable, and no less than four-fifths consider 
infrastructure designated for shipping goods to be 
undeveloped.  
Regarding the quality of the electrical energy 
system, there is no uniform attitude.  In other 
words, half of respondents perceived supply to be 
inferior to systems in other countries, while the 
opposite conviction (the quality of supply meets the 
highest standards) is supported by 0% of survey 
participants.  The prevailing attitudes on both ends 
represent partial agreements about supply, and if 
participation of indifferent respondents is taken into 
account, one might concede that in a great many 
cases, respondents believe that Serbia’s system of 
electricity supply is neither better nor worse than 
what is found in other countries.  
Postal services are found to be acceptable.  When 
asked if one would have confidence in the postal 
service to ship a package worth $100, more than half 
of respondents responded affirmatively.  A small but 
significant percentage expressed absolute confidence 
(18%). 
 Education
 The educational system in Serbia received a 
relatively unsatisfactory grade, considering that 
5% of respondents took a stand that state-run, 
free education was of low quality, while a lesser 
percentage (38%) of participants believes that 
public education “mostly” or “absolutely” matches 
the best educational systems in the world.  It is 
very symptomatic that almost two-thirds of those 
surveyed think that the educational system in Serbia 
does not meet the demands of the market economy.  
 The quality of education in the area of 
mathematics and natural science is rated as 
relatively high, considering that approximately 65% 
of participants believe it can match the best math 
and science education in the world.  However, very 
few respondents agree with the statement in full;  the 
degree of assent varies from “mostly” to “partially,” 
meaning that although respondents are generally 
satisfied with the quality of education, there is still 
room for improvement.  On the other hand, when it 
comes to business administration and management 
schools, these areas do not meet quality standards, 
according to survey participants.  Translated into 
figures, findings reveal that 53% of those surveyed 
find business administration and management 
education disappointing.  
 The availability of scientists and engineers might 
be evaluated as satisfactory (62% of respondents 
assess them as numerous and available in Serbia). 
However, there is a serious problem with “brain 
drain,” as talented people flee the country in 
pursuit of opportunities only available abroad.  This 
sentiment was shared by 89% of respondents.
 Research and development
 Looking at science and research institutions in 
Serbia, almost every other respondent believes that 
the quality of these institutions is deficient, while 
31% of the participants find them good enough 
and among the best in the world in their respective 
field.  Taking into account that 71% of participants 
agree with the previous statement only partially 
or feel indifferent, one might conclude that the 
prevailing attitude is of limited satisfaction in 
regard to the quality and availability of domestic 
science and research institutions.  The conclusion is 
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probably partially dependent on the experiences of 
interviewed entrepreneurs in the course of working 
with such institutions.  In other words, responses 
suggest that the volume and quality of collaboration 
mentioned above cannot be assessed as satisfactory, 
considering that two-thirds of respondents evaluated 
business cooperation with domestic universities in 
the area of research and development as minimal or 
non-existent, while 20% believe it is intensive and 
continuous. 
 Regarding firms’ investment in research and 
development, three-quarters of respondents think 
that businesses in Serbia do not invest enough in 
R&D activities, while only 10% of the respondents 
agree partially or mostly with the statement that 
R&D investment is sufficient.  In other words, the 
latter 10% think that R&D attracts considerable 
investment in Serbian firms compared to similar 
enterprises abroad.  
 Perhaps related to the perception that the 
overall level of research and development activities 
is unsatisfactory, many surveyed entrepreneurs 
consider the level of technological development in 
Serbia to be lagging behind most other countries. 
Such an attitude is exhibited by 86% of respondents 
(and 0% of them agreed fully with the perception 
of technological lag).  There is almost no difference 
of opinions here, regardless of whether the surveyed 
firm engages in export or not.  
 Regarding the ability of Serbian companies to 
absorb and implement new technologies, 58% of 
respondents harbor doubts.  However, moderate 
responses prevail, such that if one combines the 
number of respondents selecting partial agreement 
with the opposite attitudes (either supporting the 
view of Serbian companies as capable of adopting 
new techniques or being capable and practicing 
it aggressively) to the respondents giving neutral 
appraisals, the result is that three-quarters of 
respondents hold neither excessively positive nor 
excessively negative attitudes about domestic firms’ 
aptitude to adopt new technologies.
 73% of surveyed entrepreneurs believe that 
technologies in Serbia are obtained by licensing 
or copying foreign technologies, and that R&D 
implementation is almost non-existent, which is 
consistent with our earlier analysis of research 
and development activities.  The responses suggest 
that firms are much more likely to copy available 
technologies rather than purchase licenses.  Almost 
two-thirds of participants agree with the statement 
that purchases of foreign technology licenses are 
rare.  
 Impact on doing business
 According to the beliefs of % of managers, 
privatization of the major economic sectors in 
Serbia has had a positive impact upon the business 
environment, considering that managers believe that 
privatization creates long-term competitiveness and 
encourages efficient utilization of resources such as 
energy and materials.  On the other hand, 31% of the 
respondents support the opposite attitude, believing 
that privatization of major economic sectors upsets 
competition and increases inefficient utilization of 
resources of energy and materials.  
 
 The efficiency of energy supply and distribution 
and any shift to alternative and replenishable 
sources of energy are considered low-priority 
issues in Serbia, according to  6% of respondents, 
in contrast to 20% who consider it a high priority 
issue.  According to the sentiment shared by two-
thirds of the participants, traffic congestion in Serbia 
impedes the efficient flow of goods and people, 
and certainly generates problems in distribution, 
increasing the expenses incurred by enterprises. 
Regarding pollution caused by traffic, 59% see it as 
enormous and as triggering reductions in the use of 
certain means of transportation, although 27% of 
interviewed entrepreneurs share the belief that such 
pollution does not yet represent an alarming issue in 
Serbia.  
 When it comes to the conduct of enterprises 
that exploit and process natural resources,  73% of 
the respondents believe such enterprises hardly pay 
attention to the degradation of the ecosystem, while 
16% think that such enterprises undertake measures 
to preserve the ecosystem on which they depend.  
 
 Asked whether enterprises exploiting natural 
resources undertake analysis of ecological and 
social risks within the comprehensive framework of 
business risk analysis, 55% of participants responded 
negatively, with 27% expressing the opposite view. 
Also, the financial consequences of failure to comply 
with existing ecological and social standards do not 
grab particular attention.  That is to say, only one-
quarter of respondents think that firms’ failures 
to comply with ecological and social standards 
are carefully evaluated, while a majority (58%) of 
survey participants believe these consequences are 
disregarded.  
 As for implementation of ecological and social 
standards set forth by multilateral development 
banks (e.g.,  the World Bank and EBRD), the survey 
findings reveal that almost half of respondents 
think such standards are not implemented by their 
enterprises (20% agree fully with such a judgment), 
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while 21% of respondents believe that their enterprises 
enforced such standards at least partially.  
 A majority of Serbian enterprises perceive the 
fulfillment of ecological standards as an imposed 
obligation, as opposed to an opportunity to be seized 
to improve their entire set of business operations. 
56% of entrepreneurs believe that an ecological 
management system represents just a matter of 
fulfilling legal obligations, while 30% of entrepreneurs 
are aware of its significance in terms of achieving 
competitiveness.  On the other hand, even two-thirds 
of respondents understand that environmentally 
friendly production, management of material flow, 
decrease in waste and recycling, and management 
of product life cycles do bear significance in regards 
to the business.  The discrepancy, as compared to 
the previous question, suggests that entrepreneurs 
are generally aware of how meeting certain 
ecological and social standards affects enterprise 
operations, but they do not really understand that 
achieving ecological standards requires disciplined 
implementation and enforcement of laws, by-laws 
and certain procedures, with the possible benefit of 
improved global competitiveness.  
	 27.	 Appropriability
 Among other things, respondents were asked to 
evaluate the efficiency of the parliament.  Regarding 
its legislative and supervisory role, the majority of 
respondents (70%) declared that parliament performs 
inefficiently, with one-quarter of that majority 
expressing full agreement with such a statement. 
 Regarding the administrative obligations of 
enterprises as required by law (permits, by-laws, and 
reports), a great many of survey participants (90%) 
think these obligations are too burdensome, with 
0% of respondents agreeing completely with that 
notion.  
 When it comes to the safety and performance of 
the police, as well as police influence upon business 
operations, participants had several questions at 
their disposal.  Only 20% of respondents replied that 
they had trust in the police to protect operations 
and the enterprise in general from crime, compared 
to 60% who believe they cannot count on police 
protection.   5% of survey participants do not see 
violence or petty crime as generating significant 
damages to business operations.  However, a sizeable 
number (32%) of persons took the opposite attitude, 
believing petty crimes generate significant expenses 
for business.  Similar findings are obtained for the 
issue of organized crime, with a somewhat larger 
number of participants (38%) supporting the view 
that organized crime generates significant expenses 
in business.  
 Anti-monopoly policy in Serbia is rated extremely 
unfavorably, with 71% of survey participants finding 
it inefficient in fostering competition.  
 The structure of public spending is also evaluated 
negatively.  In other words, 80% of respondents 
perceive the structure of public spending as 
unreasonable, with 29% agreeing in full with this 
claim, and 37% mostly agreeing.  
 Judicial system
 On the legal system – particularly assistance 
with dispute resolution for private enterprises and 
challenging the legality of actions committed by the 
government and/or legality of regulations – three-
quarters of respondents consider the existing legal 
framework inefficient and prone to manipulations. 
If one adds respondents exhibiting an indifferent 
attitude to that number, then 90% of respondents are 
not particularly satisfied with how the legal system 
works, or at least, unable to evaluate it positively.  
A large number of participants (85%) consider 
courts to be very much influenced by officials, 
citizens, and enterprises, and one-third agree with 
this observation in full.  
Property rights protection also received an 
unfavorable ranking from the surveyed firms.   One-
half of respondents believe that property rights are 
not clearly defined or legally protected, and even 
among the group favoring the attitude that property 
rights are clearly defined and well-protected, not 
a single respondent agreed in full with such a 
statement.  
On the subject of the existence and enforcement of 
insolvency laws, particularly in regard to creditors’ 
protection, the 200 survey found that less than 
one-fifth of participants believe such insolvency 
laws are clearly defined and implemented strictly 
and consistently, while 60% express the opposite 
attitude.  Bearing in mind that a high percentage 
of respondents took an indifferent attitude (22%), 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that the law on 
insolvency and its implementation were assessed 
unfavorably.  We note that the 200 survey was 
distributed prior to the enactment of a valid and 
effective Law on Insolvency Proceedings (July 200), 
while the 2005 survey did not include any question to 
measure entrepreneurs’ evaluation of the new law.  
The vast majority of respondents (85%) believe that 
intellectual property protection is inefficient, and, if 
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that number is combined with respondents feeling 
indifferent about intellectual property rights, then 
95% of respondents do not positively evaluate the 
protection of intellectual property rights in Serbia
 Corruption and interest groups
 According to the findings of the 200 survey, only 
one in ten participants considered the scope of 
corruption to be increasing in Serbia over the past 
three years.  A larger portion of respondents (0%) 
believed that corruption levels had decreased. 
However, a neutral attitude outweighed the others: 
half of respondents detected no change in the level of 
corruption.  
Regarding the government’s assignment of work 
contracts and policy, the majority of respondents 
(82.5%) believe that the government is not fair, but 
provides preferential treatment to certain enterprises 
and individuals.  Three-quarters of the surveyed 
participants believe the diversion of public funds 
through corruption to the benefit of enterprises, 
individuals, or groups to be a common occurrence.  
The 200 survey asked a question measuring the 
extent to which firms had to bribe the government as 
a percentage value per contract, in order to be 
awarded the contract.  70% of survey participants 
declared they never had to resort to bribes under 
such circumstances.  Among participants admitting 
they paid some money to secure the contract, one-
fifth of such firms said they paid less than 5% of the 
total contract value.  Similarly, the next question 
asked about the annual salary percentage that has to 
be stashed in government clerks’ pockets as gifts and 
gratuities.  However, slightly more than three-
quarters of respondents denied ever practicing such 
behavior, and 22% of participants claimed to have 
paid less than 5% of the official’s salary value.  
Regarding the conduct practiced by other enterprises, 
half of the participants believe that bribing 
government and judicial officials leads to the absence 
of competition on the market, while one-quarter of 
respondents express an indifferent attitude in this 
respect.  
The 200 survey shows that more than half of the 
survey participants declared illegal donations to 
political parties to be frequent, while one-third 
expressed indifference about the issue.  On the other 
hand, two-thirds of participants believe that close 
ties between enterprise donations and politics exist, 
with almost one-third of persons holding an 
indifferent attitude in that respect.  
A great number of respondents do not have faith in 
the financial ethics of politicians:  9% of respondents 
mistrust the financial ethics of politicians, with a 
very high portion of respondents (60%) expressing 
that attitude in full.  
When it comes to evaluating the influence of various 
interest groups upon recently enacted laws and 
regulations affecting business operations, the 200 
survey respondents revealed following responses:
	 •	 	61% said their enterprise did not interfere 
with the legislative process; if combined with 
respondents agreeing partially and mostly 
with that proposition, the above-noted attitude 
is supported by 89% of respondents; 
	 •	 	According to the judgment of respondents, 
domestic competitors were slightly more 
influential, but still not excessively, considering 
that somewhat over three-quarters of the 
respondents believed that most of their 
competitors do not exert any influence upon 
legislation;
	 •	 	On influence exerted by business associations, 
similar responses are obtained, since almost 
three-quarters of the survey participants 
thought such associations hardly have any 
influence at all;
	 •	 	Considering influence exerted by individual 
and firms with close personal ties with political 
leaders, 0% of respondents doubt these well-
connected people have the  power to influence 
officials, one-third of respondents thought the 
opposite, and one-quarter were indifferent 
about the issue.  
 Government failures and shortcomings
 70% of respondents fully agree that the Serbian 
government’s economic policy is too centralized.  0% 
of enterprise managers think that the government’s 
agricultural policy is a burden for agriculture.  30% 
of respondents are neutral about the issue or declare 
that the government’s agricultural policy balances the 
interests of all stake holders.  Although the number 
of survey participants dealing in agriculture is not 
large enough to justify any valid extrapolation of this 
conclusion, it is interesting that their responses do 
not differ much from average replies across the entire 
sample; in other words, managers involved in the 
agricultural sector to some degree share the opinion 
that state agricultural policy burdens the economy.  
 The firms filling out the 200 survey also made 
statements regarding their judgment of government 
reporting habits in connection with economic policy 
and regulations and amendments.  The findings 
indicate that government is expected to put more 
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efforts in providing adequate information and 
disclosure to the general public since almost three-
quarters of respondents believed such disclosure 
hardly ever happens.  
 Business ambient
 Regarding treatment of foreign investments 
in Serbia, opinions are very inconsistent.  39% of 
respondents declare that foreign investments are 
encouraged, 28% believe them to be scarce, and 
one-third feel indifferent about the issue.  0% of 
respondents think legislation regulating foreign 
investment discourages the latter.  A smaller 
percentage (33%) of respondents defend the opposite 
attitude, believing that regulations foster international 
investments.  
 The law on foreign investments abolished almost 
all obstacles in respect of investments provided 
by foreign persons, as well as introducing various 
incentives (mostly of a fiscal nature) designated to 
motivate this type of financing.  This means that at 
least a plurality of respondents are not familiar enough 
with current legislation.  It would be interesting 
to review the replies provided by foreign-owned 
enterprises, but that sample was not large enough to 
produce a representative answer.  
 Corporate governance
 According to the survey findings, poor corporate 
governance constitutes one of the biggest obstacles 
hindering further development of the Serbian 
economy, increasing risk in investing in domestic 
companies.  Half of the surveyed managers think 
that corporate governance in Serbia is characterized 
by deficiencies in carrying out management 
responsibilities toward investors and boards of 
directors.  
 Minimal standards of business conduct are 
established by relevant legislation, but in order to 
achieve long term competitiveness, the conduct of 
market participants must be also be regulated in 
compliance with voluntarily accepted standards. 
2% of managers more or less agree that enterprise 
business ethics in their respective industry is among 
the worst in the world.  Also, for two-thirds of the 
managers, business codes on workplace behavior 
and other aspects of corporate social responsibility 
are scarce or non-existent for domestic companies.  
 Regarding the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights in Serbia, 71% of managers adopt the attitude 
that these rights are not protected by law and that 
majority shareholders often violate the rights of 
minority shareholders.  It is a very common practice 
in Serbian enterprises that majority shareholders 
take advantage of inefficient enforcement of valid 
legislation, acquiring a degree of control that does 
not correspond to the voting power of his/her 
holdings on paper.  The current practice suggests 
that many shareholders are not familiar enough with 
the rights underlying their shares, although they are 
guaranteed by the law.  
 Every company depends on the network of 
relationships among many individuals who 
contribute to its business operations, but also on 
assuming certain risks.  Maximizing the entire 
company’s potential might be achieved only by 
means of networking and fair treatment of all 
individual subjects involved.  Among the managers 
filling the questionnaires, 6% hold the opinion 
that in the course of development projects that 
might affect certain communities in Serbia, those 
communities are hardly ever consulted for feedback 
or mobilized for support.  We note that one-quarter 
of respondents felt indifferent regarding the issue. 
The necessity of changing business philosophy is 
also indicated by the fact that 30.8% of the surveyed 
top managers declared access to financing sources to 
be the biggest challenge in business. 
 Generally speaking, domestic managers exhibit 
a visible lack of understanding of the importance 
of the role of employees in their company.  When 
asked about the character of the relationship 
between employers and employees -- whether 
conflictual, amicable, or cooperative in nature -- 
almost half of respondents (8%) replied that their 
relationship was conflictual (31% of respondents 
had an indifferent attitude in this respect).  A 
significant number of shares of Serbian companies 
are possessed by employees in some firms.  A large 
number of respondents (83%) think that very little 
is invested in employee training and advancement. 
Such a perception of human resources, especially if 
practiced by companies in need of specifically skilled 
or highly qualified staff, represents an obstacle to 
retaining valuable employees.  
 According to the sentiment shared by almost 
two- thirds of respondents, top management 
positions in companies are often assigned to relatives, 
as opposed to professional managers selected on 
the merits of their qualifications.  Readiness to 
delegate duties to subordinates is rated low by 
86% of interviewed persons, which means that top 
management controls most decision-making.  Three-
quarters of interviewed managers see remuneration 
packages for management as consisting exclusively of 
salaries, not in terms of opportunities or incentives 
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for obtaining bonuses and access to the company 
stock option plan. 
 Fiscal policy
 Respondents’ appraisal of fiscal policy in Serbia 
is rather inconsistent.  The greatest number of 
respondents (5%) evaluated the tax system as 
complicated, whereas a significant number see it 
as straightforward and transparent (31%), or feel 
indifferent about it (2%).  Entrepreneurs coming 
from state sector companies were more inclined to 
judge the tax system as complicated (55%) compared 
to entrepreneurs from the private sector, 1% of 
whom supported the view that the tax system is 
complicated.  Conversely, 
private entrepreneurs were more likely to evaluate the 
tax system as simple and transparent (35%), compared 
to the 27% of managers from state companies who 
selected the simplicity and transparency description. 
 5% of respondents believe that tax rates 
are a burden to doing business and investment 
transactions.  On the other hand, one-quarter of 
entrepreneurs believing that tax rates do not impede 
business activities, with the same percentage taking an 
indifferent attitude.  In regards to their respective firm’s 
total fiscal burden, 29% of respondents estimated it to 
be lower than 15% of net company revenue, 62% of 
respondents said fiscal obligations range up to 25% of 
net company revenue, and respondents believing that 
total fiscal charges take up less than 50% net company 
revenue constituted 91% of the sample.  
 Foreign trade policy
 Regarding customs and non-customs protection, 
the prevailing attitude of entrepreneurs (55%) is that 
these do not have a negative impact upon the 
competitiveness of imported products in Serbian 
markets. with one-quarter agreeing completely.  
 If we divide the responses by export and non-
export firms, an almost identical percentage of 
companies on both sides (5%) agree with the 
attitude that barriers do not diminish competitiveness 
of imported products, but a greater segment of non-
exporting entrepreneurs believe that import 
competitiveness still has decreased (one-third of 
non-exporting respondents).  
 Regarding the frequency of bribery as a means of 
securing import and export permits, approximately 
one half of the respondents believe it to be a rare 
incident, with one-quarter of respondents who doubt 
it ever happens.  However, a portion of the survey 
participants agree completely or to a certain degree 
with the notion that bribery is a very frequent 
occurrence (38%).  Taking into account only 
statements made by exporters, the picture gets even 
brighter:  one-third of exporters think there is 
significant bribery to obtain import and export 
permits. 
 The 200 survey contained several questions 
providing insight into entrepreneurs’ attitudes 
towards the foreign trade regime in Serbia.  Two-
fifths of respondents thought that various customs 
and non-customs barriers increase the cost of 
imports by 10%.  More than three-quarters of 
respondents claimed the increased cost of imports to 
be less than 20%.  More than 80% of respondents 
evaluate customs import procedures as burdensome 
and inefficient.  
 External competitiveness 
 One-third of respondents think competition in 
domestic markets is limited, while one half adopt 
the opposite attitude, claiming that competition is 
rather intense in the majority of sectors.  However, 
exporting enterprise managers are more likely to 
believe there is intense competition in the domestic 
market, a view shared by 58% of exporters.  Only 
one-quarter of exporters believe that domestic 
competition is limited.  
 The modality of answers respondents selected 
most probably reflects what they encounter in the 
course of day-to-day business.  If that assumption 
is correct, it would indicate that competition is 
fiercer in the areas occupied by exporters.  This is an 
important conclusion, since it clearly suggests that the 
presence of healthy market competition encourages 
enterprises to improve their business, thereby 
contributing to export growth and enhancement of 
the overall level of competitiveness of the domestic 
economy.  
 The character of domestic market demand is 
illustrated by the fact that 71% of respondents believe 
that domestic consumers are not sophisticated, 
considering primarily product price when making 
purchases.  Identical conclusions may be drawn and 
similar percentages are obtained when evaluating 
only the responses provided by exporters.  It means 
that domestic demand encourages enterprises to 
cultivate price-oriented competitiveness.  On the 
other hand, the presence of well-informed and 
demanding domestic consumers requesting top 
quality goods represents a significant factor that 
should motivate enterprises to enhance product 
supply over time.  Unfortunately, domestic demand 
has no such power to affect the market, at least at 
present, according to the opinions of entrepreneurs 
taking the survey.  
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 What do firms think of their suppliers?  Two 
questions serve as indicators: the availability of 
suppliers in relevant areas, and the quality of 
domestic suppliers.  Half of respondents believe that 
domestic suppliers are numerous and offer the most 
important inputs.  (However, very few respondents 
agree in full with this proposition.)  On the other 
hand, one-fourth of respondents opine that there are 
not many suppliers available.  It is interesting that 
on average, exporters evaluated the environment 
of domestic suppliers  more favorably, since 60% 
of exporters were more or less satisfied with the 
number of supplies available on the domestic 
market.  Such an attitude also prevails among the 
respondents coming from manufacturing, with 
65% support.  However, both manufacturers and 
exporters agree only to a certain degree where their 
general satisfaction with suppliers is concerned;  a 
negligible portion of respondents were completely 
satisfied with supplies available.  
 When considering the quality of domestic 
suppliers, most respondents express dissatisfaction. 
Less than one-fourth of respondents agree that 
domestic suppliers are good and competitive 
on international markets.  Almost one-half of 
respondents said that the quality of domestic 
suppliers was poor because they were inefficient 
and have limited technological possibilities. 
Exporters’ responses are rather inconsistent and 
conflicting.  Although the percentage of exporters 
who are mostly dissatisfied with the quality of 
domestic suppliers is lower than the survey sample 
average, and percentage of exporters mostly happy 
about domestic suppliers’ services is higher than 
the sample average, not a single exporter agrees in 
full that domestic suppliers are doing a good job. 
 Two-thirds are inclined to believe that 
marketing in Serbia is not sufficiently developed 
and sophisticated.  Underdeveloped and inadequate 
marketing, in addition to other factors, explain 
non-competitiveness of domestic firms.  Moreover, 
even the very concept of marketing is very poorly 
understood, and mostly boils down to the mere 
promotion of goods.  
 On the treatment of consumers, 80% of 
respondents agreed that enterprises treat their 
customers poorly.  If only exporters’ responses are 
taken into account, poor treatment of consumers 
is still the dominant opinion, but less prominent 
(60%) in comparison to the entire survey sample 
figure above.  The difference might be explained by 
the fact that treatment of customers is somewhat 
better in industries occupied by exporters than the 
customary attitude representative of the overall 
economy.  
According to the 200 survey findings, half of local 
market respondents believe that local enterprises 
and local branches of multinational companies 
constitute competition, while 36% think that 
competition originates from importers.  Identical 
figures are obtained if only private managers and 
processing industry managers are taken into 
account:  1% of this subset of respondents think 
that competition stems from importers. 
 International exchange
 A large number of respondents report that they 
invariably import equipment.  Only 1% of 
respondents agreed (mostly or to a certain degree) 
that equipment was almost always available from 
skillful domestic producers.  Among processing 
industry enterprises, the attitude that equipment is 
always imported is even more prominent, supported 
by 80% of respondents.  
 The statement that low prices and natural resources 
are the foundation of international competitiveness 
of Serbian firms is supported by 79% of respondents. 
The value chains controlled by domestic export 
companies are rather short.  In other words, 79% of 
survey participants think that domestic enterprises 
deal mostly in exploiting natural resources and 
production, while neglecting design, marketing, 
logistics, post-sale services, etc.  Considering that 
these activities are crucial in establishing quality and 
recognizable attributes of certain products, we offer 
another explanation why Serbian enterprises are not 
competitive in international markets.  
 5% of entrepreneurs estimate that foreign firms 
that do most of the marketing and distribution on 
behalf of Serbian enterprises abroad.  If one takes into 
account only the responses provided by exporters, 
their belief that marketing and distribution are carried 
out by domestic enterprises exceeds the survey sample 
average and totals 30%.  
 Half of entrepreneurs see export to neighboring 
countries as limited in size.  However, if only responses 
by exporters are considered (which is more relevant), 
we reach a totally different finding.  The prevailing 
attitude among exporters (% of them) suggests that 
Serbian exports to neighboring countries are 
significant and on the rise, which is confirmed by the 
Serbian statistics in the middle of 2005.  
 Clusters
 70% of respondents do not think that cluster 
formations in Serbia are building up.  (One-quarter 
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fully agrees with this).  The same outcome is 
obtained if we consider only the responses provided 
by exporters.  
 The 200 survey contained more questions 
referring to entrepreneurs’ attitude towards various 
organized measures designated for advancement 
of export and competitiveness, including cluster 
development.  Almost 70% of respondents mostly 
agreed with the estimate that organized efforts to 
enhance competitiveness do not exist in Serbia.  The 
fact that majority of survey participants agrees with 
this attitude mostly or to a certain degree might be 
interpreted as a judgment by the entrepreneurs that 
such efforts do exist, but they are not sufficient or 
adequate.  Some other attitudes presented in the 
200 survey are as follows:
	 •	 	80% of respondents thought that clusters in 
Serbia are rare and shallow.
	 •	 	Taking into account the responses of more than 
half of the surveyed enterprises, cooperation 
within their clusters is non-existent, in addition 
to a large percentage of respondents upholding 
an indifferent attitude (30%). 
	 •	 	Regarding the procurement of components 
and parts specific to industry needs, 61% of 
respondents claimed they imported such 
parts and components, with one-quarter of 
enterprises almost always importing them.  If 
only the responses supplied by representatives 
of processing industries are taken into account, 
the percentage of enterprises importing such 
equipment “always” or “most of the time” is 
slightly larger, totaling two-thirds.
	 28.	 Costs	of	Financing	
 The level of sophistication in financial markets 
in Serbia is seen as low, considering that 85% of the 
respondents rated it so (with 20% of respondents 
agreeing in full with the idea).  The statement 
conforms to the real state of affairs at the market, 
taking into account that credits dominate the market, 
while the financial derivatives market remains 
underdeveloped.  Regarding the solvency of banks, 
a majority of respondents believe in banks’ financial 
health, stable profits, and loss accounting, but a high 
portion of participants disagree (3%), meaning they 
perceive banks to be mostly insolvent and likely to 
ask for financial aid from the government.  
 The 2005 survey contains several questions 
referring to the opportunities for financing of 
enterprises.  Three-quarters of entrepreneurs think 
that innovative but risky projects can rarely obtain 
capital at the financial markets to finance their 
endeavors.  For example, 7% of respondents believe 
that it is virtually impossible to obtain a loan without 
providing adequate collateral.  Collateral is not easy to 
secure since banks usually demand that the value of 
the security be several times greater than the value of 
the loan.  However, some degree of optimism may be 
operating in the sense that perceptions of conditions 
governing the approval of credits to enterprises have 
improved:  more than half of entrepreneurs (53%) 
believe that the conditions to apply for business 
loans were relaxed during 200.  The numbers of 
respondents exhibiting an indifferent attitude (the 
conditions of business loan approval remained 
the same) make up one-third of total respondents. 
Respondents claiming that the conditions of business 
loan approval worsened totaled 16% of those 
surveyed.  
 When considering other segments of financial 
markets, entrepreneurs viewed positively the 
opportunity to enter the stock exchange.  In other 
words, when it comes to financing a company by 
means of issuing shares through the stock exchange, 
half of the respondents believe that this option is 
possible for businesses that are doing well, while 
one-quarter of respondents feel indifferently about 
it.  Half of respondents think the rules on securities 
trading in Serbia are not sufficiently transparent and 
efficient, in addition to allowing interference by the 
government.  A large group of respondents (38%) 
holds an indifferent attitude.  Most strikingly, the 
percentage of those who do not consider these rules 
to be transparent and understandable is very high 
(88%). 
 3% of respondents think that money laundering 
through the official banking system is a rare occasion 
in Serbia.  However, the percentage of the survey 
participants who believe that this phenomenon is 
widespread in Serbia, at least “to a certain degree,” 
is not negligible (29%).  Money laundering through 
Serbia’s banking system has decreased in part thanks 
to the recently enacted Law on Preventing Money 
Laundering, although it calls for further development 
of various instruments to improve implementation.  
 Banks (as of January 1, 2003) and enterprises 
(as of January 1, 200) are bound to comply with 
international accounting standards.  The survey 
indicates that respondents are not properly informed 
on financial audit standards or standards for enterprise 
financial reporting because an almost even number of 
respondents declared national standards to be either 
low or high (37% and 36% respectively), in addition 
to quite a few indifferent respondents (28%).
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	 	29.	 Setting	the	Stage	for	
Growth	Diagnostics
 The main objective of this chapter is to apply the 
growth diagnostics model to the Serbian economy. 
The data and the model presented in chapters 3-5 
represent the basis for the analysis. A short-term 
analysis shows that the main obstacle to economic 
growth is the poor protection of property rights. The 
government’s strategy therefore should target the 
strengthening of the rule of law.  If this strategy 
succeeds, it will lead to strengthening of ownership 
rights and limitations of corruption over the long 
run.
 The chapter is divided into two parts.  Part one 
explains why a “laundry list” approach usually fails. 
This strategy attributes equal weight to each obstacle. 
Taking into account that every obstacle has relatively 
autonomous causal strength and influences growth, 
this approach urges governments to adopt a growth 
strategy based on a frontal attack on all obstacles. The 
typical consequences of such a strategy are confusion 
in economic policy and the absence of a transparent 
growth strategy. 
 Part two is crucial for the analysis: it details how the 
growth diagnostics model applies in two stages.  The 
first stage identifies the specific areas — social capital, 
financing, appropriability — in which the most 
important obstacle to economic growth could be 
found.  The analysis shows that the main obstacle is in 
the domain of appropriability.  However, this finding 
is too general, because appropriability consists of 
several sub-areas that theoretically cover a range of 
obstacles to economic growth.  More precisely, 
obstacles could be caused by market and government 
failures within each appropriability subsection. 
Market failures imply information externalities and 
lack of coordination, while government failures 
involve micro risks (ownership rights, corruption, or 
taxes) and macro risks (financial, monetary, and fiscal 
instability).
6. Applying Growth
Diagnostics
 As said, the analysis identifies the crucial obstacle 
in the weak protection of property rights. Better 
protection by an efficient and impartial justice system 
is needed in order to reach fast and sustainable growth. 
As will be shown in section 35, corruption is, beyond 
property rights, identified as a significant obstacle to 
faster economic growth.  The growth diagnostics 
model prioritizes these two obstacles with respect to 
the speed with which they can be eliminated.  The 
impact of corruption on growth is not completely 
evident in the short run. Corruption is usually a long-
term problem whose elimination requires a range of 
recourses from various fields.  It is important to 
emphasize the role of efficient laws and courts, as well 
as well-educated and uncorrupted judges who are 
sufficiently familiar with market economy principles. 
It takes years to reach this stage.  As a long-term 
problem unlikely to be fully resolved during a single 
government’s tenure, corruption is less relevant for 
this analysis.  This analysis identifies the key bottleneck, 
the protection of property rights, as a policy measure 
that can be improved in the short run (within six 
months to one year) and certainly possible during one 
government mandate.
	 30.	 A	Laundry	List	Strategy
 Recalling Figure 1 from the introductory chapter, 
we may easily conclude that all characteristics of slow 
development persist in the Serbian case.  If we start 
from the bottom line of Figure 1, we could hardly 
discern which problem is most pressing.  We have 
seen in previous chapters, and especially in chapter , 
that Serbia suffers from relatively high and accelerating 
inflation, heavy government spending, a high current 
account deficit, a high debt-service ratio, and an 
inefficient and corrupt judiciary.  Of course, Serbia is 
not geographically peripheral to important 
commercial routes, but other elements that have a 
significant impact on social returns – such as human 
capital and infrastructure - are more liabilities than 
assets.  Let us examine these problems in greater 
detail, and then consider the option of attacking the 
problems simultaneously.
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 Low social returns.  Contrary to established 
opinion, Serbian human capital is rather low.  Almost 
6% of population older than fifteen years has no 
education.  The number of people that have a university 
degree is just 15% higher than those without any 
schooling.  If we add the number of those without any 
schooling to those who are functionally illiterate (just 
three years of school), their composite number 
surpasses that of the university-educated by 17%.  In 
addition, almost a quarter of the population has just 
eight years of elementary education.  If those without 
schooling were unemployed and those with higher 
education were fully employed, we would say that the 
employment structure is better than the qualification 
structure of the labor force.  However, the educational 
structure of the employed is the reverse, since those 
without elementary schooling constitute just 3% of 
the unemployed.  
 As we saw in section 21, wages and salaries over the 
last four years have risen more quickly than 
productivity.  The gross average wage reached 280 
euros by the end of 200, and is higher than in Bulgaria 
and Romania, which are on the accession path to the 
EU, although Serbia’s gross average wage is less than 
that in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
are pretenders to the club.  
 Labor flexibility in Serbia is comparably low. 
Privatized firms are usually obliged by contracts 
imposed by the Privatization Agency to maintain their 
level of employment, or to decrease the number of 
employees slowly, up to 10% a year.  In other words, 
the Law imposes some administrative burdens on 
labor force reduction in order to slow the rise of 
unemployment.  Of course, such conditions also slow 
the process of restructuring, economic growth, and 
eventually state revenues.
 Now, after a thorough revision of the Labor Law, it 
is even harder to fire the surplus labor force.  The 2005 
Labor Law requires enterprises to have a long-range 
program of labor reduction in cases of technological 
surplus, despite the fact that all firms that originated 
in the self-management period of the 1960s now have 
more labor than they need.
 If an entrepreneur is dissatisfied with a worker, he 
is not allowed simply to fire the latter.  Instead, he has 
to issue a formal warning, to give precise reasons for 
his dissatisfaction, to inform labor unions of his 
intentions, and to offer a job alternative to the 
concerned worker.  Also, a Solidarity Fund has been 
established for employees who lost their jobs in 
bankruptcy procedures.  Employers are charged by 
additional taxation in order to capitalize the Fund, 
which makes the labor force even more expensive.  All 
these changes were made under the pretext of 
harmonizing labor legislation with EU standards, and 
only a few dissenting voices questioned the EU labor 
directives that were designed in the high days of 
welfare state.
 
 In principle, high costs of labor could be overcome 
by its more productive use.  Section 21 suggested that 
the rate of productivity growth in the Serbian economy 
is higher than in neighboring countries.  However, the 
starting level was rather low.  During the period of UN 
sanctions, hardly anything was invested in the 
country’s infrastructure.  The resources were practically 
depleted since no replacement occurred in the period. 
The railway tracks and car wheels were worn out and 
consequently average rail transport speed fell 
significantly.  The survey data presented in chapter 5 
revealed the virtually unanimous dissatisfaction of 
managers with the country’s infrastructure, particularly 
emphasizing the bad shape of the railway system (98% 
of managers expressed dissatisfaction).  Two-thirds of 
respondents experience traffic congestion that 
significantly increases the cost of their products, and 
more than 80% of them consider Serbia’s infrastructure 
as underdeveloped.  Contrary to repeated promises by 
governments, the main highway that links Western 
Europe with Greece and Turkey has not been finished 
yet.  Driving conditions on that highway and others, 
as well as so bad port conditions, undoubtedly raise 
the costs of transportation (90% of respondents).  
 The number of land-line telephones is relatively 
low (38 per 100 persons), but comparable to the 
regional standard.  Business communication is more 
hampered by low reliability of both land lines and cell 
phone connections.  Reliability is also a problem with 
the supply of energy, particularly electricity.  In the last 
few years, electricity supply succeeded in matching 
demand and no shortages have been experienced, but 
its quality is rather low.  More than half of respondents 
to our survey agreed with that notion.  However, 
whenever the government or electricity exporters find 
electricity export to be profitable, they simply lower 
electrical potential out of greed, which is particularly 
damaging to electrical equipment.  The price of 
electricity is approaching regional levels, and it appears 
that the period of cheap (subsidized) power has 
irrevocably ended with abandonment of the socialist 
growth model.
 By and large, a lot of elements suggest low social 
returns, similar to many underdeveloped countries. 
However, there are numerous other factors that 
seriously jeopardize economic growth.  Among them 
government failures appear to have a prominent role. 
 Government failures. To this bleak picture of 
objective factors complicating growth, we must add 
numerous subjective hurdles to growth.  According 
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to all accounts, there are a lot of government failures 
that create risks at both the micro and macro levels. 
As we have seen in section 22, corruption in Serbia is 
thriving according to all international surveys.  For 
example, the Transparency International ranking, 
which is a survey of perceptions of corruption across 
multiple countries, puts Serbia in 97th place out of 
15 countries.  The Global Competitiveness Report 
200/2005 shows much higher values of all indexes 
related to corruption compared to other states in the 
region, particularly emphasizing corruption in 
foreign trade, public procurement and protection of 
property rights (including intellectual property). 
Freedom House also ranks Serbia as the regional 
leader in corruption.  In addition, our survey revealed 
that more than half of high-ranking managers agree 
with the notion that illegal donations to political 
parties are quite common.  Partly out of that 
impression, or for some other reason, more than 
three-quarters of them do not consider the 
government as impartial toward business firms.
 As we have seen, government consumption is 
high, reaching a level of almost half of GDP.  Since tax 
administration is inefficient and/or corrupt, the bulk 
of revenues comes from taxing sales and imports. 
The share of corporate taxes in state revenues is small 
due to fraudulent, unpunished financial reporting 
that permits corporations to show no profits at the 
end of the financial year.  
 Since income taxes are still under consideration, 
and taxes on corporate profits cannot supply ample 
resources, sales taxes (or VAT) and taxes on wages 
and salaries have so far been the most abundant 
sources of state revenue.  The structure of revenue 
reflects an inefficient system of tax collection, in 
which the state chooses to tax factors of production 
and individuals that are less capable of tax evasion.  
 However, the highest micro risks and the gravest 
government failures come from property rights 
abuses.  The local media are full of stories of abuses of 
minority ownership rights (for example, C-Market), 
uncertainties over relative shares in big companies 
(Mobtel), or manipulations involving shares owned 
by the government (Knjaz Miloš).  There are auditing 
scandals (Putnik), share dilution frauds 
(Jugoremedija), related-party transactions and abuse 
of official positions (Nacionalna štedionica), rigged 
bankruptcy procedures (Sartid), or virtual sagas of 
the government taming nominally independent 
institutions (the Securities and Exchange 
Commission).  Although some newspaper stories 
may have been exaggerated or biased, it is nonetheless 
symptomatic that none of these cases has ever been 
resolved by a court verdict.
 There is still no Restitution Law, although the 
process of privatization is under way, which adds to 
instability of property rights.  Moreover, the 
Privatization Law is amended to increase discretionary 
powers vested in the Ministry of Economy and the 
Privatization Agency, creating more uncertainty. 
Some of the core provisions of the new Bankruptcy 
Law have been suspended for some firms slated for 
privatization, but not for all.  We shall discuss these 
issues and other property rights problems in a 
moment, but for the moment, we simply note that it 
would be excessive to detail in this study a 
comprehensive list of property rights abuses that 
create a lot of micro-level uncertainties.  In section 
22,  some topics under the heading of property rights 
were addressed.  Our survey confirmed managers’ 
concern regarding property rights abuses.  More than 
half of them consider property rights not to be 
properly defined and consequently to be unprotected. 
An equal share of managers point to weak 
governmental responsiveness to investors` interests, 
and more than 70% of managers perceive there to be 
inadequate protection of minority shareholders.  In 
Appendix 1 to this chapter, we present a typology of 
property rights abuses, together with suggested 
remedies.
 Government spending is not only reckless, but 
unchecked.  There is no independent control on 
spending.  The budgetary system imposes only top-
down control, and taxpayers have no way of 
controlling the government, not even indirectly 
through their parliamentary representatives. 
Practically, only one man in the whole country – the 
Minister of Finance - has a comprehensive picture of 
government revenues and outlays;  apart from 
possible corruption, he is in a position to exacerbate 
micro uncertainties by arbitrarily redirecting 
budgetary flows and exerting pressure on particular 
markets or agents.  
 Government spending also creates significant 
macro risks in the Serbian economy.  The budget 
deficit declined last year, and turned into a surplus in 
2005, but nevertheless, the rate of inflation has 
accelerated.  Official estimates for inflation in 200 
were in the single digits, but at the end of the year, the 
rate was 13.7%, and at the end of 2005 it was 17.7%. 
These rates are substantially higher than in countries 
that are Serbia’s major trading partners (mainly the 
EU countries), and higher than in Montenegro, which 
has adopted the euro as the legal tender.  At the same 
time, the dinar is not sliding proportionately in its 
value against the euro, which makes Serbian exports 
more expensive with each passing day.  So far, the 
Central Bank has resisted all pressures exerted by 
exporters for devaluation, but no one knows what the 
rate of exchange will be in the near future, which 
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creates a lot of risks in everyday business.  There are 
basically two claims underlying this point.  One is the 
predictability of depreciation, which is pretty high. 
The other is predictability of sudden devaluation, 
which is speculative.  The consequence of the first 
factor is increased credit expansion, due to the 
arbitrage opportunities given by the interest rate 
differential, while the consequence of the second is 
that this credit expansion will be mostly short term.
 Macro risks are not only created by unpredictable 
monetary policy, but also by discretionary fiscal 
policy.  More than half of our respondents cited 
instability of economic policy as the leading economic 
problem.  For the time being, all state efforts in fiscal 
policy have been dedicated to curbing tax evasion 
and creating sufficient revenues for targeted levels of 
consumption.  The government was encouraged to 
adopt such an approach by international organizations, 
which were primarily concerned with budget deficits 
and not with the structure of the budget.  The structure 
of consumption indicates a lot of room for savings 
(three-quarters of managers point to an inadequate 
structure of public consumption).  There are large 
subsidies for state-run companies (railways, state 
television), and some politically motivated subsidies 
were allocated to ministries held by the party that 
controls state finances (0% of managers find 
agricultural policy too costly).  Also, subsidies are 
given to some run-down companies that use just a 
fraction of their capacity and cannot be privatized 
due to outdated technology.  The government is not 
prepared to bear the political risk of closing down 
and firing labor from such inefficient companies, and 
therefore endlessly pours money into them.  
 In addition, the government uses fiscal revenues to 
support some politically motivated or outright 
corrupt investments through the Development Fund. 
Created as an institution for funneling money to 
inefficient socialist firms, the Fund gradually shifted 
its official policy to support firms in underdeveloped 
regions and to emulate a venture capital fund. 
However, the Fund’s policy is under close political 
scrutiny and the structure of credits reflects relative 
political influence.  Credits given by the Fund under 
favorable conditions and with subsidized interest 
rates create windfall profits to entrepreneurs, and big 
investors do not spare efforts to obtain privileged 
credits.  This naturally militates towards the 
phenomenon of a captured state.  Again, taxpayers 
pay the bill, but remarkably, this policy constrains 
capital market development, creates a lot of 
disequilibria by financing projects with high political 
support instead of with a high rate of return, and 
creates uncertainties due to a politicized business 
cycle.
 Market failures.  As is usual in underdeveloped 
economies, there are also market failures in addition 
to government failures.  For example, firms have low 
incentives to develop their own new products or 
processes, or to upgrade their labor skills.  It is always 
cheaper to use innovation developed by foreign or 
domestic competitors, or to overcome labor shortages 
by using already skilled employees from competing 
firms, as well as personnel that possess particular 
information.  Unprotected intellectual property rights 
lead to low research and development (R&D) activity 
carried out by firms.  
 Many times enterprises stubbornly stick to their 
production mix or their chief product, regardless of 
changing market circumstances.  This fact is evident 
not only among socialist managers accustomed to 
state subsidies, but also among some private 
entrepreneurs.  For example, when market conditions 
changed unfavorably for raspberry producers, they 
demanded that the state cover their losses.  Hardly any 
raspberry growers considered new production ideas, 
searched for new markets, or contemplated introducing 
higher levels of processing fruit.  Their view was that 
the government should either cover their risks, or they 
would not produce at all.  Reluctance to bear risks and 
caution in implementation of new, potentially 
profitable ideas is characteristic for underdeveloped 
economies.
 In such circumstances, one could expect the 
government to intervene by stimulating R&D activity 
among producers, to cover a part of market risks, or to 
supply organizational and information support to 
entrepreneurs.  Some governments go even further by 
allotting substantial budgetary funds for R&D. 
However, the Serbian government has proved to be 
thrifty when it comes to outlays in R&D.  
 In order to meet targets pushed by the IMF, the 
government was forced to cut its expenses, but, of 
course, not in any uniform way.  Therefore, in tune 
with Olson’s expectations (Olson, 1982), the worst hit 
were groups that could not organize effectively to exert 
pressure on the government.  Consequently, Serbia 
spends less than its neighbors on R&D, and also less 
on educating a skilled labor force.  
 These facts are easily verifiable from cross-country 
data.  We also note that managers are aware of the 
problem.  Almost three-fourths of the sample of 
surveyed managers confirm that private R&D 
investments are lacking, and 86% of them agree that 
technological improvements trail behind competing 
countries.  There is a consensus among managers 
(95%) that intellectual property rights are not 
sufficiently protected, and therefore a strong majority 
of them (two-thirds) see no use in paying for protection 
Applying Growth Diagnostics
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
10
of intellectual rights.  In such a state of affairs, it is 
rational simply to seize whatever can be obtained, and 
firms spend as little as possible on R&D.  It is a classic 
case for market failure, since everybody would be 
better off with strict implementation of the patent law, 
but there is no grass-roots initiative for it.  Individual 
agents are reluctant to pursue such a policy since free 
riders could be in a position to collect substantial 
payoffs.
 It is clear that some of the problem with developing 
and placing new products is rooted in the structure of 
firm ownership and management.  Findings from the 
survey of privatized firms in chapter 7 suggest that 
restructuring does generally occur in recently 
privatized firms.  After privatization, only 30% of the 
firms surveyed retained the same package of products, 
25% introduced new products in addition to old ones, 
15% introduced new ones and abandoned the 
production of old ones that dominated the production 
structure before privatization, whereas 30% kept the 
old structure of production but changed the share of 
old product production in overall production.  After 
privatization, 50% of the companies surveyed switched 
to new suppliers, whereas 35% kept the same suppliers 
but added some new ones.  In short, privatized 
companies in Serbia do restructure and become more 
active innovators, which is the groundwork for 
self-discovery.  
 This leads us to the problem of other coordination 
failures.  There are several Serbian business 
associations, often with substantially overlapping 
membership.  However, their primary concern is to 
capture the state, rather than coordinate some 
profitable activities.  The Yugo project, devised in the 
eighties, was practically the last one to include 
cooperation among several businesses, but it was 
imposed by the ruling communist party and 
implemented by fiat.  For the time being, entrepreneurs 
have shown no interest on their own in supporting 
some other export projects.  Theoretically, the 
Chamber of Commerce is the institution that could 
supply help and coordinate export activities, but it was 
designed in a communist fashion, more like a retreat 
for retired politicians than as a genuine business 
organization.  In the meantime, the government has 
set up an Export Promotion Agency, which is of even 
less help to exporters than the Chamber of 
Commerce.
 All this adds up to a murky picture of a 
technologically backward economy that often fails to 
do all it can to identify, produce, and place products 
that can substantially improve Serbia’s overall position 
on the world market.  
 Bad local finance. Serbia has an inefficient and 
weak banking system but due to increased competition, 
the remaining banks are becoming more and more 
efficient.  Total assets of the banking sector are valued 
at just over 0% of GDP, while, for example, 
neighboring Croatia and Hungary show total banking 
assets valued at higher than 100% of GDP.  
 Real interest rates on credits are high, since debt is 
evaluated in euros and the nominal weighted average 
rate approaches 15%.  At the same time, the interest 
rate on deposits is just over 2%.  Such a big difference 
between lending and borrowing interest rates is a sign 
of imperfect competition in the banking sector.  
 The trust of the population in commercial banks is 
low but increasing, as is the banking sector’s readiness 
to extend credits to households.  This can be seen in 
the increase of deposits and credits. The credibility of 
the central bank, on the other hand, is not increasing, 
which can be seen from the low share of savings in 
dinars.  The level of deposits indicates the credibility 
of the banking sector, whereas, in contrast, the level of 
currency substitution indicates the credibility of the 
central bank.  In 2002, when the European Union was 
switching to the euro, less than half of the amount of 
deutschmarks exchanged for the euro was collected by 
banks over the next three years.  By the end of 200, 
the total amount of savings was less then 1.5 billion 
euros, denominated almost exclusively in foreign 
currency (97%), and deposited for the short term 
(9%) -- and that amounted to just over one-fifth of 
the GDP.
 The banks are concerned with ability of customers 
to repay their debts, and usually demand collateral 
triple the worth of the loan.  The problem is aggravated 
by the fact that real estate bookkeeping is inaccurate, 
and property for seizure often does not show up in the 
land registry.  Consequently, just a small fraction of 
the population over 15 years of age has obtained credit 
(.5%), and the share of credit relative to GDP is a 
negligible 0.2 per cent.  Practically, the banks are 
swelling with funds, something confirmed by the fact 
that liquidity credit by the central bank is virtually 
nonexistent.  
 In theory, enterprises may choose between 
obtaining credit and issuing shares in order to finance 
investment.  However, the financial market is shallow, 
mostly trading in controlling stakes of corporations. 
It is virtually impossible for a firm to raise funds on 
the open market;  consequently, credit is the only 
source of external resources.  
 Last, but not least, Serbia’s risk assessment as a 
country is high, despite the fact that the UN sanctions 
were lifted almost five years ago.  Political turmoil, 
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unsettled issues with neighboring countries, and 
unenthusiastic cooperation with the Hague Tribunal 
are some of the factors that contribute to a high risk 
assessment by several international agencies.  In 
section 22, we saw that the Economist Intelligence 
Unit repeatedly ranked Serbia, sometimes alone, and 
sometimes paired with Macedonia, as the country 
with the highest risk in the region.  Banking sector 
risk is undoubtedly the highest in Serbia (general 
score 68, Macedonia 61).  To this measure, one must 
add all the ratings of “D” that Serbia received (risk is 
measured on a scale from A to E), including political 
risk, economic policy risk, risk of economic structure, 
and foreign debt risk.  These rankings are not 
groundless.  We have learned from interviewed 
managers that they mostly agree with these high-risk 
assessments.
 All these elements contribute to the high costs of 
finance, which is also a trait of an underdeveloped 
economy.
 An expert on the Serbian economy would add 
much more to this inventory of inefficiencies, but even 
this limited list of grave economic problems suffices to 
emphasize the underdeveloped character of Serbia’s 
economy.  One suggestion for an exit from this 
unfortunate state of affairs would be to attack all 
elements of this “laundry list” simultaneously. 
However, underdeveloped countries would not be 
underdeveloped if they were capable of solving all 
vital problems at the same time.  Governments of 
underdeveloped states usually do not have the 
resources and/or political capital to solve all problems 
at once.  Therefore, the government is limited to 
selecting goals that will yield the highest returns in 
accelerating economic growth.
	 31.	 An	Exercise	in
	 Growth	Diagnostics
 
 Beyond an initial consensus among growth 
theorists on the central role of accumulation for 
economic development, the next step is the subject of 
wide debate.  Namely, if accumulation is found to be 
inadequate for initiating economic growth, additional 
resources for investments have to be found.  At first 
sight, it seems logical to propose a transfer of resources 
from richer countries to poorer countries.  But, we 
may equally propose that no income is so small as to 
prevent saving a part of it (Bauer, 1991).  Moreover, 
foreign aid may create an addiction, a bad habit of 
relying on foreign resources and not on domestic 
accumulation, which could be devastating to 
economic growth.  The first democratic Serbian 
government emphasized foreign aid, but the effects of 
aid on economic growth proved to be almost 
negligible.
 This leads us to the second proposition:  not only 
does the amount of resources matter, but so does their 
targeted use.  Domestic accumulation or foreign aid 
may be ample, but use of the funds may be woefully 
inefficient, with low economic returns.  If, for example, 
decisionmakers build pagodas instead of production 
facilities, as they did at certain points in history, or 
construct “white elephants” – projects with negative 
social surplus – resources would be spent in vain, 
with few, if any effects on economic growth.  Even 
worse, such policies of resource diversion crowd out 
socially desirable projects (Robinson and Torvik, 
2005).  
 Next, even if resources are sufficient and invested 
in sectors that produce the highest returns, the entire 
increase in income can still be appropriated by the 
state, for financing health care, education and culture. 
The aggregate costs of these social programs soak up 
income that would otherwise reward private investors, 
thus contributing in the long run to slower economic 
growth.  In that case, we suggest a third proposition: 
the low capacity of investors to control returns on 
their investment will likely lead to low economic 
growth.  
 Finally, resources may be ample and investors may 
be in a position to reap returns, but they may have no 
ideas about where to invest.  The estimated economic 
surplus of each investment may prove to be too low. 
In that case, we would assert a fourth proposition: 
poor economic infrastructure closes off investment 
opportunities, which in turn produces slow economic 
growth.  If the prospects of profits from investment 
prove to be meager, external financing will likely be 
costly, since few investment projects will show 
profitability.  Economic growth would suffer from yet 
another cause.  
 By and large, lack of accumulation, low returns on 
investment, low private appropriability of returns, 
and high costs of financing investment are the 
principal factors that may impede higher economic 
growth.  According to growth diagnostics (Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Velasco, 2005), the first stage of 
examination consists of identifying the factor with 
the greatest influence on constraining economic 
growth.
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	 32.	 Stage	One
 It might seem that in a poorly developed economy, 
all the factors identified in a laundry-list fashion 
equally contribute to restraining economic growth. 
Accumulation is usually low due to low income and 
low proclivity for saving, entrepreneurs face a 
constrained choice due to high costs of information 
on profitable opportunities, and labor regulation 
often substantially increases production costs, which 
in turn lower returns to investment.  In addition, low 
GDP and populist political programs tend to increase 
the share of government consumption, which limits 
private appropriation and crowds out private 
investment.  Finally, the banking sector may prove to 
be inefficient and/or uncompetitive, with the result of 
higher than expected interest rates according to 
relative factor scarcity.
 Therefore, we need some tests that could distinguish 
the relative strength of constraints.  If, for example, 
the high cost of capital constrains investment, we 
would probably find that foreign borrowing is near 
the extreme.  In other words, we would expect the 
current account deficit to be high, and constrained 
only by the willingness of foreign creditors to lend on 
a short-term basis.  
 Financing. Now, let us turn to the Serbian context 
that we portrayed in previous chapters.  Serbia does 
have relatively high interest rates.  High interest rates 
are an indication that the cost of financing could be 
the major bottleneck to higher growth.  Rodrik writes 
that in an economy 
 that is constrained by a high cost of finance we 
would expect real interest rates to be high, borrowers 
to be chasing lenders, the current account deficit to be 
high […] and for entrepreneurs to be full of investment 
ideas.  In such an economy, an exogenous increase in 
investible funds, such as foreign aid and remittances, 
will spur primarily investment and other productive 
economic activities rather than consumption or 
investment in real estate (Rodrik 200, 7).
 Two elements of this formulation are present in 
Serbia today:  the current account deficit and interest 
rates are high.  But the trend is downwards.  The 
current account has been constantly rising since 2000. 
It jumped from less than a quarter of GDP in 2000 to 
almost one-third in 200.  However, as table 1  in 
section 22 showed, the deficit visibly lessened in 2005, 
which is by no means in line with trends in the 
region.
 Interest rates are high.  In 2001, the weighted 
interest rate on bank credits was 32.52% per annum, 
and decreased in subsequent years.  By the end of 
2005, it was 15.82%.  At the same time, the interest rate 
on deposits is just over 2%.  Such a big difference 
between lending and borrowing interest rates most 
likely indicate an imperfect banking sector.  
 A survey published by Quarterly Monitor at the 
end of 2005 (section 23) reveals that, due to the higher 
competition in the banking sector, interest rates in 
general are decreasing.  Interest rates vary, and that 
different borrowers can access credit under different 
interest rates.  Uneven interest rates point to a 
fragmented and disintegrated credit market in Serbia 
where banks respond differently to the same type of 
risk (MAT 1/2005, p.  32).
 What causes such distortions in the Serbian 
banking sector? Access to credit is limited, but not 
because of scarcity of resources that can be employed. 
Rather, the limitations are found in non-financial 
factors, such as the absence of a credit registry and the 
weakness of judiciary system.  This was revealed by 
the World Bank’s study The Cost of Doing Business 
2006.  Serbia is identified as a country with a poorly 
developed public and private credit reporting system 
that normally would evaluate borrowers and try to 
help creditors diminish risk and allocate credits more 
efficiently.  Nor is regulation of secured lending, such 
as collateral and bankruptcy laws, adequately 
implemented and applied.  As table 1 shows, Serbia 
ranks low in both aspects. 
 
 The trend is clearly for the current account deficit 
to go down and for interest rates to continue to drop 
as the Serbian banking system grows.  Actually, the 
banking system has perked up since 2001.  This was 
confirmed by the January 17, 2006 IMF report entitled 
“Financial System Stability Assessment,” which 
opened by stating that “the ongoing transformation 
of Serbia’s financial system is bringing important 
economic benefits” (IMF,p.5), something quite 
expected for a banking sector that has been 
“undergoing fundamental transition from a state 
controlled sector to a private foreign-owned system” 
(IMF, p.  7).  The assessment establishes what has been 
known for some time, namely, that the Serbian 
banking sector has been expanding credit activity in 
200 and especially in 2005.  Credit demand, driven 
in 200 by high public expenditure, is high, but, quite 
unexpectedly for a country where borrowers are 
supposed to chase lenders, the supply of credit has 
been even higher.  The volume of dinar credits in 
2005 compared to 200 grew by 69%.  The absolute 
increase was 16,782 million dinars (and reached, at 
the end of 2005, 360,51 million dinars).  The 
structure of credit favors firms:  credits to firms 
account for 63% of all dinar credit;  by contrast, credits 
to consumers account for 35%, although consumer 
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credit expanded faster (by 9%) than firm credit in 
2005 (MAT 1/2006, pp.  23-2).
 At the same time, despite the deep distrust in the 
banking system, the volume of dinar and foreign 
currency deposits rose in 200 and 2005.  As the 
graph below shows, by the end of 200, domestic 
deposits with commercial banks amounted to 0.3 
billion dinars, whereas credit expansion amounted to 
36 billion dinars.  (Net savings was .3 billion).  In 
2005, the volume of credits increased by 65 billion 
dinars, but domestic deposits also rose by 80 billion 
dinars (net savings was 16 billion)  (MAT 12/2005, p. 
23).
 Despite the growth of all monetary aggregates, the 
Serbian economy still appears to be undermonetarized. 
The M1:GDP ratio in 2001-2005 is 9%, as opposed to 
European Union economies where it is typically 36%-
38%.  Yet, actors in the Serbian economy informally 
use the euro along with the dinar, suggesting that the 
ratio must be higher.  (In 2002, when the EU was 
switching from local currencies to the euro, Serbian 
citizens exchanged around € billion.  One can 
surmise that at least half of it is still immobilized by 
banks, as well as circulating unregistered in the 
Serbian market.)
 There are other reasons for why firms cannot 
access credits more easily.  All are of a non-financial 
nature.  The rise in monetary aggregates (especially 
cash) in circulation has posed some risk for the 
economy.  Since consumers are demanding more 
credit than firms, the National Bank has had to 
constrain credit growth, fearing higher inflation.  (In 
2005, inflation was 17.7%, which was highest in the 
region.)  Monetary measures to restrict credit growth 
(repo operations and the use of statutory reserve 
requirements on foreign currency denominated 
deposits) were designed to slow down consumer 
credits.  Yet they have affected the very firms that are 
Country
Public registry coverage 
(borrowers as % of adult 
population)
Private bureau coverage 
(borrowers as % of adult 
population))
ICredit information 
index
Legal rights index
Serbia 0,1 0,0 1 5
Croatia 0,0 0,0 0 4
Macedonia 1,9 0,0 3 6
Hungary 0,0 4,0 5 6
Bulgaria 13,6 0,0 3 6
Table 1.  Indicators of credit informations.  The first three indices measure whether registries possess necessary information on borrowers.  
A higher index number  signifies a more developed registry system.  The legal rights index ranks from 0 (absence of legal protection) to 10 
(maximal protection).  Source:  The World Bank, The Cost of Doing Business 2006.
in need of additional resources to boost export 
production by making it harder for them to access 
credits.  Monetary policy, not the scarcity of resources, 
is the culprit.  In addition, according to a regular 
monthly survey from January 2006 done by Institute 
for market research, around one-third of the surveyed 
firms complain they cannot access credits.  But most 
of these have low credibility or are still socially 
owned.
 As may be seen, Serbia is surely not the country 
where “borrowers are chasing the lenders” but rather 
the other way round.  The banking sector as a whole 
is liquid (the exceptions are several state banks) and 
banks are swollen with funds.  “They are financing 
credits from steady increases in euro-dominated 
deposits, reflecting improved confidence in banking 
system, as well as borrowings from headquarters of 
foreign banks” (IMF, p.  7).
 Rodrik also argues that “an exogenous increase in 
investable funds, such as foreign aid and remittances, 
will spur primarily investment and other productive 
economic activities rather than consumption or 
investment in real estate.”   However, in 200, net 
transfers (with foreign donations) in Serbia increased 
from 16.6% to 17.9% of GDP, while gross investment 
share stagnated in GDP (around 16%), and domestic 
savings in foreign currency have risen steeply (from a 
negligible amount to two billion euros in 2005).  
 Net transfers (in which remittances of labor are 
the most important source) had covered almost half 
of the trade deficit in 200.  Net transfers accounted 
for up to 15.5% of GDP in that year.  However, the 
current account deficit quadrupled its share of GDP 
and reached 13.2% in the same year.  It was covered 
by a higher capital account surplus;  consequently, 
central bank reserves increased.  As the official data 
show, there was a steep rise in short-term credits, as 
well as mid-term and long-term credits.  
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 High interest rates are surely one of the reasons for 
low direct investments.  Yet high interest rates are an 
indicator of high risk.  Risk is created somewhere else. 
It is difficult for creditors to ensure the return of debt 
in case of default.  The legal system is weak, the land 
registry is incomplete, and bankruptcy procedures 
typically last several years.  The inefficient, under-
resourced and corrupt legal system is the primary 
obstacle, generating other relevant obstacles in the 
area of financing.
 Social capital return.  If we exclude high interest 
rates as the principal cause of low investment, then 
maybe entrepreneurs do not invest due to a lack of 
opportunities to reap returns.  Maybe the economy 
does not have an adequate level of skilled workers in 
relation to GDP, or the country has a poor 
infrastructure, or there are some geographical 
disadvantages.  
 As we have already stated, Serbia is not peripheral 
to primary trading routes.  These facts are reflected in 
the structure of foreign trade.  Around half of Serbia’s 
foreign trade is with EU countries (56% in exports). 
Germany and Italy, as Serbia’s two largest trading 
partners, combine for almost a quarter of Serbian 
foreign trade.  Exports to neighboring countries 
comprise one-third of total exports, and are becoming 
increasingly important:  regional trade exhibits the 
highest growth rates, due to bilateral treaties on free 
trade that include abandoning 90% of import dues 
and cancellation of the quota system.  Also, according 
to the survey data presented in chapter 5, Serbian 
managers confirmed their trust in regional trade: 
almost half of them agreed on the rising importance 
of regional trade.
 Serbia has similar free-trade treaties with Russia 
and Belarus, and it may be expected that 
implementation of these treaties, together with the 
fact that Serbia is sandwiched between EU countries, 
will probably show more effects in the future.  By and 
large, geography cannot be considered a constraining 
factor on Serbia’s economic growth.
 Serbia’s labor force has a skill structure and costs of 
labor similar to other regional countries, but the 
increase in labor productivity is the highest in the 
region.  Other elements of economic infrastructure 
are about the same, with no marked deficiencies.  The 
picture is corroborated in our survey:  60% of 
managers have no problem in finding and hiring able 
workers;  62% of them say that they have contact with 
numerous competent engineers and even scientists 
who are ready to take positions within the firm.  On 
the other hand, more than half of those surveyed 
point to bad working habits of employees, particularly 
in the public sector.  By and large, we may say that 
opportunities for investment in a technical sense may 
produce similar rates of return as elsewhere in the 
region, and yet we see that economic growth in 
general is more sluggish than in neighboring 
countries.  Consequently, we do not regard low 
human capital as the principal constraint to higher 
economic growth.
 Appropriability.  Finally, the only factor left in the 
growth diagnostics model is low appropriability.  As 
we have seen, it may be a consequence of two failures 
– market and government.  Since both failures are 
present in the Serbian context, we must evaluate their 
relative strength.  
 If we first examine market failures, we may observe 
all kind of problems, in information, coordination 
and “self-discovery.”  Some of them we described in 
the earlier section on the laundry-list approach. 
However, there are also some positive elements that 
have to be explained in an effort to evaluate the 
relative strength of different failures.
 Serbian managers have a long history of business 
relations with market economies.  Trade with the 
West comprised more than half of foreign trade even 
in the 1980s.  Moreover, economic sanctions imposed 
by the UN, however devastating for the economy, 
represented an additional challenge and positive 
experience for domestic entrepreneurs.  They were 
obliged to find alternative ways, often illegal, to 
conduct trade, find new products that could be sold 
for hard currency, and import whatever was needed 
into the country.  It was practically a “high school” of 
“self-discovery,” and only the most able survived this 
demanding test.  Therefore, one could hardly label 
entrepreneurs as uninspired.  
 True, after initial successes, some entrepreneurs 
could not resist the temptation of government 
protection, and applied for state subsidies, import 
protection, guaranteed prices, subsidized credits, and 
tax rebates.  After all, a quiet life enabled by a captured 
state is more pleasurable than a struggle for survival 
under conditions of unbridled competition.  This 
behavior is characteristic of groups such as the 
previously mentioned raspberry growers, but on the 
other hand, there are a lot of success stories in the 
gray economy.  Most entrepreneurs in gray economic 
activities never applied for any state help since their 
businesses were not eligible for state protection. 
Examples include shoe and garment production, but 
also other staples designed by the Western fashion 
industry.  
 With the phase-out of UN sanctions and opening 
up of possibilities for trade, the number of newly 
registered firms increased rapidly, which is also a sign 
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of vitality in business activities.  In section 22 we 
found out that, each year, more than 6,000 new firms 
enter the market.  Also, with institutional changes in 
200 and 2005 – the simplification of the business 
registry, the streamlining of procedures for starting a 
business, and the substantial reduction of the 
minimum required capital (from 5000 US dollars to 
500 euros) for registration -- the number of new firms 
increased even more.  Such a vibrant rate of new entry 
is a sign that entrepreneurs have not run out of ideas 
for collecting profits, and one could hardly characterize 
the economy to be burdened by “self-discovery” 
problems.  
 However, the structure of newly created firms also 
points to their predominant formation in trade and 
other activities with high turnover, suggesting an 
unwillingness of entrepreneurs to invest greater 
amounts of resources, or to invest in activities with a 
longer maturation period.  Clearly, entrepreneurs are 
concerned for their investments because they do not 
trust the government.  Therefore, we argue that 
government failures are the more pressing issue in 
the Serbian context.
 By excluding the previously discussed constraints 
as the most binding, we may consequently conclude 
that low opportunities for appropriating investment 
revenues due to government failures are the most 
binding constraint for higher economic growth. 
However, this very general proposition must be 
dissected in the second stage of growth diagnostics. 
Private investors may shun investing due to broadly 
defined taxation, which comprises not just state and 
local taxes, but also poor protection of property 
rights, insufficient enforcement of contracts, 
macroeconomic instability, and widespread 
corruption.  
	 33.	 Stage	Two
 If entrepreneurs are not able to enforce contracts, 
and feel that their property is unsafe due to general 
judicial uncertainty and widespread corruption, or 
if there is substantial macroeconomic instability, 
investors will have low incentives to place their 
resources in productive uses.  Economic growth 
would be sluggish in such a state, and government 
failures would be the only culprit for blame.  As we 
witnessed, government failures are reflected in rising 
macro and micro risks.  Macro risks include financial, 
monetary, and fiscal instabilities, while micro risks 
include property rights abuses, corruption, and 
broadly defined taxation (i.e., not only central 
government and local taxes, but also increased costs 
of doing business).  
 We begin with macro risks in the Serbian 
economy, particularly the fiscal element of risk. 
Serbia has a flat corporate tax of 10%, which is among 
the lowest in Europe, and therefore could hardly be 
considered as an obstacle to investment.  True, the 
government has made labor more expensive by 
taxation, and use of capital cheaper, which contrasts 
with relative factor scarcity.  In other words, the 
government has been sending the wrong signals to 
entrepreneurs, but we cannot say that distorted 
relative prices hampered appropriability of 
investment returns, despite often-repeated 
complaints by investors.  
 Regardless of how relative factor prices changed, 
they were known to all investors in advance, and if 
the latter concluded that a certain combination of 
factors was unprofitable, they could have increased 
their capital intensity in order to meet the change. 
The ability to appropriate profits has not been 
distorted by this change in relative prices of labor 
and capital.  As a matter of fact, we may agree that 
the government erred and made big failures in this 
area, but appropriation has not been hampered.  One 
may even suggest that government failure, through 
low rates of tax collection, extensive tunneling from 
state and socially-owned enterprises to private firms, 
and false financial statements and inefficient controls 
all helped to increase private appropriation of 
profits.  
 Most government revenues come from taxing 
consumption.  Starting in January 2005, Serbia 
abandoned an inefficient sales tax system with a lot 
of rates and exemptions, and introduced the uniform 
VAT rate of 18 per cent, with just a few exemptions. 
The new system, at least in theory, does not distort 
relative prices, and together with an increased, 
regular tax collection, stabilizes entrepreneurial 
expectations, which is a precondition for boosting 
investment activity.  Given that the consumption tax 
is the main source of state revenues, one may 
conclude that investors’ ability to appropriate returns 
from investment is not seriously jeopardized.  And, 
as cross-national data revealed in chart  from 
section 22, the VAT rate of 18% is in the lower band 
among regional economies as well as among Serbia’s 
main trading partners, and cannot be declared the 
prime suspect for low appropriation by investors.
 The next possible explanation for the reluctance 
of investors to invest is monetary and financial 
instability.  After the democratic turnover in 2000, 
one of the main objectives of the new government 
was price stabilization.  Despite initial success, the 
rate of inflation has been accelerating from 7.8% to 
13.7% in 200, and in mid-2005, it reached more 
than 17% on a yearly basis.  However, that rate is still 
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far from the hyperinflation range, which might 
destabilize the business environment.  At the same 
time, the budget deficit shrank from .2% of GDP to 
just 1.5% in 200, and it turned into a surplus in 
2005.  
 Meanwhile, the domestic currency turned out to 
be overvalued, due to the fact that the exchange rate 
had not tracked the difference between inflation in 
the EU and domestic inflation.  That created a heated 
debate among economists over the significance of an 
appreciated currency rate for the trade imbalance, 
especially after the record trade deficit in 200. 
However, overall balance of payments is in positive 
territory, along with rising foreign currency reserves. 
We may therefore suggest that the gap is not so big as 
to cause macroeconomic instability, at least for the 
time being.  
According to standardized international surveys,  
Serbia’s real unemployment rate at the end of 200 
stood at 18.5%.  At the end of 2005, the rate was 
probably around 20%.  Even such a high 
unemployment rate could not be considered a threat 
to social stability, as clearly witnessed in this and 
other transition countries.  Unlike developed market 
economies, many domestic urban dwellers still have 
relatives in the countryside or small plots of arable 
land that enable them to supplement their daily diet. 
By and large, although macro instabilities are 
substantial and almost endemic, they could not be 
considered an immediate threat to investors or a 
serious obstacle for accruing profits.  
 By successive elimination of possible macro 
culprits for low investment, we have finally reached 
the conclusion, easily confirmed in many cases, that 
micro risks are the principal causes of low investment, 
including poor protection of property rights.
	 34.	Property	Rights
 As it is well known from property rights theory, a 
market economy cannot function properly without 
effective protection of property rights and enforcement 
of freely expressed consent given by contracting 
parties.  Therefore, it is almost universally accepted 
that without a strong constitutional protection of 
those rights, there is not only a serious deterrent to 
productive activity, but also that there are broader 
effects on social faith in democracy.  The freedom to 
undertake legal contracts between private parties, 
and have those contracts enforced by state institutions, 
is one of the basic features of a democratic society 
that fully respects individual freedom (Sunstein, 
1993).  
 Several laws are vital for protection of property 
rights.  In Appendix 1, we have enumerated several 
laws that are either deficient or simply are absent 
from the set of rules that govern Serbia’s economic 
system.  Here we shall examine three particular, vital 
laws for protection of property rights.  Good company 
law is a safeguard that specifies the limits of firms’ 
conduct.  Good bankruptcy law protects creditors 
and businesses by making investments recoverable. 
The third vital law that protects ownership is the law 
on legal enforcement.  
 Property  laws. These laws are vital in consolidated 
market economies.  Nevertheless, post-socialist 
countries have to tackle one additional problem, 
which is restitution of the property taken decades 
ago from individuals on various grounds, i.e., in 
some legal or extra-legal way (Pejovich, 2005). 
Although fifteen years have passed since the 
introduction of a competitive multi-party system, 
Serbia still has no restitution law.  In that respect, 
Serbia is the laggard in the region, with serious 
consequences for the stability of property rights. 
While the privatization process is under way, and 
original owners also advance claims on the state 
assets to be privatized, nobody is able to predict the 
final outcome of conflicting claims.  The Parliament 
has adopted a law that stipulates evidence of property 
claimed by the original owners, which only shows 
the reluctance on the part of the government to 
solve the issue, given that there is ample official 
evidence of the property taken.
 Once property rights are defined, business 
activities have to be regulated and protected by good 
company law.  It is often held that common law and 
civil law traditions lead to diverging corporate 
institutions.  However, each tradition has several 
diverging paths, or more loosely put, there is an 
interaction between markets, asset pricing, and 
legal institutions (Gilson, 2005).  It is therefore hard 
to tell in advance which model protects property 
rights most effectively.
 The European Union made substantial progress 
in unifying different company law traditions by 
issuing European Council and Parliament 
Directives.  Member countries are obliged to adopt 
these provisions in domestic legislation in order to 
secure a smooth flow of capital across internal 
borders.  For transition countries that seek to join 
the Union, this process of unification has an 
additional positive effect.  It saves them effort, and 
also limited resources, in their attempt to devise 
their own company codes. 
 
 Serbia’s laws on companies draw on the German 
civil law tradition.  The latest version of the law, 
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adopted in the fall of 200, incorporates all the 
European corporate law Directives, and sets a level 
playing field for foreign investors.  However, 
implementation of the law is problematic because 
other laws that regulate capital markets are not in 
tune with this law and do not provide for a consistent 
system.  There is also a problem with judges who are 
unfamiliar with some market economy concepts. 
In such a situation, courts do not make consistent 
decisions, which creates uncertainty concerning 
property rights.  Several cases that were highly 
publicized showed especially weak protection of 
minority shareholders and the strong power of 
incumbent management structures, something 
confirmed by managers in our survey.  
 Both unfortunate traits led some foreign investors 
to change their mind and invest somewhere else 
(e.g., the privatizations of Knjaz Miloš and C-
Market).  Of course, it is one thing to drop a project 
of putting money in one firm and choose another in 
the same market; it is quite another to abandon the 
idea of investing in one country and relocate 
resources to an entirely different market, running a 
risk of ruining domestic credibility..
 Bankruptcy laws. In 2005, Serbia started 
implementing a new Bankruptcy Law based on a 
creditor protection model.  The previous bankruptcy 
law protected debtors, and was abandoned as a 
remnant of socialism.  Often, it is considerably 
easier to change certain provisions than to accept a 
completely new legal approach.  As an international 
survey clearly suggested, in many cases, the 
inefficiency of courts and their inability to deliver 
justice is due to the transplanting of unfamiliar legal 
systems (Djankov, et al.  2005a).
 According to Djankov et alt.  (2005b), there are at 
least four main legal traditions that define creditors’ 
rights:  English, French, German, and Nordic. 
Moreover, we find different provisions under each 
tradition.  If we were to rank them by assigning them 
a creditors’ rights index that varies between 0 (poor 
creditors’ rights) and  (strong creditors’ rights), we 
might, for example, score a 1 for the United States 
and  for the United Kingdom or New Zealand.  The 
American model of bankruptcy law gives greater 
protection to debtors and company management 
and fosters reorganization, but it is implemented in a 
highly competitive market for corporate control.  In 
other words, it is not clear ahead of time which system 
is more effective:  the answer depends on the nature 
of corporate governance and debt structures, and 
development of complementary market institutions 
(Sefa, 200).  
 The previous Serbian Bankruptcy Law (of the 
socialist era) was quite ineffective, with bankruptcy 
procedures lasting for many years (even decades in 
some cases).  Also, some bankruptcy trustees were 
overloaded with more than a hundred firms in their 
portfolio.  As no trustee is capable of managing a 
hundred firms at the same time, this fact signaled 
corruption in the judiciary.  It is still rather early to 
discuss the merits of the new law, especially since 
its implementation is severely restricted by other 
legislation.
 Privatization laws.  Even before the new 
Bankruptcy Law became effective in February 2005, 
Serbia’s parliament adopted new privatization 
legislation but exempted firms in the process of 
privatization from the Bankruptcy Law’s provisions. 
The new privatization legislation intended to spur 
the process by making insolvent firms more attractive 
for sale through restructuring.  In the process of 
restructuring, state firms are obliged to write-off 
debts of firms slated for privatization, and private 
creditors are left with an option to negotiate debt 
settlement with the new owners.  Also, no collateral 
can be collected from firms under restructuring, for 
up to two years from the commencement of the 
restructuring process.  Despite the good intentions 
to accelerate the pace of privatization, these 
provisions created additional uncertainties and 
instability regarding property rights.  Consequently, 
the cost of doing business will increase, and investors 
will be reluctant to invest, with continued devastating 
effects on economic growth.
 Since firms due to be privatized account for the 
bulk of debt in the Serbian economy, this practically 
means that the Bankruptcy Law has been suspended 
before coming into force, applying only to the tiny 
part of the private sector that is insolvent.  Serbia is 
therefore in a position similar to some developing 
countries (for example Malawi), where otherwise 
credible bankruptcy legislation superseded by some 
other legislation (Djankov et alt.  2005b).  Such a 
legislative environment is certainly not encouraging 
for investors, but there may be even more 
discouraging factors, as we shall soon see.
 Good laws must be coupled with an efficient 
judiciary in order to attain effective protection of 
property rights.  Serbian courts are overloaded with 
cases;  as we have seen, in some courts, each judge 
handles an average of one thousand cases per year. 
With 128 new cases arriving for each judge’s 
consideration in a year, substantial backlogs are 
inevitable.  Serious delays in trial or resolution (more 
than a quarter of cases are extended into the next 
year) represent a strong incentive for agents to use 
extra-legal means in enforcing their rights.
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 Almost all respondents in our survey were 
dissatisfied with the judicial system (more than 
90%).  The same majority pointed to cumbersome 
and often conflicting regulations, and almost 85% 
considered judges to be under government influence. 
In addition, more than 60% did not trust the police, 
and 38% considered costs of organized crime to be a 
regular part of production costs.  
 Inefficiency, coupled with corruption, in the area 
of law enforcement is perceived as substantial, not 
only by our survey, but also by several other domestic 
surveys.  That finding is hardly surprising—Serbia is 
highly ranked in corruption in leading international 
surveys.  
	 35.	 Corruption
 Apart from inadequate laws and their ineffective 
implementation, we also found in our survey that a 
high degree of corruption is one of the principal 
causes for the low investment rate in Serbia.  We will 
review here some of the indicators of corruption. 
Then, in the next section, we will establish the link 
between poor protection of property rights and 
corruption.
 Corruption cannot be equated with mere bribery. 
It is a much more difficult and elusive problem to be 
discussed in this limited space, especially if it is of a 
systemic character.  If corruption permeates the 
whole society, the question becomes:  where to start 
with efforts to curb it?  As a matter of fact, the 
problem is aggravated by ambiguity in the notion of 
corruption, that is, it is difficult even to define what 
corruption is.  
 The World Bank working definition that defines 
corruption as an abuse of position in order to gain 
personal benefit is the most widely used.  The 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy advocated by the 
Serbian government uses this definition, too. 
However, misuse of resources, or their outright theft, 
both in public and private sectors, should not be 
classified as corruption, despite a clear abuse of 
office-holding.  As argued by Colombatto (2003), 
corruption needs at least three persons: the principal, 
the agent, and the third party who derives benefits 
from the agent’s activities.  The third party has 
incentives to make an offer to the agent, who in turn 
has interest in abusing his position at the expense of 
the principal.  In other words, the agent takes 
advantage of his discretionary position in order to 
sell property rights that do not belong to him.  
 Even by taking this more narrow and precise 
definition of corruption, one may easily detect its 
wide scope in Serbia.  Both grand and petty 
corruption are widespread, since top-ranking 
politicians are involved in several affairs documented 
by the government’s Anti-Corruption Council.  Petty 
corruption is also acknowledged in several surveys 
of corruption in courts, and among customs officials, 
physicians, teachers, or policemen.  One-fifth of 
interviewed managers admitted that paying bribes is 
indispensable in order to win contracts, although, in 
their view, kickbacks rarely surpass 5% of contracting 
value.
 The widespread character of corruption is also 
recognized in the National Strategy for Combating 
Corruption, a document adopted by the Serbian 
government and sent to the Parliament for approval 
in mid-2005.  The findings of this document 
expressed the view that corruption permeates the 
whole society.  
 Although many authors point to devastating 
effects of corruption, economists have established, 
starting with the seminal Mauro (1995) paper, a clear 
(negative) relationship between corruption and 
economic growth.  Empirical studies have confirmed 
that corruption alters the composition of government 
expenditure towards less productive activities, and, 
therefore, that it is detrimental to economic growth 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).  Although in some cases, 
corruption may temporarily boost economic growth, 
it generally undermines good governance and 
inevitably hampers economic growth.  For example, 
the sale under privileged conditions, and allegedly 
with extensive corruption, of the SARTID steel 
company proved to be economically beneficial to a 
certain extent.  New owners not only restructured 
the company without shedding labor, but also 
dramatically increased production and export. 
Today, the company is the leading Serbian exporter, 
with a share of about 7% in total exports.  Also, the 
buyer of the company used its influence to help 
Serbia in acquiring the most favorable position in 
export to the US market.  
 Undoubtedly, these were good points, but there is 
no way to know if some other investor might not 
have achieved even better economic results.  Also, 
without competitive tender bids, one may never be 
sure that the highest value bidder acquired the 
company and its resources.  Therefore, some other 
investor may have been interested in paying a higher 
price for the company, or willing to settle at least a 
part of company’s debt.  Any of that would have been 
a great relief for government finances.  To be sure, 
bids by potential investors are by definition a matter 
of speculation, but what we do know is that the 
company was sold for a fraction of its estimated value 
and with no obligation by the buyer to settle the 
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company’s debt with foreign banks (mainly from 
Austria and Germany).  Also, the sale was conducted 
under a bankruptcy procedure with several flaws, 
and in the presence of substantial political pressure 
on courts (documented in the Anti-Corruption 
Council Report).  Therefore, at least two short-run 
adverse effects could be discerned:  state finances 
suffered, and German and Austrian investors showed 
great reluctance to invest in Serbia.  In the long run, 
the case will produce lasting effects:   the judiciary 
that experienced pressure by the executive branch of 
power may never feel capable of implementing laws 
and resolving disputes impartially.  We submit that 
these broader effects of hampering the rule of law 
can outweigh the positive effects of a rise in exports, 
higher employment and income.  
 Nevertheless, several authors found effective 
quelling of corruption to be a substantial part of 
good governance, and a prerequisite for sustainable 
growth.  Kaufmann (200) found that governance 
and corruption issues constituted key constraints on 
investment and business, and that these issues were 
particularly significant in assessing a country’s 
overall competitiveness.  He has conducted a wide-
ranging cross-national empirical investigation and 
found that a country that manages to reduce the 
extent of corruption by one standard deviation can 
expect, on average, to move at least 20 rank positions 
in the World Economic Forum’s Growth 
Competitiveness Index.
 This and other empirical findings on the 
importance of an effective struggle against corruption 
for the purpose of sustaining economic growth may 
be disputed.  However, we strongly doubt that 
effective protection of property rights is possible 
with corrupt courts.
	 36.	Short-term	vs.	Long-term	
 Application of the growth diagnostics model 
clearly pointed to one principal culprit for low 
investment and consequently sluggish Serbian 
economic growth.  This is the poor protection of 
property rights.  Corruption is, in large part, a 
symptom of weak formal protection of property 
rights.  In the absence of reliable formal means for 
the protection of capital, informal means are used. 
These informal means take the form of corruption.  
 In searching for the most critical bottleneck, we 
should be searching for the problem that can be 
eliminated by short-term efforts, such as policy 
changes or the removal of certain institutional 
obstacles or deficiencies.  Protection of property 
right is, and corruption is not, that kind of a problem. 
It is hard to expect that corruption can be eliminated 
or controlled in a short period of time.  What is more, 
corruption depresses the long-term growth rate, but 
does not have a clear impact on the short-term 
growth rate.  As we saw in section 19, the Serbian 
economy grew by 6.5% on average in 2001-2005, 
although corruption was present for all that time. 
However, if the policy for strengthening property 
rights is successful in the short run, the struggle 
against corruption will benefit in the long run.  
 Keeping in mind the distinction between the 
short and long run, we propose some governmental 
measures to stabilize property rights, measures 
which would exert positive effects on economic 
growth.  
 First of all, we think restitution is the most urgent 
task. It is a prerequisite for privatization, which 
cannot be delayed anymore.  Property rights are 
simply not protected in a country that expropriates 
some individuals and sells the very same assets to 
others.  In addition, many original owners and their 
descendents live abroad, and continue to pressure 
their new countries to ban investment in Serbia, 
unless the issue is settled.  As German and Austrian 
investors already invest in Serbia to a rather sparse 
extent, negative publicity campaigns in other 
countries cannot be dismissed as unimportant.
 Next, the privatization of companies in the 
process of restructuring under the auspices of the 
Privatization Agency must be accelerated.  At the 
beginning of this process, 71 companies were slated 
for privatization through restructuring, and after 
four years, only a few companies have completed the 
process.  The latest changes in the Privatization Law 
open possibilities for an extensive increase in the 
number of companies that must wait to be 
restructured and sold by the state.  That situation 
creates a lot of uncertainties concerning property 
rights, but also an abundant source of state capture 
and corruption.  From this point of view, the best 
move would be to repeal these latest changes in the 
Privatization Law.  The suggested move would also 
have positive effects in other spheres, mainly by 
enabling the implementation of important legislation, 
like the Bankruptcy Law and the Company Law.
 For the time being, these laws have not been 
implemented, for various reasons.  However, they 
are vital for a market economy.  Ignoring these laws 
creates a lot of abuses of property rights and 
uncertainties, such as suppression of minority 
shareholders’ rights, asset stripping, insider trading, 
slow restructuring, rigged bankruptcy procedures, 
etc.
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 Connected to the problem of properly defining 
and stabilizing property rights is the introduction of 
international accounting standards and procedures 
in the Serbian economy.  The existing Law on 
Accounting and Auditing is founded on these 
standards, but a lot of necessary supporting 
regulations are missing.  Professional organizations 
are weak and cannot impose codes of conduct, and 
proper education of accountants and auditors is 
lacking.  In practice, a narrow definition of audit 
objectives and procedures is implemented, which in 
many cases, leads to audits that conceal more than 
they reveal.  Therefore, the expectations of claimants 
of property rights are often frustrated, creating not 
only individual dissatisfaction, but also lack of 
confidence in capital markets.
 Parallel with these institutional changes, the 
government must strengthen the existing regulatory 
setting.  Several independent agencies with economic 
authority have been established, but they need a 
comprehensive regulatory environment in order to 
be effective.  Typically, these agencies do not have the 
authority to impose sanctions on economic agents, 
their expertise is quite limited due to the low quality 
of personnel, and they cannot hire experts with a 
limited budget.  Their budget structure is also 
inadequate, such that they are not in a position to 
make use of budgetary appropriations.  Sometimes 
these agencies even lack proper office space.  The 
government must focus on these and related 
problems, and it must respect independent rulings 
by these institutions, since they are vital for a market 
economy.  Among the priorities is the need to 
establish the Commission for Protection of 
Competition (Anti-Monopoly Commission), but 
also the need to give additional legal powers to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Radio-
Diffusion Agency.
 With each step toward strengthening property 
rights, the government would remove one crucial 
obstacle to investment, and, consequently, to 
economic growth.  Therefore, an Action Plan must 
be devised with clear objectives, a clear designation 
of the institutions involved and the persons in 
charge, a precise timeline (describing immediate, 
short-, mid-, and long-term measures to be taken). 
High-profile political support for such a reform is 
needed, as well as a public awareness campaign.
 The first steps in the struggle for the protection of 
property rights have already been taken by devising 
laws congruent with European standards, and Serbia 
entered the process of legislative harmonization with 
the strong support of the EU.  On the other hand, the 
first steps in combating corruption have not been 
taken yet.  These facts could suggest that the struggle 
with corruption assumes paramount importance. 
Of course, corruption’s effects on constraining 
economic growth could not be exaggerated.  But 
relaxing this constraint would be a long-term task 
that needs careful design and implementation.  This 
is not meant to become an excuse for doing nothing 
against corruption, but simply argues for a realistic 
notion that strengthening of property rights can be 
accomplished in the relatively short term, with 
almost immediate effects on economic growth, while 
the effects of an efficient anti-corruption campaign 
will come in the long run and in a roundabout way.
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	 	37.	 Competitiveness	of	Privatized	
Companies	
 The chapter establishes whether the companies 
that were privatized after 2001 became more efficient. 
The analysis is premised on the assumption that 
competitiveness of the firm, not mere change of 
ownership, should be the focus of the research on 
privatization.  Here, enhancing financial and 
operating efficiency implies an ability of the firm to 
accomplish four goals:  adopt the principles of 
corporate governance, detach itself from the state, 
enlarge its position in the market, and increase 
profitability. 
The data analyzed in this chapter present an 
extension of the survey data presented and analyzed 
in chapter 5.  It gives a fuller picture on how Serbian 
firms understand their role in a competitive market. 
	 38.	 Sample	and	Methodology
 The analysis in Part I is based on a survey of 31 
companies privatized through tenders in 2002 and 
2003 (Table 1).  The questionnaire was structured 
after, and rendered compatible with, a number of 
questionnaires used in Central and East Europe, in 
particular the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) by the World Bank. 
One significant difference from other surveys done 
after 1990 is that in the most of them, the sample 
consisted of both socially-owned and privatized 
companies, as well as firms that have never been 
socially-owned. 
 Other research was done by the Center for 
Liberal Democratic Studies from Belgrade in 2002. 
That study assesses only the changes in corporate 
governance, a subject that constitutes only one part 
of the analysis in this book.  Second, the Center’s 
study includes socially-owned enterprises as well as 
the companies privatized before 2001, whereas this 
chapter considers only privatized firms.  Lastly, we 
note a survey conducted by the Faculty of Economics 
of the University of Belgrade in 2003.   
7. Competitiveness of 
Privatized Enterprises
PART I: Corporate Governance After Privatization
 This study, however, assesses exclusively the 
attitudes of managers in privatized firms, and reduces 
the issue of restructuring to subjective values.  The 
ambition of this research was to establish the level of 
restructuring of newly private firms in an objective 
manner as much as possible. 
 The survey’s sample is taken out of the pool of firms 
privatized in 2002 and 2003.  A total of 879 firms were 
privatized (31 by tender and 88 by auction) during 
the first two years of the privatization program. 
The 879 firms are by no means representative of 
the structure of the Serbian economy.  The sample 
includes all 31 firms privatized by tender in 2002 and 
2003.  Originally, the population was meant to equal 
the sample, but 61% the firms agreed to fill in the 
questionnaire  (Table 1).  In most of the cases, general 
managers, financial managers, or legal departments 
of the firms filled in the questionnaire.  The survey 
was conducted in April-June 2005. 
 The research is based on a very small sample that 
is not statistically significant.  It cannot be said that 
it even properly reflects the body of the 880 firms 
privatized in 2002-2003, let alone the whole economy. 
The results are rather an illustration of what the 
effects of privatization are on particular firms, rather 
than grounds for sweeping generalizations about 
the effects of privatization for the Serbian economy. 
However, Part II of the research includes a sample 
of 81 companies (31 tender and 50 auction sales). 
This sample is more significant statistically, but the 
findings of Part II deal exclusively with financial 
ratio analysis.  (For more on the reliability of data 
and the sample for financial analysis, see section 
5.)
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	 39.	 Corporate	Governance
 Privatization does not necessarily imply separation 
of ownership and management.  In cases where 
one person bought the firm, she may be both the 
manager and the owner.  In such cases, the problem 
of corporate governance does not arise.  Most of the 
privatized firms in Serbia resulted in concentrated 
ownership: 70% of the shares were sold, and 30% 
of the shares were given out to employees of the 
privatizing firms, and citizens.  The survey tries to 
establish whether some privatized firms did in fact 
separate ownership from management, and to what 
extent they carried out necessary changes in running 
the firm.  The findings suggest an implementation of 
the principles of corporate governance.  The study 
focused on three aspects of corporate governance: 
a) relations between management and the owners; 
b) the position of small shareholders; and c) strikes 
during the working process.  
 The 200 company law introduced a major 
change in the relation between the board of 
directors and management.  Under previous 
legislation from 1996, a company’s general manager 
enjoyed enormous authority.  The board of directors 
typically was confined to a weak oversight function, 
and possessed little authority to override a general 
manager’s decisions.  Newer legislation gives boards 
the right to appoint managers.  The division of 
responsibilities between management and the 
owners now seem to be more properly balanced. 
63% of the firms said that the board of directors 
is composed of the people who are essentially 
independent from management.  21% responded 
that this was not the case, 10% responded with 
“partially”, and 5% with “I don’t know,” both of 
which can be interpreted as a “no. ” Regarding who 
holds the greatest power of decision-making in the 
firm, 57% of respondents said that it was the owner, 
26% answered that it was the board of directors, 
and 10% thought it was the manager.  The manager, 
however, has significant impact on the board of 
directors: 31% responded that manager “practically 
always” influences the board’s decision, and 63% 
responded that it happens “frequently. ” 58% of 
firms have internal written rules or regulations that 
deal with conflicts of interest between the members 
of management and the owners, but 37% have no 
such regulations. 
 These results deserve an observation.  Although 
the majority of the firms claim that the board 
of directors is independent from managers, the 
influence the manager has over the board suggests 
otherwise.  Perhaps, the answer to the question – 
“Is the board of directors really independent from 
the manager?” – can be inferred from the fact 
that 57% of firms do not pay out dividends.  This 
suggests that firm management is more successful 
than shareholders in promoting their respective 
interests. 
 Shareholders in general do seem to have some 
real power over management, but not all of them. 
As will be seen, the interests of small shareholders 
can hardly be said to be protected.  9% of the 
firms responded that shareholders have the ability 
to remove the manager.  57% said that the largest 
share of power in the company is reserved for the 
shareholders’ assembly, and 26% for the board of 
directors.  Only 10% of the firms responded that it is 
the manager who really calls the shots in the firm.  
 Taking into account the methods of privatization 
in Serbia after 2001, it is unlikely that the problem 
of protection of small shareholders appears in any 
dramatic form.  The reason is that, on the sale 
model, new owners are able to purchase more than 
a controlling stake, meaning that they would appear 
to have no significant motive to obstruct small 
shareholders in the attempt to sell shares to someone 
other than the majority owner or the manager. 
But this is precisely the point of this survey: it 
establishes that, when it comes to the freedom of 
small shareholders, the obstacles to selling shares 
have not been generated by the sale model set up by 
the 2001 privatization act. 
 Some results indicate that the right of small 
shareholders to liquidate their shares is not ensured 
by privatization.  58% of firms responded that small 
shareholders do not have the right to freely sell their 
shares to someone outside the company.  10% of the 
firms inform their shareholders about activities in the 
company by written materials, 57% attach the note 
on the blackboard and leave it to the shareholders’s 
personal insight, and only 26% of the firms permit 
the shareholders’s to learn about it upon request. 
The shareholder book (a book that contains the 
description of ownership structure) exists in 8% 
of the cases, but only 63% of the firms allow their 
shareholders to view it.  21% of the firms responded 
that “shareholders do have a right to examine the 
books but are not interested.” Small shareholders 
are also not always free to become familiar with the 
terms under which their company was sold: 7% do 
have the right to view the contract, 26% do not, and 
21% have the right to view the contract, but are not 
interested.  “Not interested” was here inserted as a 
control question: it is most likely that all those who 
are not interested do not actually know if they have 
that right. 
57% of the firms allow the shareholders to vote 
by mail and 36% do not.  A large majority of 8% 
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responded that shareholders who are also employees 
of the firm do not have more rights and privileges 
than shareholders who are not employees, but a 
minority of 10% responded that this was the case.  
 Corporate governance also implies paying more 
to those who want to work more.  Here, the findings 
document a poor understanding of how to motivate 
managers to be more efficient and competitive. 
Only 37% of the firms pay bonuses to the managers 
who try to perform better.  A large majority of 7% 
do not do that, and 10% did not know.  Employees 
are in a somewhat better position because 89% of 
the firms pay bonuses for working overtime. 
 If judged by the practice of divided pay outs, 
corporate governance and possession of private 
ownership does not pay off.  The survey found that 
57% of the firms do not pay out dividends to their 
shareholders.  This points to a rather low corporate 
culture in Serbian firms and relates to another 
finding to the effect that 55% of the firms do not 
have their shares quoted on the stock exchange.  (All 
of the firms are a publicly traded companies.)
 Strikes and workers’ protests have proven to 
be one of the major setbacks in the privatization 
process in Serbia so far.  This was particularly the 
case with firms in which the very privatization 
procedure was irregular.  The survey attempted to 
examine to what extent workers’ discontent after 
the privatization can block the governance of the 
firm.  The survey found that an average of 86% of 
the workforce of the surveyed firms belongs to the 
trade unions.  57% of those surveyed responded that 
trade unions play a “relatively significant role” in 
the life of the company, 10% said that unions play a 
“very important role,” and 31% responded that trade 
unions played no role in the company.  As much as 
8% of the firms had signed a collective agreement 
with the trade unions in the company.  This seems 
to have bearing on the absence of conflicts with 
trade union:  79% of firms responded that strikes 
and work lockout have never affected the work of 
the firm (even if it did occur), and 68% of the firms 
answered that strikes never occurred.  Most of the 
new owners (63%) have paid back wages when they 
took over the firm.  (In the rest (26%) there were  no 
back wage obligations upon takeover.) 
 The record shows that, one year after the 
privatization, corporate culture in the privatized 
firms is beginning to take root.  Further improvement 
in corporate legislation would certainly bring about 
further improvements in the practice of corporate 
governance. 
	 40.	 Competitiveness
 The findings suggest that a large number of the 
firms undertook some restructuring measures in 
the area of production so as to become more 
competitive.  Yet, the effects of  these measures vary. 
For example, the average share of all the companies 
in the domestic market declined from 52% to 7.7% 
after privatization, which suggests that some 
companies used to have monopoly  positions that 
are now waning.  
 Modes of production were also affected by 
privatization.  95% of firms responded that they 
introduced some new lines of production.  30% of 
privatized firms retained the same product lines, 
25% introduced some new products in addition to 
old ones, 15% introduced new products and 
abandoned the production of old ones (that had 
dominated the production structure before 
privatization), whereas  30% kept the old structure 
of the production but changed its share in the overall 
production.  After privatization, 50% of companies 
switched to new suppliers, whereas 35% kept some 
of their old suppliers, but also employed some new 
ones.  The client structure of the newly privatized 
firms is as follows: the government is a client in 15% 
of the cases, private companies in 100%, and socially 
owned companies in 85% of the cases.  
 The awareness of the need for product quality 
control seems to be on the rise, although very slowly. 
Only 30% of the firms have introduced some sort of 
quality standard (ISO or HACCP).  0% do not have 
it, and 30% still do not have it, but said it would 
obtain it soon.  The phasing in of quality standards 
is among the preconditions for entering the EU 
market.  The restructuring of firm departments 
seems also to have been taking place: 60% of the 
firms have a market research department, and 60% 
of the firms have a marketing department.  
 Some steps to enhance competitiveness of Serbian 
firms have been taken.  Firms are trying to compete 
by introducing new products, lines of production, 
and quality standards.  Yet the real indicator of 
competitiveness is the competitiveness of domestic 
firms on international markets.  Serbian firms 
overall are performing very poorly in this respect, 
as Serbia ran a 33. 7% trade deficit in 200.  Privatized 
companies appear to be no exception from the rest 
of the Serbian economy—75% of surveyed firms do 
not have offices outside Serbia & Montenegro.  
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	 41.	Detachment	from	the	Government
 The strongest resistance to privatization, and hence 
restructuring, in Central and Eastern Europe came 
from old (usually bad) managers facing an ‘endgame’ 
situation.  The resistance was indicative of the ties 
between the management and the government. 
Privatization is supposed to break these ties and 
detach the government from firm management.  
 Djankov and Murrell have shown that the 
enterprises that are more likely to restructure are the 
enterprises with concentrated rather than dispersed 
ownership structure (Djankov & Murrell 2000, 
10).  Since dispersed ownership leads to insufficient 
monitoring of incumbent managers, as the practice 
of the firms that were privatized in Serbia during the 
1990s shows, the restructuring of dispersed ownership 
will naturally face larger obstacles.  But this problem 
seems to have been solved by the application of the 
direct sale model that brought about concentrated 
ownership structures and thereby immensely 
facilitated the replacement of old managers.  This 
survey proves that the direct sale model applied in 
Serbia is immune to this obstacle.  Indeed, 70% of 
the firms reported the replacement of the general 
manager after privatization.   In fact, 30% of the firms 
reported the replacement of all managers. 
 Management turnover cannot be the sole indicator 
of restructuring.  New owners may wish to continue 
to use the state to extract subsidies (state capture). 
The majority of newly privatized firms detached 
themselves from the government.  The survey found 
that 65% of firms do not receive anything from the 
government.  25% receive subventions for export, 
10% are still subsidized.  In addition, 5% receive 
exemption from custom duties, and the state tolerates 
unpaid taxes by 5% of firms.  (More than one answer 
was allowed for this question.)
 Of interest is the answer to this question: ”how 
often have personal connections of the new owner 
helped solve the problems the company faced after 
the privatization?” 68% of those surveyed said that 
“this was the only way that the problems are solved,” 
whereas 31% responded with “here and there. ” This 
points to the weakness of state institutions (police, 
courts) and the reliance of the new owners on 
informal ties, some of which may have well included 
links to the government. 
 The following table suggests the extent to which 
the government was ready to tolerate delays in tax 
payment by privatized firms.  The question asked 
was: “how regularly does your firm pay taxes?
 The finding suggests that approximately one-third 
of firms pay taxes with a delay.  An identical question 
was posed to the firms in the study The Cost of Doing 
Business in Serbia in 2003, and the percentage of 
those who did not pay or refused to answer was much 
higher (The Cost of Doing Business in Serbia 2, 2003, 
117).”
	 42.	 Employment1
 Our research contradicts the prevailing view that 
reduction in the workforce of firms is not a major sign 
of restructuring.  In time, privatized firms, if they are 
reformed, decide to expand, which implies hiring.  In 
this view, increased employment, not layoffs, is a sign 
of successful restructuring.  However, some authors 
do not consider downsizing as part of strategic 
restructuring, but rather as a first step in corporate 
restructuring (Meyer 1998, 12).  Privatization, on the 
long run, increases employment, but in this survey, 
this distinction between the two phases is irrelevant, 
for the aim here is to measure restructuring in the 
short run, namely in the first year after privatization. 
Regularly
 (%)
With delay
 (%)
By order of 
inspector 
(%)
Did not pay 
(%)
Did not have 
basis to pay
a) Purchase tax 68,4 15,8 0 5,3 0
b) Cirporate tax 57,9 31,6 0 0 0
c) Retirement and social benefits contribution 57,9 31,6 0 0 0
d) Real estate tax 57,9 26,3 5.3 0 0
e) Building tax 63,2 21,1 0 5,3 0
f ) Local tax 57,9 26,3 0 5,3 0
Table 1.  Question: How regularly does your firm pay taxes?
1The data on employment were extracted from financial statements, meaning that they refer to the full sample of 31 companies.
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 The analysis documents a drop in employment by 
25% among the tender-privatized firms.  Over 90% of 
firms experienced some reduction in their labor force. 
Among the 50 auction-privatized firms, the situation 
is the same.  88% of the firms reduced the workforce, 
which on average dropped by 62%.  This finding is in 
line with the privatization record to date in Central 
East Europe, a record that suggests that employment 
decline is essential for successful restructuring. 
However, it seems that in the case of auctions, the 
drop of 62% was exaggerated.  It is possible that some 
firms laid off more than they needed in order to 
reduce or avoid social and retirement benefits for the 
employees. 
	 43.	 Financing	the	Firm
 Financial consolidation will be addressed in Part 
II where financial analysis of the firms will be done in 
detail.  This section analyzes the resources for firms’ 
financing.  
 When asked what their two most dominant sources 
of investment were, survey respondents answered 
with the following: 
 The fact that 60% of financing is coming from 
personal investment and 50% from bank credits, but 
only 15% from retained earnings, suggests that the 
privatized firms are still not able to generate enough 
profit to support themselves financially.  Moreover, 
the firms do not seem to be interested in attracting 
fresh money from external sources.  The bulk of firms 
(70%) is not interested in attracting new investors, 
shares of the 55% of the firms are not quoted on 
the stock exchange, even though 65% of the firms 
claim they are getting ready to issue new shares to be 
quoted on the market.  These findings confirm that 
the institutions of financial markets are weak and 
unattractive for the majority of the firms.  
 The following question suggests that financial 
discipline imposed by banks is rather weak.  When 
asked what creditors would do if their firm defaulted 
on loans, 0% responded that the bank would 
postpone repayment without changing the conditions. 
15% said that the bank would postpone repayment 
but would increase interest rates, and 20% responded 
that the bank would not do anything because credit is 
insured.  Weak financial discipline is a substitute for 
hard budget constraints.  The absence of hard budget 
constraints suggests the absence of restructuring. 
	 44.	 Conclusions
 This part of our research shows that freshly 
private firms are implementing the principles of 
corporate governance and are adapting to a new 
situation where the government does not play an 
essential role in production.  Yet, restructuring 
appears to be slow and uneven.   It may have to do 
with governance structure, but it also may have 
to do with the conditions for privatization (so-
called social and investment plans that have to be 
submitted to participate in a privatization tender). 
The unattractiveness and underdevelopment of the 
economic environment, especially financial markets, 
is still affecting restructuring of firms.  
Source %
Retained earnings 15
Personal investment of owner 60
Bank credits 50
Shares 10
Direct investments 10
Leasing 5
State subsidies 0
Credits from connected parties 10
Note: More than one answer was requested. 
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PART II: Financial Consolidation After 
Privatization
	 45.	 Methodology	for	Financial		
	 Analysis
 This part relies on financial ratio analysis that 
measures and compares pre- and post-privatization 
financial and operating performance of 81 Serbian 
companies.  The sample consists of 31 firms privatized 
by tender and 50 by auction in 2002 and 2003.  The 
data were extracted from financial statements of 
the firms obtained by the Solvency Centre (Centar 
za bonitet) at the National Bank of Serbia in May 
2005.  Since the data for all firms were available, 
the population and the sample match.  The t-test for 
significance has, therefore, not been run.  
 All companies that are surveyed were able to 
produce financial data comparable to pre-divestiture 
data.  What was compared here was the data from 
the last year before privatization (YEAR -1) with the 
first year after the privatization (YEAR 1).  The year 
of privatization defined as YEAR 0 is not taken into 
the calculus, as this year implied a simultaneously 
social and private status of the firm.  
 Table 2 gives the overview of all the ratios that 
were employed in the analysis.  Table 3 gives the 
items (so-called positions) that were extracted from 
financial statements to calculate ratios.  The major 
reason why the data in this part were extracted from 
a separate source (other than the questionnaire used 
in Part I) is that most firms did not want to answer the 
questions about profit in the questionnaire, thinking 
probably that these should remain confidential. 
 Although the data for financial analysis were 
extracted directly from financial statements, it is 
difficult to believe that these statements were fully 
reliable.  Approximately 50% of the companies 
reported neither profit nor loss in their financial 
statements because of which all the ratios factoring 
in net income (ROS, ROA, SALEFF and NIEFF) are 
adversely affected.  Unreported profit hints at rigging 
financial statements because it is difficult to believe 
that such a large proportion of firms experienced 
exactly zero loss or profit.  
 The data on employment also appear to be 
exaggerated and unrealistic.  Although auction sales 
involved small and medium-sized firms (including 
up to 250 workers), one firm sold in auction reported 
the employment of 0,000 prior to divestiture and 
only 332 after the divestiture. 
 For both manipulations there are explanations. 
Income was not reported most likely in order to 
evade taxes.  Abnormally huge reductions in work 
force are most likely a consequence of the wish to 
keep employees without reporting them to tax 
authorities and paying full social and retirement 
benefits tax (the rate for which in Serbia runs as high 
as 70%).  It is difficult to imagine that a firm with 
0,000 workers can, in only two years, continue to 
do business with only 332 employed.  It is possible 
that the real number of employees was higher but 
that they were not officially registered. 
* * *
 There are three commonly used standards to make 
use of financial ratios: rule-of-thumb measures, 
past performance, and industry norms (Needles 
& Powers 2000, 691).  Rule-of-thumb and industry 
norms cannot be employed in Serbia because these 
are not established.  This leaves past performance 
of the company as the only valid measure.  The idea 
of the analysis was not to compare firms with one 
another (which would be a typical requirement of an 
investor), but rather to compare the firms, as it were, 
with their respective previous incarnations, namely 
with the position for each firm as existed before 
divestiture.  
 In order to render the research findings 
comparable with previous findings on privatization, 
the selection of ratios (Table 2) was based on previous 
research by Megginson, Nash & van Randenborgh 
(199), Boubakri & Cosset (1998), Megginson & 
D’Souza (1999), and Aussenegg & Jelic (2002). 
 The ideal relationship is supposed to document 
an increase in value in most of the indicators. 
Profitability, operating efficiency, investment, 
and output are expected to increase in companies 
that moved from public to private ownership.  In 
leveraged cases, however, the situation is predicted to 
be the reverse.  State-sponsored companies were able 
to borrow under favorable conditions.  Privatization 
should lead to higher borrowing costs, thus resulting 
in leverage decline. 
 Liquidity is the only indicator that does not 
appear in previous research.  It is used here as an 
essential form of measuring the financial strength 
of a company, and is expected to increase as the 
company switches from social to private status. 
	 46.	 Profitability
 One way to measure profit is to calculate return 
on sales and return on its asset ratio.  The return on 
Competitiveness of Privatized Enterprises
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy 2006: Growth Diagnostics
122
sales ratio (net income before taxes divided by sales), 
which is essentially the profit margin of a firm, shows 
an average decline of 169%.  In both years return on 
sales was negative, meaning that for each dinar of 
sales a loss of 0.06 dinars in YEAR -1 and a loss of 
0.18 dinars in YEAR 1, respectively, was recorded. 
Firms sold in auction display the opposite tendency. 
The average profit margin increased from -1.03 to -
0.33, up by 68%.  Over 50% of firms saw an increase 
in both cases.  (Results for all ratios are presented in 
tables  and 5.) 
 The return on sales ratio does not take into account 
the asset needed to generate operating profit.  The 
return on asset ratio measures how effectively the 
company deploys its assets.  The analysis shows that 
the return on asset ratio, on average, nose-dived by 
300%.  Again, in both years, the average return was 
negative, which indicates overall poor management 
of firms’ assets.  Each dinar of firms’ assets produced 
an average loss of 0.02 dinars in YEAR -1 and a loss 
of 0.07 dinars in YEAR 1, respectively.  Auction sales 
again saw an increase from -0.83 in YEAR -1 to -0.22 
in YEAR 1, up by 26%. 
 The high negative percentage change in tender 
sales suggests that, overall, firms before and after 
privatization were unable to control costs relative to 
revenues, and that high costs continued to obstruct 
higher profitability.  However, section 2 shows 
that firms managed to reduce their labor force, 
which means that some costs were cut.  Decline 
in profitability is, thus, most likely to be the result 
of misstating net income, namely—the practice 
according to which firms do not report profit in order 
to evade taxes.  A number of firms in their financial 
statements either did not report their net income for 
the observed period or simply stated 0 for profit or 
loss, or sometimes for both.  
 It is difficult to explain what caused the increase in 
profit with the firms sold in auction.  It could be that 
smaller firms were less afraid to report profit because 
the profit in absolute terms was lower.  Or it could be 
that smaller firms restructure faster.  Other research 
done in Latin America, Africa and Central and 
Eastern Europe during the 1990s do not point to a 
unanimous conclusion.  For instance, research made 
by Boubakri and Cosset (1998) found profitability 
increase by 12%.  D’Souza and Megginson found 
statistically significant small increases in return on 
sales and asset ratios (1999, 13).  However, Aussenegg 
& Jelic found an increase in return on sale ratios but 
a decrease in return on asset ratios (2002, 12).  (Add 
what region for each research.)
	
	 47.	 Operating	Efficiency
 In this study, two ratios serve as proxies for 
operating efficiency: sales efficiency (inflation-
adjusted sales per employee) implies the ability of the 
company to generate profit, and net income efficiency 
(inflation-adjusted net income per employee).  The 
ratio is supposed to show if restructuring has lead 
firms to use their resources more efficiently.  In both 
cases, tenders and auctions, the average sales efficiency 
ratio increased and the net income efficiency ratio 
decreased.  Sales income efficiency increased a lot 
because, as data on employment showed, around 90% 
of firms reduced their workforces.  However, since 
the reduction of workforces in some cases seems to 
be unrealistic, this is what made the sales income 
efficiency ratio increase unrealistically in absolute 
terms for particular firms, thus biasing the aggregate 
ratio.  This was also probably the case with net income 
efficiency.  Namely, beside total employment that went 
underreported in YEAR 1, net income, as suggested 
in the previous section, was misstated.  Two misstated 
sets of data (income plus employment) most likely 
have led to absurd changes in net income efficiency 
ratios in absolute terms.
 Although the absolute numbers are unreliable, 
they may be reliable in showing trends.  Sales 
efficiency most likely did increase because some 
work force was reduced.  It is likely that the increase 
in sales efficiency was not followed by an increase in 
net income efficiency.  Firms have managed to sell 
more, but they did not manage to keep costs low. 
This is entirely consistent with the results obtained 
by ROS and ROA analysis from the previous section. 
Costs have increased much more than sales perhaps 
because firms increased debt (confirmed by findings 
on leverage in section 9) or because some firms 
were inactive prior to privatization and then had to 
purchase a lot of fixed capital to restart production. 
 Operating efficiency was found to increase in 
Boubakri & Cosset’s research (by 25% in sales 
efficiency and 63% in net income efficiency).  Similar 
results were obtained by D’Souza & Megginson (1999, 
1).  In contrast, Aussenegg & Jelic found a significant 
mean decrease in efficiency after privatization (2002, 
15).  
	 48.	 Capital	Investment	Spending		
	 and		Output
 
 Aussenegg & Jelic found an increase in investment 
after divestiture (2002, 16) and Boubakri & Cosset 
found a 126% increase in capital expenditures to sales 
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after privatization.  D’Souza & Megginson, in contrast, 
found that capital investment decreases (1999, 1). 
 Higher capital investment than expected in the 
post-privatization period partly materialized in 
Serbian privatized firms.  Two proxies were used to 
establish the level of investment after privatization. 
The mean capital expenditure to sales ratio shows 
an increase of 100%, whereas the mean capital 
expenditure to asset ratio shows an increase of 116%. 
However, the reverse trends are recorded with auction 
sales.  Both ratios, CES and CETA, show a decrease of 
16% and 1%, respectively. 
 The trends were reversed with respect to output 
(using the nominal sales/consumer price index). 
Output fell by 10% with tender sales, and increased 
by 3% with auctions. 
 The findings from this section are in line with 
other findings, especially with those from the section 
on leverage.  The firms increased their debt that will 
most likely in the future lead to increases in output. 
However, it is too early to expect a significant increase 
in output in YEAR 1.  The usual explanation is that 
higher output before privatization was, to an extent, 
sponsored by the state.  This is again confirmed by the 
difference in output between tender privatizations 
(larger firms) and auction privatizations (smaller 
firms).  Since the state’s help is supposed to be 
withdrawn after divestiture, negative output could 
also be a sign of restructuring rather than the absence 
thereof.  In addition, larger firms are adapting more 
slowly than smaller firms to the new situation, which 
results in negative output.  Other research, once again, 
could be interpreted as supporting either conclusion. 
Boubakri & Cosset found an increase in output by 
25%.  D’Souza & Megginson found a spectacular 
increase of 270% (1999, 15).  Jelic & Aussenegg’s 
research revealed, however, a decline in output by 
16% (2002, 17). 
	 49.	 Leverage
 In the socialist era, firms used credits to cover 
losses rather than to invest.  This practice largely 
remained in force during the Milosevic era.  Leverage 
shows whether the firm relies more on stockholders’ 
equity or on credits.  Creditors prefer low debt ratios, 
but stockholders are typically more interested in 
financing firms with borrowed funds because the 
debt can “leverage up” the rate on return to equity. 
Leverage is measured here by the debt ratio (total 
debt to total asset). 
 Hard budget constraints and the abolishment of 
subsidies to socially owned enterprises should lead 
to more expensive credits.  However, if privatization 
is followed by the expansion of capital markets, new 
owners will face more opportunities to borrow from 
banks.  In their research, Aussenegg and Jelic found 
no statistically significant increase in leverage (2002, 
19), whereas D’Souza et al.  found a statistically 
significant decline of 6 percentage points (1999, 16). 
In our tender sample, the leverage ratio shows a mean 
increase from % to 13%, up 225%.  A portion of 5% 
of the firms experienced an increase in leverage after 
privatization.   A similar trend is detected with smaller 
(auction) firms where the leverage ratio increased by 
21%.
 Determining the optimal amount of debt is a 
complicated process.  Generally, if the market is 
stable, the firm can make a profit even if the debt ratio 
is high.  When the economy goes into a recession, 
high leverage exposes firms to risk.  Since the analysis 
shows that the population’s debt ratio increased, it 
could suggest that the firms want to use more leverage 
to boost production.  However, the analysis from the 
previous sections suggest that the firms could not pull 
off an increase in output, profit, and efficiency, despite 
the fact that the macroeconomic circumstances in 
200 were favorable and the economy grew by over 
8%.  
 It is too early to tell whether the privatized firms 
are properly leveraged and whether the assets were 
employed properly. Most of the firms have accumulated 
huge debts in the socialist and the Milosevic era. 
Companies cannot get rid of such debt (known as 
bad debt) within one year.  It takes time to distinguish 
bad debt from leverage.  Secondly, the effective results 
of the leverage debts that increase production (and 
potential profitability) should come in 2005 or 2006. 
As the findings from the survey suggest, at this point, 
increased leverage seems to be a burden, for 25% of the 
firms identify big debts as among the most dominant 
factors that obstruct the production.  Among others 
are bureaucratic procedures (cited by 20% of firms), 
and upfront payments for working capital (10% 
of firms).  Something else (mainly left unstated) is 
identified in 25% of the cases.  65% of  firms owe 
money to suppliers, 5% owe banks, and only 5% owe 
the government.  It is easier to reschedule repayment 
terms to another firm (e.g., a supplier) than to a bank, 
which is another indicator about financial discipline 
and underdeveloped financial markets that block 
faster restructuring. 
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	 50.	 Liquidity
 Problems with liquidity arise when the company 
meets unexpected needs for cash.  The current ratio 
(current assets relative to current liabilities) is one of 
the most commonly used ratios for measuring the 
liquidity of a firm.  It shows a firm’s ability to pay its 
bills and outstanding loans.  If current debt is rising 
faster than current assets, the current ratio falls, and 
the firm is in trouble.  The analysis found a decrease 
in liquidity as measured by the current ratio.  It 
fell by 0.5%, which shows that newly privatized 
firms are facing problems in liquidity management. 
The mean current ratio also fell by 2. 75% in the 
auction sample.  This explains why Serbian banks 
are reluctant to extend credits under less expensive 
interest rates.  
 The quick ratio indicates the ability to manage 
short-term liquid assets arising from cash 
transactions, investment of cash, and extension of 
credit.  This definition of assets typically excludes 
inventories and refers to assets that can be cashed 
relatively quickly.  The research recorded a decline 
in the average quick ratio by 3%.  The auction firm 
sample analysis records a slight increase in the quick 
ratio by 0. 99%. 
	 51.	 Conclusions
 The findings from this part of the analysis 
document low profits, high indebtedness, high cost of 
production, and difficulties with cash management. 
Reported low profits are consistent with low financing 
from retained earnings.  It is likely that in the first 
year of privatization, the restructuring of the labor 
force is taking place, as are significant investments, 
while increased profitability will only come later. 
 A decline in ratios that measure liquidity is 
indicative of the need for cash.  However, it can hardly 
be argued that scarce cash is the sole responsibility 
of the business sector.  It is most likely because of the 
weak financial system that the firms are reluctant to 
borrow from banks.  Another potential conclusion 
would be that borrowing is avoided because the 
rate of return is low.  Fiscal and monetary policy 
also affect to a great extent the circulation of money 
(See MAT 5/2005, pp.  25-27).  It is thus up to the 
government to set better economic policy in order 
for the firms to manage their cash management 
better. 
 It is certain that privatization did bring about 
changes.  The findings indicate that companies are 
having a hard time adapting to the new situation. 
Therefore, the decline in the ratios might suggest 
restructuring rather than the absence thereof. 
However, if the trend does not reverse in the 
consequent years, it would mean that restructuring 
either failed or was abandoned. 
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No. Name
Year of 
privatization 
Identity 
number
Reasons why not responded to 
questionnaire
1. Beočinska fabrika cementa 2002. 08028222
2. Kosjerić 2002. 07190425
3. Novi Popovac 2002. 07112904
4. Merima 2002. 07102160 Manager not interested
5. Valjaonica bakra 2002. 07606273
6. Jedinstvo šećerana (MK) 2002. 08096198
7. Donji Srem (MK) 2002. 08071624
8. Šajkaška 2002. 08058075
9. Jugozapadna Bačka (MK) 2002. 08024723
Financial director thought that MK 
Commerce would not agree
10. Zorka farma 2002. 07199821
11. Zdravlje 2002. 07204817
12. PKS-Lateks 2002. 07326947
13. Rumaguma 2003. 08250600 Manager did not have time
14. Crvenka 2003. 08004617 Claimed to have sent it
15. Žitopek 2003. 07204124
16. PKB Frikom 2003. 07042728
17. Mitrovačka industrija ventila 2003. 08039453 Filed for bankruptcy
18. Polet 2003. 08019916 Manager did not care
19. Putnik 2003. 07034377
20. Kolubara – gasbeton 2003. 07440626
21. Jelen Do 2003. 07219784
22. Frad 2003. 07187505 Manager not interested
23. Nissal 2003. 17138367
24. Srbija-turist 2003. 07173598
25. DIN 2003. 07319665 Rejected because “it slows down production” 
26. DIV 2003. 07178972 Manager had no time
27. Beopetrol 2003. 07524951 Secretary refused to give terminate answer
28. Fabrika kablova Zaječar 2003. 07147350
29. Sava Kovačević 2003. 08065888
30. Valjaonica bakra Sevojno 2003. 07606273
31. Južni Banat 2003.
Table 1: The list of 31 Firms Sold by Tender in 2002 and 2003
Annex
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Variable Proxy Predicted Relationship
1. Profitability Return on sales: net income/sales ROS1>ROS-1a
Return on asset (net income/total asset)) ROA1>ROA-1
2. Operating efficiency Sales efficiency: sales/total employment SALEFF1>SALEFF-1
Net income efficiency: net income/total employment NIEFF1>NIEFF-1
3. Capital investment Capital expenditure to sales CESA1>CESA-1
Capital expenditure to total assets CETA1>CETA-1
4. Output Real sales: nominal sales/consumer price index SAL1>SAL-1
5. Employment Post-privatization<pre-privatization Post<pre
6. Leverage Debt to asset: total debt/total asset TDTA1<TDTA-1
7. Liquidity Quick ratio: short term liquid asset/current liabilities QR1>QR-1
Current ratio: current assets/current liabilities CR1>CR-1
Table 2. Financial ratios to be used in financial analysis of the firm
Variable Items 2001-2003. Column Items 2004. Column
1. Profitability
AOP 021
AOP 275
AOP 273
5
5
5
AOP 201
AOP 228
AOP 226
5
5
5
2.  Operating efficiency AOP 789 5 AOP 538 4
3.  Capital investment AOP 637 6
AOP 503
AOP 501
4
4
4. Output
6. Leverage
AOP 124
AOP 054
5
7, 4
AOP 109
AOP 020
5
5
7. Liquidity AOP 024 7 AOP 010 5
AOP 131 5 AOP 114 5
AOP 044+031 7 AOP 012 5
Table 3. Financial statements Items that were used to calculate ratios
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Variable Before After Absolute Difference
Percentage 
change
Proportion of firms: 
after>before (in %)
Profitability
ROS (%) -0,068 -0,183 -0,115 169 51,6
ROA (%) -0,019 -0,076 -0,057 300 38,7
Efficiency
SALEFF 1,771 2,459 688 38 83,9
NIEFF -53,39 -343,3 -289,9 -543 41
Capital investment
CES (%) 0,14 0,24 0,14 100 87,1
CETA (%) 0,06 0,13 0,07 116 74,1
Output
RSAL 2.141.986 1.945.190 -196.769 -10 41,9
Employment
EMPL 983 736 -247 25,13 90
Leverage
LTDTA (%) 0,04 0,13 0,09 225 54
Liquidity
CR 2,22 1,32 -0,90 -40,54 29
QR 1,00 0,66 -0,33 -33 35
Table : Results of Finacial Analysis – Tender Sales
Variable Before After Absolute Difference Percentage change
Proportion of firms: 
after>before (in %)
Profitability
ROS (%) -1,03 -0,33 0,70 68 58
ROA (%) -0,83 -0,61 0,22 26 54
Efficiency
SALEFF 5,6 490 484 8650 92
NIEFF -0,71 -58,36 -57,65 -8119 44
Capital investment
CES (%) 0,31 0,26 -0,05 -16 44
CETA (%) 0,12 0,07 -0,05 -41 46
Output 43.863 45.194 1.331 3 48
RSAL
Employment
EMPL 7.814 2.974 -4.840 -61,94 88
Leverage
LTDTA (%) 0,014 0,044 0,03 214 24
Liquidity
CR 1,09 1,06 -0,03 -2,75 21
QR 0,67 1,66 0,99 149 50
Table 5: Results of Finacial Analysis – Auction Sales
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 This analysis concludes that the most critical 
bottleneck to sustainable growth in Serbia today is 
the weak protection of property rights.
 To best illustrate that claim, consider the 
relationship between property rights and bank credits 
to industry.  Many think that both today in Serbia 
present obstacles to faster growth.  Property rights are 
weakly protected, which dissuades investors from 
investing, and credits for industry are expensive, 
which discourages enterprises from borrowing.  The 
first obstacle, according to Rodrik’s outline, falls 
under the heading of micro risks, relative to the area 
of appropriability, while the credit problem falls 
under the heading of financing problems (see graph 
model 1 in section 16).  Expensive credits are clearly 
an obstacle to faster growth, but the analysis shows 
that high interest rates are explained by high political 
risk, that is, the inefficient court and justice system. 
The reasons for bad financing opportunities are, 
therefore, located in the non-financial sphere.  Foreign 
banks, which by the end of 2005 dominated the 
market in Serbia compensate for political risk with 
high interest rates.  An efficient judiciary, especially 
in the area of protecting property rights, would reduce 
that risk.
 Other than that, the data reported in section 23 
and  the analysis from sections 31 and 32 point to 
the conclusion that the banking system is on the road 
to recovery.  By contrast, the analysis from section 2 
and the analysis from sections 31 and 32 show that 
the court system, especially the commercial court 
system where economic cases are resolved, represents 
one of the most inefficient and corrupt institutions in 
Serbia.
 This is not to argue that enhancing property rights 
will solve all of Serbia’s economic problems.  Indeed, 
our analysis identified a number of problems across 
the economic and institutional spectrum.  Rather, our 
task was to seek out the best next step in the sequencing 
of reform with the aim of maximizing return on 
growth of the Serbian economy.
 The Growth Diagnostics model sets a priority 
among obstacles, on the basis of the speed with which 
the obstacle can be eliminated.  For corruption, it is 
not completely clear what influence it has on growth 
8. Conclusion:  
Growth Diagnostics -Improving 
the Protection of Property Rights
in the short term.  The protection of property rights is 
a bottleneck that can be broken in a relatively short 
period.  In chapters , 5 and 7, we listed many 
problems that are based on poor protection of 
property rights.  To solve each of them, years are not 
necessary, but rather weeks or months, in the worst 
case.  Let us take, for example, the result from the 
survey on privatized enterprises (section 39), 
according to which 37% of small shareholders do not 
have the right to inspect the list of shareholders.  The 
violation of the rights of small shareholders is obvious, 
but the solution to the problem is simply demanding 
respect and protection of the legal requirements by 
which small shareholders have the right at any 
moment to inspect the ownership structure of 
enterprises whose owners they are.  A similar situation 
exists with enterprises whose shares are traded 
publicly on the stock exchange, but whose ownership 
structure is not accessible to the public.  It would only 
require legal changes in the form of amendments for 
the publishing of ownership structures to become an 
obligation of publicly traded enterprises and the 
bottleneck would be removed.
 A special problem for protecting ownership rights 
is the motivation to obey the law.  In many cases, the 
legal solutions are good, but there is no suitable 
penalty for actors for failing to respect the law.  For 
example, all enterprises must deliver annual financial 
statements to the Center for Solvency.  The statements 
must be an objective and accurate review of the 
enterprise at that moment.  But, as shown in the 
survey on privatized firms, some enterprises do not 
even submit such statements. The reason for not 
respecting that rule most probably has to do with the 
fact that the Center for Solvency (or some other 
body), except for warnings, does not have any kind of 
means at its disposal to punish enterprises that submit 
inaccurate statements.  A similar situation exists with 
enterprise managers who refuse to sign the prospectus 
that is a condition for trading shares on the stock 
exchange.  As the case of C-Market showed long ago, 
the sanctions that existed for violations were obviously 
not enough of a motive for managers to respect the 
rule.  All that is required is to make sanctions a 
criminal matter, and the degree of compliance with 
the law would probably be greater.  And that is one 
bottleneck that is possible to remove with a simple 
change of the law in a short timespan.
Conclusion
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